Leon Williams v. Department of Homeland Security

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJune 4, 2026
DocketDC-1221-24-0748-W-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Leon Williams v. Department of Homeland Security (Leon Williams v. Department of Homeland Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Leon Williams v. Department of Homeland Security, (Miss. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

LEON BERNARD WILLIAMS, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DC-1221-24-0748-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND DATE: June 4, 2026 SECURITY, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Leon Bernard Williams , Atlanta, Georgia, pro se.

Linda M. Aragon , Esquire, and Shari Manasseh Ohri , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

Ivonne Cruz Serrano , Esquire, Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, for the agency.

BEFORE

Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman James J. Woodruff II, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal without prejudice to refiling. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board ‘s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). We FORWARD this matter to the Washington Regional Office for docketing and adjudication as a refiled appeal. On July 3, 2024, the appellant filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) asserting that the agency constructively removed him in retaliation for engaging in protected whistleblower activity. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 10, Tab 3 at 19-26, 39-40. On July 22, 2024, OSC advised the appellant that it was terminating its inquiry and provided him with notice of his right to file an IRA appeal and seek corrective action from the Board. IAF, Tab 3 at 39-40. The appellant timely filed the instant IRA appeal. IAF, Tab 1. Because he alleged that his participation in an equal employment opportunity (EEO) investigation was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take personnel actions against him, the administrative judge dismissed the appeal without prejudice to refiling, pending the Board’s reconsideration decision or the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Reese v. Department of the Navy, 2025 MSPB 1. IAF, Tab 3 at 19-26, 39-40, Tab 14, Initial Decision (ID). He advised the appellant that he could refile his appeal no later than 45 days after the Reese reconsideration decision. ID at 2. 3

The appellant has filed a petition for review arguing that the administrative judge abused his discretion in dismissing the appeal because it unfairly prejudices him. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 6-9. 2 Specifically, he asserts that it requires him to monitor the Board’s public decisions to determine whether and when the reconsideration decision in Reese is issued, and then to calculate and meet a new 45-day refiling deadline. Id. He further contends that dismissal needlessly delays resolution of his case and undermines fairness and administrative efficiency by requiring a new proceeding. Id. The agency has responded, and the appellant has replied. PFR File, Tabs 3-4. An administrative judge has wide discretion to dismiss an appeal without prejudice in the interests of fairness, due process, and administrative efficiency, and he may order such a dismissal at the request of one or both parties, or to avoid a lengthy or indefinite continuance. Thomas v. Department of the Treasury, 115 M.S.P.R. 224, ¶ 7 (2010). Here, the appellant alleged that he challenged the denial of his reasonable accommodation request and participated in an EEO investigation related to his denial. IAF, Tab 3 at 19-26, 39-40. In Reese, 2025 MSPB 1, ¶¶ 44-52, the Board held that disclosures concerning alleged violations of Title VII may constitute protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C) if made to a covered entity. In Holman v. Department of the Army, 2025 MSPB 2, ¶¶ 12-13, the Board expanded that holding and held that communications with an agency’s EEO office, whether formal or informal, constitute protected activity within the definition 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C).

2 The appellant has filed a motion for leave, seeking to supplement his petition for review to “elaborate on the legal errors in the [i]nitial [d]ecision and present arguments concerning a pattern of agency misconduct that has obstructed the fair adjudication of this appeal.” PFR File, Tab 7 at 4. However, he does not identify any such errors or arguments. Id. Therefore, we deny the appellant’s motion for leave. See Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980) (finding that the Board will not grant a petition for review based on new evidence absent a showing that it is of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(4). 4

Thus, we agree with the administrative judge that Reese and Holman apply to the appellant’s claim. ID at 2. As the administrative judge correctly explained, at the time he issued the initial decision, there was a reconsideration request pending before the Board and a request for judicial review pending before the D.C. Circuit in Reese, and the outcome of those cases could have impacted the adjudication of the appellant’s claim. ID at 2. Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion in the administrative judge’s decision to dismiss the appeal without prejudice to refiling on that basis. 3 Because Reese has been resolved and the appeal has not been refiled, we forward the appeal to the Washington Regional Office for docketing and adjudication as a refiled appeal.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Kali M Holman v. Department of the Army
2025 MSPB 2 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2025)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Leon Williams v. Department of Homeland Security, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/leon-williams-v-department-of-homeland-security-mspb-2026.