HERRMANN, Justice:
This appeal arises in an action by a real estate developer to enjoin the Mayor and Council of the City of Dover from interfering with the construction of a certain low-rent public housing project in Dover. The Chancery Court denied the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment by which the plaintiff sought a decree that the actions of the Mayor and Council, complained of, were improper and unlawful. See 270 A.2d 539. The plaintiff appeals.
I.
The determinative and undisputed facts are these:
In early 1969, the Dover Housing
Authority
solicited proposals from developers for the construction of a low-rent public housing unit under the so-called “turnkey” program, whereby the Housing Authority purchases the completed project from the developer. The obligations of the Housing Authority are backed by a financial assistance commitment of the Federal Government through its Department of Housing and Urban Development (hereinafter “HUD”), thus requiring the developer to comply with HUD’s requirements, as well as with all local requirements, including those pertaining to zoning and planning.
The plaintiff, Leon N. Weiner & Associates, Inc., submitted its proposal for the housing unit to the Dover Housing Authority and, in July 1969, the Authority notified the plaintiff that it had tentatively approved the plaintiff’s proposal. The site thus selected and approved is on land situate east of U.S. Route 13, west of U.S. Route 113, and south of Court Street in Dover.
After thus receiving the tentative approval of the Housing Authority, the plaintiff did all things specified by law to meet the requirements of authorities having jurisdiction over the project. There was no zoning problem, since the current zone classification of RG-2 permitted the proposed use of the land, and the plaintiff’s proposed project complied in all respects with the Dover Zoning Ordinance. However, since the project constituted a “subdivision” as defined in the Dover Land Subdivision Regulations, which were promulgated by the Dover Planning Commission
and approved
by Dover’s City Council, the plaintiff was obliged to comply with those Regulations before commencing construction.
The plaintiff complied with all of the requirements of HUD, of the Housing Authority, and of the Planning Commission to the point of applying for “Conditional Approval” of the “Preliminary Layout” of the development, as required by the Land Subdivision Regulations. On March 16, 1970, the Planning Commission, by a 5 to 4 vote, approved the plaintiff’s application. On March 23, 1970, before either the plaintiff or the Planning Commission could proceed further in compliance with the specifications of the Regulations,
the Council issued a directive to the Planning Commission to take no further action in the matter until directed to do so by the Council. This
was done summarily, without notice to the plaintiff and without any opportunity to the plaintiff or other interested party to be heard in the matter. The reasons advanced by the Council for the directive related to: problems of traffic, pedestrian and vehicular, and noise; the changing character of the area from residential, as presently zoned, to commercial; the lack of schools, recreation areas, and shopping facilities; and the proximity of another low-income housing development nearby.
Believing that the action of the Council had no legal effect, the plaintiff proceeded to submit to the Planning Commission a Plat of the proposed development. On the basis of the directive it had received from the City Council, however, the Planning Commission took no further action in the matter; there was no public hearing on the Plat as required by the Regulations; and the Plat remained, and remains, neither approved nor disapproved by the Planning Commission. Thereafter, the plaintiff applied to the Dover Building Inspector for a building permit. As in the case of the Planning Commission, the City Council directed the Building Inspector not to entertain the plaintiff’s application; and, as a result, the Building Inspector refused to accept the plaintiff’s submissions. Thus, the plaintiff’s proposal and the housing project remain in limbo to this date.
II.
We hold that the action of the Dover City Council, in issuing the veto directive to the Planning Commission, was an impermissible usurpation of the functions and powers of the Commission. The Mayor and Council concede that the action thus taken was an attempt to perform the same planning functions that had been vested in the Planning Commission under 22 Del.C. Ch. 7 and the Land Subdivision Regulations. As such, the action of the Council was improper and unlawful.
The Planning Commission is a separate and independent statutory body, having the responsibilities, powers, and functions vested in it by 22 Del.C. Ch. 7 and the Land Subdivision Regulations. Having established the Planning Commission under 22 Del.C. Ch. 7, the City Council of Dover delegated to it all of the powers and functions specified by that Statute or otherwise vested in the Commission thereunder. The Land Subdivision Regulations, duly approved by the Mayor and Council, referred certain powers and duties to the Planning Commission in addition to those specified by 22 Del.C. Ch. 7, as is expressly authorized by that Statute.
