COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 1717-24-1
LEON BARCLEY STUSALITUS v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges AtLee, Chaney and Bernhard Argued at Norfolk, Virginia Opinion Issued May 19, 2026*
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH Scott Joseph Flax, Judge
Leon Barcley Stusalitus, pro se.
Catherine E. Spencer, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,1 Attorney General; Angelique Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE RICHARD Y. ATLEE, JR.
Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted Leon Stusalitus of trespassing, in
violation of Code § 18.2-119. Stusalitus raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends that the
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Next, he argues that Code § 18.2-119 is
unconstitutional as applied to his conduct. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court.
BACKGROUND
“Consistent with the standard of review when a criminal appellant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence, we recite the evidence below ‘in the “light most favorable” to the
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 Jay C. Jones succeeded Jason S. Miyares as Attorney General on January 17, 2026. Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court.’” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74
Va. App. 225, 231 (2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)).
On December 12, 2023, Stusalitus went to the Virginia Beach courthouse and completed
a form requesting permission to bring a cell phone and audio recording equipment into court.2
On January 11, 2024, after not yet receiving a response to that request, Stusalitus returned to the
courthouse to check on the status of his application. He attempted to take his cell phone and a
camera pen through the building’s security checkpoint. When Virginia Beach Sheriff’s Deputy
Pedro Vega told Stusalitus that cell phones were prohibited inside the courthouse, Stusalitus
responded that he was not going inside the courthouse but instead down the hallway.3 Deputy
Vega and Stusalitus repeated the exchange twice. Deputy Vega then told Stusalitus that he must
put the phone in his vehicle or in one of the lockers, which were located both outside the
courthouse and inside the courthouse next to the front entrance. At that point, Sergeant Mark
Rupert approached Stusalitus, and Deputy Vega stepped away from the conversation.
Sergeant Rupert introduced himself to Stusalitus and asked if he needed assistance.
Stusalitus asked why he was not allowed to have his cell phone in the building, and the two men
had a “brief conversation.” Stusalitus began to ask Sergeant Rupert “hypothetical questions”
such as, “What if I put this phone in my pocket and just walk past you?” Realizing that the
2 Pursuant to a December 2022 court order, non-attorney civilians are prohibited from possessing “[l]aptop computers, cellular telephones, camera phones or other electronic or personal communication devices . . . in the Court Building” unless authorized by the presiding judge. The order further provides that “willful violation . . . may be punished as contempt or prosecuted as trespass, as applicable.” 3 Outside the courthouse, at least three signs were posted stating that cell phones are prohibited inside the building, and an additional sign prohibiting the use of cell phones inside the building is located at the top of the stairs leading into the main entrance. The courthouse lobby contains lockers with posted signs stating, “TURN OFF CELL PHONES & PLACE IN LOCKERS.” -2- situation was “going to devolve into something deeper” than merely answering questions,
Sergeant Rupert activated his body camera.
After the body camera was activated, Stusalitus pulled his cell phone from his pocket and
said, “I’ll show it again for your camera.” He stated that he was in a “publicly accessible
hallway” and asked, “If I go past you with the cell phone in my pocket, what then happens to
me?” Sergeant Rupert repeated that Stusalitus was not allowed to have his cell phone. Stusalitus
said “ok” and asked, “and then what?” Sergeant Rupert told him to “either put it where it’s
supposed to be, or you’ll leave the building.” Stusalitus asked, “and what if I don’t?” Sergeant
Rupert answered that Stusalitus could be arrested for trespassing because the sergeant already
explained that cell phones were prohibited. Sergeant Rupert further stated, “If you refuse to
leave, then it will be trespassing.”
During the conversation, a woman walked by the door behind Sergeant Rupert, so he
asked Stusalitus to move to stop blocking the door. When Stusalitus refused to move away from
the door, Sergeant Rupert took his right hand and touched Stusalitus’s left elbow. Stusalitus
twice asked Sergeant Rupert not to touch him, and Sergeant Rupert responded that the
conversation was over and twice asked Stusalitus to leave. Stusalitus told Sergeant Rupert that
he “can ask all [he] want[s]” for Stusalitus to leave and stated that “if [Seargeant Rupert] [was]
telling [him] to leave under threat of arrest, [he] w[ould] leave.”
Sergeant Rupert reiterated that Stusalitus could place his phone in a locker or he could
leave, and he then asked about the purpose of his visit. Stusalitus replied, “I’m trying to see if
you will violate my rights or uphold my rights.” When Sergeant Rupert asked if Stusalitus was
attempting to “goad” him into violating his rights, Stusalitus denied that assertion and stated that
he wanted to see the court clerk to complete a permission form to bring his phone in the
courthouse. After an exchange about whether Stusalitus could record his interaction with the
-3- court clerk, he asked, “may I go in?” to which Sergeant Rupert stated, “if you lock th[e phone]
up.” Stusalitus responded, “Okay, I am not going to lock it up, could I [go in] please?” Sergeant
Rupert told him no and that his options were to put his phone in a vehicle or a locker or that he
could leave. A deputy even offered Stusalitus a quarter for the locker.
