In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
________________
NO. 09-24-00172-CR ________________
LEON CAULEY JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 252nd District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. 23DCCR0060 ________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Leon Cauley Jr. (“Cauley”) appeals his conviction for injury to a
disabled person, a first-degree felony punishable by five to ninety-nine years or life
imprisonment and a fine of up to $10,000. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.32,
22.04(a)(1), (e). In four issues, Cauley complains of the trial court’s rulings
admitting hearsay, evidence of an extraneous offense, and evidence of a criminal
trespass warning prohibiting him from entering the home where the offense took
1 place. The State responds that Cauley failed to preserve error as to his evidentiary
complaints, and that even if the trial court erred in admitting this evidence, its errors
were harmless. Since the trial court did not reversibly err in admitting the challenged
evidence, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
In 2013, the complainant, “Wendy,” sustained a gunshot wound. Due to this
injury, Wendy has limited use of her upper extremities, cannot walk, and is confined
to a bed or wheelchair. 1 Wendy’s mother (“Mother”) helps to care for Wendy, and
as Mother was bathing Wendy, Mother discovered that Wendy had sustained burn
injuries. Mother therefore called 911 for assistance. Wendy stated that Cauley had
caused her injuries, and Cauley was charged accordingly. Cauley is Wendy’s former
boyfriend.
The indictment alleges that “on or about” December 14, 2022, Cauley “did
then and there intentionally and knowingly cause serious bodily injury to [Wendy],
a disabled individual, by pouring scalding hot water onto [Wendy].” The indictment
1 We refer to the victim and the civilian witnesses or other alleged victims by pseudonyms or familial relationships to conceal their identities. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 30(a)(1) (granting crime victims “the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”). See Smith v. State, No. 09-17-00081-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1874, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 14, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
2 also contains an enhancement paragraph alleging that Cauley was previously
convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The case was tried to a jury,
which found Cauley guilty of the offense charged. The trial court sentenced Cauley
to thirty years’ imprisonment pursuant to the jury’s verdict and Cauley filed this
appeal. We summarize below the evidence pertinent to Cauley’s appeal.
Mother’s Testimony
On Saturday, December 17, Mother went to Wendy’s house to take care of
Wendy.2 As Mother was getting ready to bathe Wendy, Mother saw that Wendy had
“a very bad burn on her left side.” Mother called the paramedics, who “suggested it
was a third-degree burn[,]” and called the police. After Wendy told the police
officers how she came to be burned, she was transported by ambulance to the
hospital for treatment of third-degree burns.
According to Mother, even though some of Wendy’s burned skin healed,
Wendy has suffered long-term effects of her burns in that she has lasting scars to the
burned areas.
Paramedic Rachel Clark’s Testimony
Rachel Clark (“Clark”) testified that she was a paramedic. Clark was called to
Wendy’s house on December 17 to address a burn injury. When Clark arrived, she
saw that Wendy was lying in a hospital bed in her bedroom. The room also contained
2 All dates are 2022 unless otherwise confirmed. 3 a wheelchair and a lift used to assist patients who cannot get up without assistance.
As Clark assessed Wendy’s condition, Clark observed third-degree burns on
Wendy’s left leg, buttocks, and genital region. In response to Clark’s questions about
the burns, Wendy told Clark that on the previous Wednesday, Cauley had burned
her with “scalding water[,]” and “that she was in severe pain[.]” Clark recited a
complete answer as follows:
[H]er ex-boyfriend had broke into the house and had taken her cell phone away, broke the TV, and he had taken scalding water and dipped a towel into it. He then took the towel and [w]rung it over [the] top of her and then used the towel to rub the scalding water around on her.
According to Clark, “[t]hird-degree burns are very unlikely to heal on their
own[,]” and if a third-degree burn is not treated, it can become infected, potentially
leading to septic shock and death. Third-degree burns may also “cause permanent
scarring, which could involve some nerve-endings.”
Officer Andrew Collins’ Testimony
Andrew Collins (“Collins”) testified that he worked in the Patrol Division of
the Beaumont Police Department. After describing his training and qualifications,
Collins explained that he was dispatched to Wendy’s home on December 17, where
he spoke with Mother, Wendy, and EMS personnel.