Such delegated powers and functions may not be reclaimed summarily by the Council at will. The Council may not peremptorily interpose and substitute itself in the place of the Commission in the performance of powers and duties thus lawfully assigned to the Commission. Nowhere in the Statute or the Regulations is there reserved to the City Council the power to intervene in the Commission’s deliberations and decisions, or to substitute itself for the Commission ; nor is there reserved to the Council the power summarily to review and reverse decisions made by the Commission. Having failed to reserve the power to review and reverse action of the Planning Commission, it is clear on the face of the Land Subdivision Regulations that the decisions of the Planning Commission made in accordance therewith are final, subject only to judicial review.
There must be order and certainty in the law, especially with respect to real property. As has been often stated, it is almost as important that the law be settled as it is that the law be right, particularly where real property is involved. Abbott Supply Co. v. Shockley, Del.Super., 128 A.2d 794, 798 (1956); State v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., Del.Ch., 228 A.2d 587, 598 (1967). Property holders are entitled to know, with a reasonable degree of certainty, the legal rules and regulations, the legal processes and procedures, governing them in the use of their property.
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HERRMANN, Justice:
This appeal arises in an action by a real estate developer to enjoin the Mayor and Council of the City of Dover from interfering with the construction of a certain low-rent public housing project in Dover. The Chancery Court denied the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment by which the plaintiff sought a decree that the actions of the Mayor and Council, complained of, were improper and unlawful. See 270 A.2d 539. The plaintiff appeals.
I.
The determinative and undisputed facts are these:
In early 1969, the Dover Housing
Authority
solicited proposals from developers for the construction of a low-rent public housing unit under the so-called “turnkey” program, whereby the Housing Authority purchases the completed project from the developer. The obligations of the Housing Authority are backed by a financial assistance commitment of the Federal Government through its Department of Housing and Urban Development (hereinafter “HUD”), thus requiring the developer to comply with HUD’s requirements, as well as with all local requirements, including those pertaining to zoning and planning.
The plaintiff, Leon N. Weiner & Associates, Inc., submitted its proposal for the housing unit to the Dover Housing Authority and, in July 1969, the Authority notified the plaintiff that it had tentatively approved the plaintiff’s proposal. The site thus selected and approved is on land situate east of U.S. Route 13, west of U.S. Route 113, and south of Court Street in Dover.
After thus receiving the tentative approval of the Housing Authority, the plaintiff did all things specified by law to meet the requirements of authorities having jurisdiction over the project. There was no zoning problem, since the current zone classification of RG-2 permitted the proposed use of the land, and the plaintiff’s proposed project complied in all respects with the Dover Zoning Ordinance. However, since the project constituted a “subdivision” as defined in the Dover Land Subdivision Regulations, which were promulgated by the Dover Planning Commission
and approved
by Dover’s City Council, the plaintiff was obliged to comply with those Regulations before commencing construction.
The plaintiff complied with all of the requirements of HUD, of the Housing Authority, and of the Planning Commission to the point of applying for “Conditional Approval” of the “Preliminary Layout” of the development, as required by the Land Subdivision Regulations. On March 16, 1970, the Planning Commission, by a 5 to 4 vote, approved the plaintiff’s application. On March 23, 1970, before either the plaintiff or the Planning Commission could proceed further in compliance with the specifications of the Regulations,
the Council issued a directive to the Planning Commission to take no further action in the matter until directed to do so by the Council. This
was done summarily, without notice to the plaintiff and without any opportunity to the plaintiff or other interested party to be heard in the matter. The reasons advanced by the Council for the directive related to: problems of traffic, pedestrian and vehicular, and noise; the changing character of the area from residential, as presently zoned, to commercial; the lack of schools, recreation areas, and shopping facilities; and the proximity of another low-income housing development nearby.
Believing that the action of the Council had no legal effect, the plaintiff proceeded to submit to the Planning Commission a Plat of the proposed development. On the basis of the directive it had received from the City Council, however, the Planning Commission took no further action in the matter; there was no public hearing on the Plat as required by the Regulations; and the Plat remained, and remains, neither approved nor disapproved by the Planning Commission. Thereafter, the plaintiff applied to the Dover Building Inspector for a building permit. As in the case of the Planning Commission, the City Council directed the Building Inspector not to entertain the plaintiff’s application; and, as a result, the Building Inspector refused to accept the plaintiff’s submissions. Thus, the plaintiff’s proposal and the housing project remain in limbo to this date.