Stusalitus again asked the deputies how they would respond if he walked past them, and
Sergeant Rupert told Stusalitus he was not going to walk past them. Stusalitus retorted, “What
would you do if I tried?” Sergeant Rupert warned, “See, that’s . . . where we sometimes have to
use force with people. And you’re putting it to that point where we’re gonna have to use force.
We’ve explained to you your options and you’re refusing to do anything.” Stusalitus contended
that using force was illegal if no crime was committed. He accused Sergeant Rupert of trying to
push him and claimed that it was an “assault.”
Sergeant Rupert then stated, “I’ve explained to you what your options were, and if you
didn’t want to follow them . . . then it was going to be trespassing . . . . Are you ready to
trespass?” Stusalitus asked, “What do you mean, am I ready to trespass?” Sergeant Rupert
asked, “Are you coming in or are you leaving?” Stusalitus responded that he was trying to come
in, and Sergeant Rupert responded, “I’ve explained to you how you can do that, but you don’t
want to seem to follow those rules.”
Stusalitus then stated, “Well, I mean, if you’re telling me I’m going to be arrested unless
I leave, then I’ll leave.” Sergeant Rupert responded, “Alright you’re going to be arrested unless
you leave.” Stusalitus asked, “Are you sure about that?” When Sergeant Rupert said yes and
asked if Stusalitus was ready, Stusalitus asked, “Do you know that’s against the law?” Sergeant
Rupert then grabbed Stusalitus’s left elbow and arrested him for trespassing.
At trial, after the Commonwealth rested, Stusalitus moved to strike the evidence as
insufficient to prove he was trespassing. He argued that he was merely “trying to get permission
-4- to bring his cell phone in” and that the evidence failed to show he was prohibited from entering
the courthouse or that he refused to leave after Sergeant Rupert ordered him off the property. He
specifically contended that there was insufficient evidence of criminal intent because he was
arrested only “five seconds” after he was told to leave. Noting that the deputies repeatedly asked
him to leave, the trial court found that Stusalitus did not have a good-faith belief that he could
stay in the courthouse and denied the motion to strike.
Stusalitus testified in his own defense. He admitted that he knew that he could not bring
a cell phone into the courthouse without authorization and conceded that he had previously
applied for permission to do so. He denied reading the courthouse signs but admitted to
“notic[ing] there were things there.” He acknowledged that the signs said he could not bring his
cell phone into the building and defined the word “building” as “the entirety of the structure.”
He testified that when Sergeant Rupert told him to leave under the threat of arrest, he walked
toward the door “on [his] own free will” and intended to leave.
Stusalitus renewed his motion to strike at the conclusion of all the evidence, arguing that
he was not given reasonable time to comply with Sergeant Rupert’s demand for him to leave and
that he had a bona fide claim of right to remain at the courthouse. He asserted that there was
insufficient evidence of criminal intent. The trial court again denied the motion. Stusalitus now
appeals.
ANALYSIS
A. The trial court properly denied the motion to strike.
Stusalitus contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his trespass conviction. He
makes several arguments. He asserts that the record supports that he had a bona fide claim of right
to remain at the courthouse, that the evidence was insufficient to show he was afforded a reasonable
-5- opportunity to leave the premises after being directed to leave, and that the evidence was
insufficient to prove willful intent.4 We disagree.
“On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘the judgment of the trial court is presumed
correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’”
Ingram v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 59, 76 (2021) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va.
450, 460 (2018)). “The question on appeal, is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Yoder v.
Commonwealth, 298 Va. 180, 182 (2019)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the
reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from
the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App.
149, 161 (2018) (quoting Banks v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 273, 288 (2017)).
1. The record does not support Stusalitus’s assertion that he had a bona fide claim of right to remain in the courthouse after receiving a directive to leave.
Code § 18.2-119 provides in pertinent part: “If any person without authority of law goes
upon or remains upon the lands, buildings or premises of another, or any portion or area thereof,
after having been forbidden to do so, either orally or in writing,” by any person “lawfully in charge
thereof,” he shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. “However, ‘one cannot be convicted of
trespass when one enters or stays upon the land under a bona fide claim of right.’” Commonwealth
v. Kartozia, 304 Va. 321, 332 (2025) (quoting Reed v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 65, 71 (1988)).