Collins defined “deadly weapon[]” as including scalding water because it is
able to cause serious bodily injury or death.
4 “Wendy’s” Testimony
Wendy testified that her 2013 gunshot wound left her with incomplete
quadriplegia, which Wendy understood to mean that she is immobile, but that her
condition “can be reversed with the right therapy.” Wendy testified that although her
mobility has improved over the years, and she could cook, clean, and use her cell
phone, she could not walk or care for herself on her own. Due to her 2013 injury,
Wendy requires “round-the-clock care . . . seven days a week[]” and wears
incontinence protection. In addition, the paralysis caused by Wendy’s 2013 injury
renders her unable to defend herself or to provide her own food and shelter.
Wendy recalled that she and Cauley had a dating relationship from about
August to December, when Cauley burned her. Wendy denied having invited Cauley
to her home on Wednesday, December 14. Cauley, however, came to Wendy’s home
on that date and “kicked a 55-inch TV, . . . broke [a] laptop and stole medications . .
. and a camera[.]” Wendy also testified that Cauley broke her cell phone, and
barricaded the door of her bedroom with her wheelchair, so that nobody could enter
the room.
During that day, Wendy needed to clean herself, and since Cauley had
excluded everyone but himself from the room, Wendy needed Cauley’s help in doing
so. Wendy testified that Cauley told her to stay in bed while he obtained a basin of
water. When Cauley returned with the water, Wendy saw steam rising from the water
5 and thus knew that the water was too hot. Wendy told Cauley that the water was too
hot, and Cauley returned to the bathroom. When Cauley again came into Wendy’s
bedroom with water, Wendy noticed that the water was still steaming hot. Wendy
described Cauley’s next actions:
He actually grabbed the towel and squeezed the towel on me, and that’s when I jumped and I told him it was hot. Because I can feel a lot of my body. And before I could even turn back over on my back, that’s when he proceeded to pour a big basin of hot water on me.
Wendy stated that the hot water was painful and that she screamed that the
water was hot and burning her. Cauley told Wendy, “Shut up, bitch,” and “shut the
[expletive] up.” Although Wendy cried and repeatedly told Cauley that he was
hurting her, Cauley laughed and wiped her “hard” with the towel and called Wendy
a “big baby.”
When Wendy’s home care attendants came to the house on Thursday
morning, Cauley answered the door and told them that he would take care of Wendy,
so the attendants’ services were not needed. After Cauley left late Thursday morning,
Wendy's attendants saw her but did not provide medical care.
When Mother came to take care of Wendy on Saturday, Mother saw Wendy’s
injuries and immediately called 911. Wendy confirmed Mother’s testimony about
the paramedics, the police, and treatment at St. Elizabeth Hospital. Wendy testified
that hospital personnel characterized her injuries as “third and fourth-degree burns.”
6 While at the hospital, Wendy related the same history of injury that she had
told Mother, the paramedics, and the police: that Cauley had burned her with
scalding water. Wendy testified that Cauley did not trip and accidentally pour the
water on her nor did anyone force Cauley to pour the water on her. When asked
whether her injuries had healed, Wendy explained that she still bore the scars from
the burns on her left leg from her buttock to her knee. Wendy also noted that her
fourth-degree burns “doesn’t completely heal. Like, it will heal so much and then it
will reopen and then close to a certain extent and then reopen.” Wendy
acknowledged a preexisting injury on her right side, stating that she “was
hospitalized, septic with the whole – basically you can see all the way to my bone
on my right side from a nursing home[.]”
Leon Cauley Jr.’s Testimony
Cauley testified that he receives disability income for what he called
“schizofitzo” disorder. According to Cauley, he met Wendy through social media.
Cauley recalled that before coming to Beaumont, he was in Jacksonville, where he
“was getting cut on by a female[,]” so he stayed with his brother in Hillsboro for a
time. Cauley also testified that in about October, he took a bus from Dallas to
Houston and Wendy paid his Uber fare from Houston to her home in Beaumont.