II.
We hold that the action of the Dover City Council, in issuing the veto directive to the Planning Commission, was an impermissible usurpation of the functions and powers of the Commission. The Mayor and Council concede that the action thus taken was an attempt to perform the same planning functions that had been vested in the Planning Commission under 22 Del.C. Ch. 7 and the Land Subdivision Regulations. As such, the action of the Council was improper and unlawful.
The Planning Commission is a separate and independent statutory body, having the responsibilities, powers, and functions vested in it by 22 Del.C. Ch. 7 and the Land Subdivision Regulations. Having established the Planning Commission under 22 Del.C. Ch. 7, the City Council of Dover delegated to it all of the powers and functions specified by that Statute or otherwise vested in the Commission thereunder. The Land Subdivision Regulations, duly approved by the Mayor and Council, referred certain powers and duties to the Planning Commission in addition to those specified by 22 Del.C. Ch. 7, as is expressly authorized by that Statute.
Such delegated powers and functions may not be reclaimed summarily by the Council at will. The Council may not peremptorily interpose and substitute itself in the place of the Commission in the performance of powers and duties thus lawfully assigned to the Commission. Nowhere in the Statute or the Regulations is there reserved to the City Council the power to intervene in the Commission’s deliberations and decisions, or to substitute itself for the Commission ; nor is there reserved to the Council the power summarily to review and reverse decisions made by the Commission. Having failed to reserve the power to review and reverse action of the Planning Commission, it is clear on the face of the Land Subdivision Regulations that the decisions of the Planning Commission made in accordance therewith are final, subject only to judicial review.
There must be order and certainty in the law, especially with respect to real property. As has been often stated, it is almost as important that the law be settled as it is that the law be right, particularly where real property is involved. Abbott Supply Co. v. Shockley, Del.Super., 128 A.2d 794, 798 (1956); State v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., Del.Ch., 228 A.2d 587, 598 (1967). Property holders are entitled to know, with a reasonable degree of certainty, the legal rules and regulations, the legal processes and procedures, governing them in the use of their property. To the extent reasonably possible, the rights and obligations of a property holder under the
law should be clear; and the consequences of a course of action, duly adopted and followed by him under existing law, should be predictable.
The Land Subdivision Regulations constitute the basic body of existing law governing the present situation. The plaintiff is entitled to the orderly progression of deliberation and action by the Planning Commission prescribed by those Regulations. Any interference by the City Council, which obstructs action by the Planning Commission taken in compliance with the Regulations, is improper and unlawful and should be enjoined.
In support of their position, the Mayor and Council rely almost entirely upon Popular Refreshments, Inc. v. Fuller’s Milk Bar, Inc., 85 N.J. Super. 528, 205 A.2d 445 (1964). That case is inapposite; it dealt with the discretionary powers of a planning commission, not with the power of a city council to supersede and surplant the planning commission.
It is recognized, of course, that the Mayor and Council of Dover have a direct interest and responsibility in any project such as is here involved. The reasons advanced by the Council for its veto directive to the Planning Commission, however, are reasons related to the Council’s zoning function. If the property should have been rezoned, there are orderly and certain processes and procedures set forth in the Dover Zoning Ordinance for such action by the Council. Included are requirements for a study and report by the Planning Commission and for a public hearing on the proposed change in zoning, with the due process rights of all concerned fully protected. The requirements of the Zoning Ordinance, and the law pertaining thereto, may not be circumvented; they must be fulfilled before the subj ect property may be declared by the Council to be unusable for purposes now permitted by law.
* * *
Accordingly, it is held that the judgment of the Chancery Court must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
This is not to say, however, that the plaintiff is entitled to a building permit now. It may be so entitled ultimately; but the Regulations require the fulfillment of several more steps by the plaintiff and the Planning Commission before the building permit stage is reached. The plaintiff is entitled now to the restoration of the matter before the Planning Commission to the same status and posture it had when the proceedings of the Commission were improperly halted by the Council. The plaintiff is also entitled now to prompt action by the Planning Commission at each subsequent stage of the procedures set forth in the Regulations, including a public hearing on the Plat and express approval or disapproval thereof. Upon such approval, and upon compliance by the plaintiff with the remaining obligations of the developer under the Regulations, the plaintiff may be entitled to a building permit as specified by the Regulations.
Reversed and remanded.