“[A] bona fide claim of right is a sincere, although perhaps mistaken, good-faith belief that one has
4 In his first assignment of error, Stusalitus also challenges the trial court’s interpretation of Code § 18.2-119. Specifically, he argues that the deputies lacked authority under the statute to ban him from the courthouse and that the courthouse was a thoroughfare excluded from the reach of Code § 18.2-119. However, because Stusalitus did not raise these arguments in the trial court, they are not preserved and we do not consider them. See Rule 5A:18 (“No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.”). -6- some legal right to be on the property.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Reed, 6 Va. App. at 71).
“The claim need not be one of title or ownership, but it must rise to the level of authorization.” Id.
(quoting Reed, 6 Va. App. at 71). “Thus, a good faith defense requires more than abstract good
faith; it requires a good-faith belief, supported by objective facts that, if true, rise to the level of
being an authorization to enter or remain on the premises.” Id. at 332-33. “Apart from statutory
exceptions, legal authorization to enter or remain on private property requires permission from the
property ‘owner, lessee, custodian or the agent of any such person, or other person lawfully in
charge thereof,’” which are also “the same individuals with authority to exclude one from private
property.” Id. at 333 (quoting Code § 18.2-119).
Here, there are no objective facts on which this Court can conclude that Stusalitus had a
reasonable, good-faith belief that he was authorized to remain on the premises after being instructed
to leave. Stusalitus argued with the deputies for over ten minutes and, during the encounter, he
repeatedly challenged their explanations of the rules he was required to follow to remain in the
courthouse. Sergeant Rupert explained to Stusalitus several times that his options were to put his
cell phone in his vehicle or a locker. Approximately six minutes before the arrest, Sergeant Rupert
informed Stusalitus that he would be asked to leave if he did not comply with one of these options
and warned that he would be arrested for trespassing if he refused that directive. Beyond that,
Stusalitus even conceded at trial that he knew he could not bring a cell phone into the courthouse
without authorization, which he did not have.
Even assuming Stusalitus genuinely believed, as he maintains, that he had the legal right to
remain in the courthouse lobby because it was open to the public, “a sincere belief alone is not
sufficient to create a bona fide claim of right.” Kartozia, 304 Va. at 333. Rather, Stusalitus was
“required to present evidence that his claim of right amounted to . . . a facially valid authorization.”
-7- Id. He failed to do so.5 He presented no evidence that someone with legal authorization to grant
him permission to remain on the property after he was told to leave was present and allowed him to
remain. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that Stusalitus failed to carry his burden of
proving a bona fide claim of right to remain in the courthouse lobby after being told to leave.
2. The evidence was sufficient to prove that Stusalitus was given a reasonable opportunity to leave the courthouse.
In the context of trespass, “[a] person who has been ordered to leave must do so within a
reasonable amount of time under the circumstances.” Carter v. Commonwealth, 300 Va. 371,
375 (2021). Stusalitus argues that Sergeant Rupert did not afford him a reasonable opportunity
to comply with the demand to leave before initiating the arrest. His contention is misguided for a
more fundamental reason: he never began to comply at all. Contrary to his assertion, Stusalitus
did not turn and walk directly toward the door “on his own free will” when Sergeant Rupert
unequivocally directed him to leave under threat of arrest. Instead, he continued to argue with the
sergeant, asking, “Are you sure about that?” And when Sergeant Rupert responded, “yes,” and
asked Stusalitus if he was ready, Stusalitus again continued to argue, asking, “Do you know that’s
illegal?” Those are not the acts of a person in the process of complying with a directive to leave;
they were an affirmative rejection of it. The reasonable-opportunity rule exists to protect a person
who needs time to physically depart, not to provide an occasion to relitigate one’s right to remain.
Sergeant Rupert afforded Stusalitus a reasonable amount of time to leave and, instead of doing so,
Stusalitus used that time to continue arguing with the sergeant. As discussed further below, that
choice was not accidental. It reflected the same willful intent that pervaded the entire encounter.
Accordingly, we do not disturb the trial court’s finding.
5 Indeed, his claim that Code § 18.2-119 “cannot apply to a citizen upon public property,” because “citizens enjoy authority of law to be upon public property,” contradicts the well-settled principle that “trespass statute[s] . . . appl[y] to publicly owned property other than thoroughfares.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 579, 582 (1972). -8- 3. The evidence was sufficient to prove the element of willful intent.
“Intent in fact is the purpose formed in a person’s mind and may be, and frequently is,
shown by circumstances. It is a state of mind which may be shown by a person’s conduct or by his
statements.” Austin v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 60, 66 (2012) (quoting Vincent v.