Cauley recalled that on or near Thanksgiving, he was at Wendy’s home. When
Wendy and Cauley had an altercation, Mother called the police, who responded and
7 told Cauley that Wendy wanted him “to leave and get some fresh air.” The officers
also took Cauley to jail due to an outstanding warrant from Jacksonville, in Cherokee
County. After being in jail in Jacksonville “a couple days[,]” Cauley posted bond,
and obtained a ride back to Beaumont “about a week and a half” later. He arrived at
Wendy’s home in mid-December.
According to Cauley, Wendy told him it had “been hard on her since [Cauley]
left” and she was “ready for [Cauley] to come back because they ain’t been treating
[her] properly.” Cauley averred that Wendy invited him to return to her home and
that Cauley, therefore, had not violated the criminal trespass warning.
Cauley denied having intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly poured scalding
water on Wendy, but acknowledged that he may have accidentally spilled hot water
aggravating Wendy’s preexisting scars. Instead, Cauley stated that he obtained
“normal temperature” water from the bathtub. Cauley claimed that the water was not
steaming, that Wendy did not complain that the water was too hot, and that he
believed “the water probably irritated the burn.” Cauley then stated that he stopped
bathing Wendy when she complained that the water was too hot. Cauley further
denied telling Wendy to “shut the [expletive] up, bitch[,]” and did not know whether
he called her a “crying baby[.]” In addition, Cauley testified that he did not barricade
the door with Wendy’s wheelchair and that “[t]he only time I kept the door like that
when we was intimate with each other. That’s the only time. . . . Because the door
8 don’t have a lock on it.” Cauley stated that he did not know why Wendy would make
the accusations she made against him.
When asked about past and current criminal complaints, Cauley
acknowledged having “very trouble with women[,]” but denied that he assaulted his
former wife, “Tanya,” even though he pleaded guilty to the charge and was
sentenced to three years in prison. Cauley also denied that he was charged with
assaulting “Vivian” in Jacksonville, and that his warrant out of Jacksonville was
related to a case involving Vivian. Cauley later acknowledged the accusation.
Cauley admitted that his Dallas court case arose out of an allegation that he had
assaulted “Faith.” The parties and the trial court discussed Cauley’s difficulties in
Jacksonville as follows:
[THE STATE]: You also talked about getting cut by a female in Jacksonville. You also talked about a warrant out of Jacksonville.
Would that be related to the case involving [Vivian]?
[CAULEY]: No.
[THE STATE]: [Vivian] did not accuse you of assaulting her in –
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, improper impeachment.
[THE STATE]: Judge, he opened the door when he talked about the warrant and this female in Jacksonville –
[CAULEY]: That wasn’t what the warrant was –
[THE COURT]: Hold on. Hold on. Don’t – hold on. Overruled. You can ask a question. 9 [THE STATE]: [Vivian], where does she live?
[CAULEY]: Jacksonville.
[THE STATE]: Jacksonville. [Vivian], she’s accused you of assaulting her, correct?
[CAULEY]: Well, when I was –
[THE STATE]: “Yes” or “no”?
[CAULEY]: – cut on, it was – it was another woman.
[THE STATE]: Objection, nonresponsive.
[CAULEY]: It wasn’t [Vivian].
[THE COURT]: That’s fine, but make sure – he asked you a specific question about this person, so answer that question, and then he can ask you follow-ups about other things if he needs to.
[CAULEY]: No. Because that wasn’t – when I was getting cut on –
[THE STATE]: Objection.
[THE COURT]: Hold on.
[THE STATE]: Mr. Cauley, I’m going to ask the questions here. I’m not going to just let you talk. Do you understand that?
[CAULEY]: Mm-mm.
[THE STATE]: So, is there not a criminal case charging you with assaulting [Vivian] pending in Jacksonville?
[CAULEY]: Yes.
...
10 [THE STATE]: Your Honor, the State at this time would offer State’s Exhibit No. 9, a certified copy of a document from the Cherokee County Clerk’s Office. And for purpose of the record, I’m tendering to defense counsel for inspection.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I will renew my objection of improper impeachment and object to the astringent evidence.
[THE COURT]: Improper impeachment why?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, Judge, he’s only allowed to impeach him with convictions that are under 609 that are felony convictions that are less than ten years.
[THE STATE]: I think I can – sorry. Go ahead.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No. That’s the probations –
[THE STATE]: Well, Judge, it is not a conviction. He’s essentially lied about that case pending and it also goes to his credibility. It is not a conviction. I can see that, but he lied about being –
[CAULEY]: I didn’t lie about anything –
[THE COURT]: Hold on. This – this conversation doesn’t include you.
[THE STATE]: He lied about being charged with assault involving [Vivian]. It goes towards his credibility.
[THE COURT]: Overruled. State’s 9’s admitted.
When the State summarized the evidence, asking “Four ladies have accused
you of assault, correct?” Cauley responded, “Could have been ten.” When the State
next asked Cauley to confirm that he was a convicted felon, Cauley replied, “I don’t
know. I gotta look into it.” 11 The Criminal Trespass Warning
On November 23, the Beaumont Police Department issued Cauley a criminal
trespass warning. The warning was admitted over Cauley’s objection and reflects
Wendy as the complainant and gives the reason as “disturbance.” The warning also
identifies Cauley as the person warned, stating, “WHO IS HEREBY NOTIFIED
THAT IF HE/SHE ENTERS, WITHOUT EFFECT WRITTEN CONSENT
[Wendy’s address] THEY WILL BE ARRESTED AND CHARGED WITH
CRIMINAL TRESPASS.” Wendy signed the warning as the complainant.
Cauley’s Criminal Records
State’s Exhibit 9, admitted over Cauley’s objection, contains a complaint
against Cauley for assaulting Vivian in Jacksonville on or about November 10, 2021.
When Cauley failed to appear, the court issued a warrant for his arrest. The warrant
reflects that Cauley was taken from Jefferson County to Cherokee County on
December 7.
State’s Exhibit 10 reflects that Cauley was convicted of a second-degree
felony in the assault of Tanya, in that he cut Tanya using a box cutter during the
assault. This exhibit was admitted without objection.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Cauley argues that the trial court reversibly erred by admitting (1)
a paramedic’s hearsay testimony; (2) State’s Exhibit 9 (the pending assault
12 complaint and arrest warrant from Cherokee County); (3) evidence of the pending
assault charge from Cherokee County; and (4) State’s Exhibit 11 (the criminal
trespass warning).
We review complaints about the admission of evidence under an abuse-of-
discretion standard. See Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App.
2019). We will not reverse a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence
unless it falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. See Dabney v. State, 492
S.W.3d 309, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
Even if the trial court should have excluded the challenged evidence, we will
not sustain Cauley’s appellate issues unless he preserved error at trial by making a
timely request, objection, or motion. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Moreover, if
similar evidence is admitted without objection, error is not preserved, and the
objection at the trial court level must comport with the complaint on appeal. See
Compton v. State, 666 S.W.3d 685, 714 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); Coble v. State, 330
S.W.3d 253, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citations omitted).
Issue One: The Paramedic’s Hearsay Testimony
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement that a party offers to prove the truth of
the matter asserted within the statement. See Tex. R. Evid. 801(d). Hearsay is not
admissible except as provided by statute, the rules of evidence, or by other rules
prescribed under statutory authority. Id. 802. Once the opponent of hearsay evidence
13 makes the proper objection, it becomes the burden of the proponent of the evidence
to establish that an exception applies that would make the evidence admissible
despite its hearsay character. See Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 578-79 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008). There are several exceptions to the hearsay rule, including an
exception for “[a] statement that: (A) is made for -- and is reasonably pertinent to --
medical diagnosis or treatment; and (B) describes medical history; past or present
symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general cause.” Tex. R. Evid.
803(4). This exception presumes that the patient understands the importance of being
truthful with the medical personnel involved to receive an accurate diagnosis or
treatment. See Puderbaugh v. State, 31 S.W.3d 683, 685 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
2000, pet. ref’d); For statements to be admissible under Rule 803(4), the proponent
of the evidence must show that: (1) the declarant was aware that the statements were
made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and that proper diagnosis
or treatment depended on the veracity of the statement; and (2) the particular
statement offered is also “pertinent to treatment;” that is, it was reasonable for the
healthcare provider to rely on the particular information in treating the declarant. See
Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 589-90; Hanke v. State, No. 09-14-00326-CR, 2015 Tex. App.
LEXIS 9884, at *18 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 23, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (citing Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 588-91).
14 Clark’s hearsay testimony includes both Wendy’s identification of Cauley as
her assailant and Wendy’s statement that Cauley broke into Wendy’s home and
broke her cell phone and television and stole some of Wendy’s property. When Clark
testified, she recalled that she asked Wendy questions, and Wendy responded that
“her ex-boyfriend” burned her with scalding water. Cauley objected that the State’s
question elicited hearsay, and the State responded that “it’s for purposes of providing
medical treatment[.]” The trial court overruled Cauley’s objection. Clark’s
testimony that Wendy said her ex-boyfriend burned her with scalding water falls
within the medical treatment exception to the general rule excluding hearsay, since
it explains how Wendy came to be injured, and thus was “made for -- and is
reasonably pertinent to -- [Wendy’s] medical diagnosis or treatment[]” and described
the inception and cause of Wendy’s injury. See Tex. R. Evid. 803(4).
Wendy was an adult and therefore was aware that her statements to Clark and
other paramedics were made for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment
and that proper diagnosis or treatment would depend on the veracity of her statement.
Wendy’s statement that she had been burned with scalding water was pertinent to
treatment, since it was reasonable for the paramedics to rely on this information in
treating Wendy’s injury. Clark’s testimony about Wendy’s statement thus satisfies
the cited exception to the general rule requiring exclusion of hearsay testimony.
15 Although Clark’s testimony repeating Wendy’s statement that Cauley broke
into the house, broke Wendy’s cell phone and television, and stole medications and
a camera, falls beyond the scope of a statement made for the purpose of medical
treatment, Cauley did not object on this basis at trial. Cauley therefore has not
preserved error as to the portion of Clark’s testimony that is not protected by a
hearsay exception. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
In addition, during Wendy’s own testimony, Wendy described not only how
Cauley injured her, but also testified that Cauley broke her cell phone and television
and stole medications and a camera. Wendy’s testimony duplicates Clark’s hearsay
testimony. Since it is not reversible error for a trial court to either admit or exclude
cumulative evidence, the trial court did not reversibly err by admitting Clark’s
testimony regardless of its hearsay status. See Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d at 282
(“[e]rroneously admitting evidence ‘will not result in reversal when other such
evidence was received without objection, either before or after the complained-of
ruling’”).
Since the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence, we
overrule Cauley’s initial issue.
Issues Two and Three: Hearsay and Extraneous Offense Evidence
Cauley’s second and third issues posit that the trial court erred in admitting
State’s Exhibit 9, evidence of a misdemeanor assault complaint then pending in
16 Cherokee County. Cauley contends that this evidence was both hearsay and evidence
of an extraneous offense and therefore was inadmissible. Although Cauley correctly
argues that this exhibit is both hearsay and evidence of an extraneous offense, the
trial court did not reversibly err by admitting it, since this exhibit is cumulative of
Cauley’s testimony.
As discussed above, hearsay is an out-of-court statement that a party offers to
prove the truth of the matter asserted within the statement. Tex. R. Evid. 801(d).
Here the truth of the matter asserted by the challenged evidence is that Cauley was
charged with assaulting and injuring Vivian in Cherokee County on or about
November 10, 2021. Since the State offered its Exhibit 9 to show that Cauley was
charged with this assault, the exhibit was hearsay, and thus inadmissible unless it
fell within an exception to the hearsay rule. See id. 802.
As evidence of an extraneous offense, this exhibit was inadmissible under
Rule 404(b)(1) unless it was shown to be admissible for another purpose under Rule
404(b)(2). Id. 404(b)(1). Rule 404(b)(2) permits evidence of extraneous offenses if
such evidence is offered to show “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Id. 404(b)(2); see
Martin v. State, 173 S.W.3d 463, 465-68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
When the State offered its Exhibit 9, Cauley objected to “improper
impeachment and . . . astringent evidence.” Cauley contended that he could be
17 impeached only “with convictions that are under 609 that are felony convictions that
are less than ten years.” The State responded that the exhibit was admissible because
Cauley “lied about being charged with assault involving [Vivian]. It goes towards
his credibility.” The trial court overruled Cauley’s objection and admitted the
exhibit.
