Leonard P. Gonzalez, Jr. v. State of Florida
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Opinion
Supreme Court of Florida ____________
No. SC2023-0740 ____________
LEONARD P. GONZALEZ, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.
December 14, 2023
GROSSHANS, J.
In this death-penalty case, Leonard P. Gonzalez, Jr., seeks
review of a nonfinal order entered by the circuit court. We deny
Gonzalez’s petition, concluding that the review he seeks must come
at a later time, if at all.
Facts
Gonzalez robbed, shot, and killed a married couple in their
home in Escambia County. Based on those events, the State
charged Gonzalez with home-invasion robbery and two counts of
first-degree murder. A jury found him guilty as charged and, following the penalty-phase hearing, recommended a sentence of
death for each murder by a ten-to-two vote. Accepting the jury’s
recommendations, the trial court imposed two death sentences.
Gonzalez appealed, raising twelve issues for our review. We
found no reversible error and concluded that competent,
substantial evidence supported his first-degree murder convictions.
Gonzalez v. State, 136 So. 3d 1125, 1140-69 (Fla. 2014).
Accordingly, we affirmed his convictions and sentences. Id. at
1135, 1169.
Following the United States Supreme Court’s denial of
certiorari review, see Gonzalez v. Florida, 574 U.S. 880 (2014),
Gonzalez filed a motion in the circuit court asking that his
convictions and sentences be vacated, cf. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851
(establishing rules for collateral challenges in death-penalty cases).
In an amendment to that motion, Gonzalez requested relief under
Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d
40 (Fla. 2016) (on remand). In response to the amendment, the
State conceded that Gonzalez was entitled to a new penalty phase
under Hurst v. State. Consistent with the State’s concession, the
circuit court vacated and set aside Gonzalez’s death sentences and
-2- ordered a new penalty phase. The court, however, denied Gonzalez
any other relief.
Since that ruling, death-penalty law in Florida has undergone
significant changes. In the wake of Hurst v. State, the Legislature
codified that decision’s jury-unanimity requirement. Ch. 2017-1,
§ 1, Laws of Fla. Just three years later, though, we partially
receded from Hurst v. State, holding that juror unanimity is not a
constitutional requirement. State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 507
(Fla. 2020). Then, this year, the Legislature amended the death-
penalty statute and removed the unanimity requirement: the
statute now authorizes a death recommendation if eight or more
jurors determine that death is the appropriate punishment. Ch.
2023-23, § 1, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 921.141(2)-(3), Fla. Stat.
(2023)).
Following this legislative change, Gonzalez sought an order
declaring that the amended statute does not apply in his case. In
part, Gonzalez argued that application of the amended statute
would be unconstitutional, would violate certain preclusion
doctrines, and would be inconsistent with the presumption that
substantive statutes should apply prospectively. The circuit court,
-3- however, disagreed with Gonzalez, ruling that the amended statute
would apply at his upcoming penalty phase. 1 In response to that
adverse ruling, Gonzalez filed the petition that is now before us.
Analysis
Gonzalez seeks to invoke our all-writs authority as well as our
authority to issue writs of prohibition. See art. V, § 3(b)(7), Fla.
Const. On the merits, he primarily argues that the circuit court
was wrong in ruling that the new statute could be lawfully applied
at his upcoming penalty phase. We, however, do not reach the
merits of Gonzalez’s petition. Instead, we conclude that the relief
sought is not available by way of prohibition or our all-writs
authority.
Under article V, section 3(b)(7), we have discretionary
authority to issue writs of prohibition. Such writs are preventative
and operate to preclude a lower court from acting in excess of its
jurisdiction. English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293, 297 (Fla. 1977)
(“Prohibition lies to prevent an inferior tribunal from acting in
excess of jurisdiction but not to prevent an erroneous exercise of
1. The court denied Gonzalez’s motion for rehearing.
-4- jurisdiction.” (citing Burkhart v. Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial
Circuit, 1 So. 2d 872 (1941))); Mintz Truppman, P.A. v. Cozen
O’Connor, PLC, 346 So. 3d 577, 580 (Fla. 2022) (discussing scope of
writ of prohibition). Here, the circuit court certainly has
jurisdiction to conduct the new penalty phase; indeed, it must do so
if it is to impose a new death sentence. See State v. Okafor, 306 So.
3d 930, 933-35 (Fla. 2020); State v. Jackson, 306 So. 3d 936, 940
(Fla. 2020). Such jurisdiction would not be affected by the court’s
decision to apply the new statute, either in instructing the jury or in
ultimately rendering its sentence. Accordingly, a writ of prohibition
could not supply the relief Gonzalez requests.
Gonzalez fares no better in seeking to invoke our all-writs
power. We have long recognized that the all-writs provision does
not give us “added appellate jurisdiction.” Williams v. State, 913 So.
2d 541, 543 (Fla. 2005); see also St. Paul Title Ins. Corp. v. Davis,
392 So. 2d 1304, 1305 (Fla. 1980). Since this writ “operates as an
aid to the Court in exercising its ‘ultimate jurisdiction,’ conferred
elsewhere in the constitution,” Williams, 913 So. 2d at 543, “its use
is restricted to preserving jurisdiction that has already been invoked
or protecting jurisdiction that likely will be invoked in the future,”
-5- Okafor, 306 So. 3d at 933 (quoting Roberts v. Brown, 43 So. 3d 673,
677 (Fla. 2010)). Gonzalez has failed to show how issuance of a
writ here is necessary to preserve or protect our jurisdiction.
We note two things. First, if the circuit court was to impose
the death penalty, we would have appellate jurisdiction under
section 3(b)(1) to review that sentence. In such a proceeding,
Gonzalez could advance arguments like the ones presented in his
petition. And second, the circuit court’s adverse ruling on the
applicability of the new statute does not alter the nature of the
proceedings below. Like other capital defendants, Gonzalez will
have the opportunity to challenge the State’s aggravating evidence,
present his own mitigating evidence, and argue to the jury and
judge that a life sentence is the appropriate punishment in his case.
Conclusion
For these reasons, we deny Gonzalez’s petition. 2
It is so ordered.
2. We have considered other discretionary-writ provisions in section 3(b) and conclude that they would not support the nonfinal review that he seeks. Nor would a motion to compel mandate support immediate review either.
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