Commonwealth, 276 Va. 648, 652 (2008)). Although Code § 18.2-119 is silent as to intent, the
statutory offense of criminal trespass “has been uniformly construed to require a willful trespass.”
Lawson v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 610, 616 (2001). “‘Willful’ generally means an act done
with a bad purpose, without justifiable excuse, or without ground for believing it is lawful.” Ellis v.
Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 548, 554 (1999). It “denotes ‘an act which is intentional, or knowing,
or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental.’” Id. (quoting Snead v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App.
643, 646 (1991)). “Intent may, and most often must, be proven by circumstantial evidence and the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from proven facts are within the province of the trier of fact.”
Austin, 60 Va. App. at 66 (quoting Fleming v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 349, 353 (1991)).
Here, Stusalitus admitted knowing that he was not allowed to bring his cell phone into the
courthouse. Indeed, on the day of the offense, he was there to check on the status of his application
for permission to take his cell phone inside the building. Despite this, Stusalitus took his phone
through the security checkpoint and attempted to enter the interior of the building with it. During
the ensuing exchange with Sergeant Rupert, Stusalitus was told several times that he could not pass
through the main entrance with the cell phone and that his options were to lock the phone up or
leave the building. He refused both options. Sergeant Rupert warned Stusalitus that he would be
asked to leave if he continued to refuse those options and arrested for trespass if he did not comply.
Instead of leaving when Sergeant Rupert unequivocally directed him to under threat of arrest,
Stusalitus continued to argue with the sergeant. On these facts, the trial court’s finding that
-9- Stusalitus’s conduct was willful and intentional is not plainly wrong or without evidence to support
it. Accordingly, we leave that finding undisturbed.
B. Stusalitus did not preserve his constitutional challenge to Code § 18.2-119.
Stusalitus contends that Code § 18.2-119 is unconstitutional as applied to his conduct.
Specifically, he argues that he did not use force, that he did not block other citizens “in utilizing the
property,” that he did not damage any property, and that “[t]here was no interference with the
owner’s use of the property.” He also notes that he was allowed to return to the courthouse during
the pendency of the proceedings and even encountered Sergeant Rupert again without incident,
which suggests that “his ability to be on the property was never removed.” We do not consider
these arguments, however, because he did not preserve the issue for appeal.
“No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless an objection
was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to
enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.” Rule 5A:18. “Rule 5A:18 requires a litigant to make
timely and specific objections, so that the trial court has ‘an opportunity to rule intelligently on the
issues presented, thus avoiding unnecessary appeals and reversals.’” Brown v. Commonwealth, 279
Va. 210, 217 (2010) (quoting West v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 327, 337 (2004)).
Stusalitus concedes that he did not raise his constitutional argument in the trial court.
Nonetheless, he asks us to invoke the ends of justice exception. “‘The ends of justice exception is
narrow and is to be used sparingly,’ and applies only in the extraordinary situation where a
miscarriage of justice has occurred.” Holt v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 199, 209 (2016) (en
banc) (quoting Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215, 220 (1997)). “In order to avail oneself
of the exception, a defendant must affirmatively show that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, not
that a miscarriage might have occurred.” Redman, 25 Va. App. at 221. “The burden of establishing
a manifest injustice is a heavy one, and it rests with the appellant.” Holt, 66 Va. App. at 210
- 10 - (quoting Brittle v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 505, 514 (2009)). The “exception requires proof of
an error that was ‘clear, substantial and material.’” West, 43 Va. App. at 338 (quoting Brown v.
Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 126, 132 (1989)). “Virginia courts applying the ends-of-justice
exception require a defendant to present not only a winning argument on appeal but also one
demonstrating that the trial court’s error results in a ‘grave injustice’ or a wholly inexcusable ‘denial
of essential rights.’” Winslow v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 539, 546-47 (2013) (quoting Brittle,
54 Va. App. at 513). “Where the record does not affirmatively establish error, we cannot invoke the
ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 710, 724 (2012).
Stusalitus has failed to carry his burden of proving a manifest injustice. Although he asks
that we consider his constitutional argument under the ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18, he
fails to put forth any argument as to how the ends of justice exception applies in his case. Nor does
he offer any case law in support of his assertion that his failure to properly preserve his
constitutional argument for appeal has resulted in a manifest injustice—and we fail to see one.
Stusalitus was prohibited by signage and by several deputies from bringing his cell phone into the
building. Rather than accepting that, he held the deputies up from their normal duties and engaged
in a ten-minute confrontation to discuss “hypothetical” scenarios that had nothing to do with his
constitutional rights. The trial court did not accept such gamesmanship, nor do we. And we will
not apply the ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18 merely on Stusalitus’s bare assertion that the
exception applies. The argument is waived, and we will not consider it.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Stusalitus’s trespassing conviction is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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