When the State asked Cauley, “You also talked about getting cut by a female
in Jacksonville. You also talked about a warrant out of Jacksonville. Would that be
related to the case involving [Vivian]?” Cauley said, “No.” The State understood
Cauley as denying that he was accused of assaulting Vivian, so it was not improper
impeachment to offer evidence to refute Cauley’s denial. See Tex. R. Evid.
404(b)(2); Reyes v. State, 741 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (“It is well
established that when a defendant in a criminal case voluntarily takes the witness
stand in a trial on the merits on his behalf he occupies the same position and is subject
to the same rules as any other witness. He may be contradicted, impeached,
discredited, attacked, sustained, bolstered up, made to give evidence against himself,
cross-examined as to new matter, and treated in every respect as any other witness,
except where there are overriding constitutional or statutory provisions.”) (citations
omitted).
In addition, Cauley has not preserved error as to this exhibit, since his
objections at the trial court consisted of “improper impeachment,” and “astringent
18 evidence.”3 On appeal, Cauley argues that State’s Exhibit 9 was “hearsay and related
to an extraneous inadmissible offense.” Since Cauley did not object to this exhibit
as hearsay in the trial court, he may not do so now. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a);
Compton, 666 S.W.3d at 714.
As for Cauley’s “astringent evidence” objection, since Cauley referenced
Rule 609 and impeachment through evidence of a felony, we believe the trial court
understood the basis of Cauley’s objection. See Tex. R. Evid. 609. We agree, as did
the State, that State’s Exhibit 9 is not evidence of a felony conviction within ten
years. The State, however, offered this evidence to show that Cauley’s testimony
was incorrect, and that Cauley was charged with assaulting Vivian, just as Cauley
had been charged with assaulting Faith and Tanya. Once some confusion was
resolved, Cauley admitted the assault charge against Vivian. Accordingly, State’s
Exhibit 9 duplicates Cauley’s admission about this charge, and the trial court did not
reversibly err by admitting it. See Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 282.
We overrule Cauley’s second and third issues, as the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence.
Issue Four: The Criminal Trespass Warning
In his final issue, Cauley argues that the trial court erred by admitting the
criminal trespass warning, State’s Exhibit 11, for impeachment purposes. Cauley
3 Cauley posits that “defense counsel probably meant ‘extrinsic.”’ 19 contends that this evidence “was not proper impeachment in any manner[]” because
“[p]roper impeachment does not include the introduction of unrelated bad acts that
only serve to show the accused is a ‘bad actor.’” Cauley relies on Rule 404, which
states, “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.” Tex. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Cauley has not, however,
shown that the State offered this exhibit for the improper purpose Cauley contends
on appeal. Instead, it appears that the State offered this exhibit to attack Cauley’s
credibility, a permissible subject of impeachment. See id. 607.
Here, the police issued Cauley a criminal trespass warning on November 23.
This warning states, in bold print, that written consent is required for Cauley to
reenter Wendy’s home, yet Cauley testified that on November 23, the police did not
“put[] [him] out[,]” but told Cauley that Wendy wanted him “to leave and get some
fresh air.” Cauley also testified that he did not violate the criminal trespass warning
by going to Wendy’s home in December, since, according to Cauley, Wendy
allowed him to return. The record contains no evidence that Cauley had Wendy’s
written consent to visit her home. Therefore, the state’s evidence about the criminal
trespass warning was relevant to show Cauley’s lack of credibility and was
admissible under Rule 402, which states that relevant evidence is generally
admissible. Id. 402, 611(b); see also Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677, 688 (Tex.
20 Crim. App. 2000) (holding that witness credibility is relevant). Additionally, since
Cauley did not object on the basis that this evidence bearing on his credibility should
have been excluded because its “probative value is substantially outweighed by a
danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence[,]” he has not preserved that argument
as to State’s Exhibit 11. See Tex. R. Evid. 403; Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. We
overrule Cauley’s fourth appellate issue.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled all of Cauley’s appellate issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
AFFIRMED.
JAY WRIGHT Justice
Submitted on January 2, 2026 Opinion Delivered April 1, 2026 Do Not Publish
Before Johnson, Wright and Chambers, JJ.