Leon Randolph v. Lola Rawlinson

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-24-00399-CV

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LEON RANDOLPH, Appellant

V.

LOLA RAWLINSON, Appellee

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On Appeal from the 75th District Court Liberty County, Texas

Trial Cause No. CV2015889

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

In 2020, Appellant, Leon Randolph, filed a trespass to try title suit against Appellee, Lola Rawlinson, alleging superior title to 23.65 acres situated in Liberty County, Texas. Randolph’s petition alleges he acquired title by adverse possession under the ten-year and twenty-five-year limitations periods, because he and his family have occupied and held the property in open, peaceful, notorious, exclusive, hostile, adverse and continuous possession at all times since the early 1900s. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 16.026, 16.027. Rawlinson answered with a

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general denial and plea of not guilty and counter-claimed for damage to the property allegedly caused by Randolph and his family. In 2024, Rawlinson filed a traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment asserting three independent grounds: (1) that Randolph’s petition—by alleging that Randolph and his family possessed the property for over a hundred years—negated the exclusivity element of Randolph’s adverse possession claim; (2) that tacking was unavailable to Randolph because he had no evidence of privity of estate with the family members upon whose possession he was relying; and (3) that Randolph admitted in bankruptcy proceedings in 2021 and 2022 that he did not own the property in question.

Randolph filed a response challenging all three grounds, and Rawlinson filed a reply to the response. After a hearing, the trial court granted Rawlinson’s motion without specifying the reason, Rawlinson nonsuited her counterclaims, and the trial court signed a final summary judgment from which Randolph appeals. Randolph presents two issues on appeal. First, Randolph argues the trial court “incorrectly held tacking applied when the provided evidence proved that Leon Randolph could show more than ten years of adverse possession, supplanting adverse possession with tacking.” Secondly, Randolph asserts the trial court “incorrectly found that non- claimants on the property must be excluded for a claimant to attain ‘exclusivity.’”

We review grants of summary judgment de novo. Cantey Hanger, LLP v.

Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. 2015). That said, “[a]n appellate court may not

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reverse a trial court’s judgment without properly assigned error.” Rosetta Res. Operating, LP v. Martin, 645 S.W.3d 212, 226 (Tex. 2022) (citing Cent. Educ. Agency v. Burke, 711 S.W.2d 7, 8 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam)). “The law is well-settled that either (1) a specific assignment of error must be attributed to each ground on which a summary judgment could be based or (2) a general assignment that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment must be made, which permits the appellant to assert arguments against all grounds on which summary judgment could be based.” Rollins v. Denton Cnty., No. 02-14-00312-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 12327, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 3, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).

“When a trial court’s order granting summary judgment does not specify the grounds on which its order is based, the appealing party must negate each ground upon which the judgment could have been based.” Rosetta, 645 S.W.3d at 226 (citing Malooly Bros. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 120–21 (Tex. 1970) and Jarvis v. Rocanville Corp., 298 S.W.3d 305, 313 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied)); see also Nixon Family P’ship, LP v. Jet Lending, LLC, No. 09-20-00201-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 5544, at *23 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 4, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“When a summary judgment motion alleges multiple grounds and the order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground on which the summary judgment was rendered, the appellant must challenge and negate each and every basis for the summary judgment on appeal.”).

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“If an appellant fails to challenge each ground on which the trial court could have granted summary judgment, we must uphold the summary judgment on the unchallenged ground, regardless of its merits.” Matlock v. Balzer, No. 12-24-00329- CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 8157, at *6 (Tex. App.—Tyler Oct. 22, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Madhu Lodging Partners, LP v. Amguard Ins. Co., No. 02-23- 00379-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 3756, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 30, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Nixon Family P’ship, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 5544, at *26; Law Office of Andrew L. Jones, P.C. v. Schachar, No. 05-19-00188-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 1160, at *14-15 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 11, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); Wright v. City of Hous., No. 01-10-00941-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 8523, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 27, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Here, Randolph challenges only two of the three grounds for summary judgment contained in Rawlinson’s motion, any or all of which may have served as the basis for the trial court’s granting summary judgment in Rawlinson’s favor. In two issues on appeal, Randolph argues that Rawlinson’s motion mischaracterizes the law regarding the exclusivity element of adverse possession and that Randolph’s summary judgment evidence establishes adverse possession on his own accord without relying on tacking, but Randolph does not address Rawlinson’s argument that Randolph admitted in bankruptcy filings that he did not own the property, a separate ground upon which the trial court may have granted summary judgment.

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Without regard to the merits of Rawlinson’s arguments regarding Randolph’s bankruptcy filings, “we are procedurally constrained to affirm the trial court’s summary judgment[.]” See Rollins, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 12327, at *5.

AFFIRMED.

KENT CHAMBERS

Justice

Submitted on June 29, 2026 Opinion Delivered August 27, 2026

Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ.