Leodan Cruz-Hernandez v. U,S, Attorney General
This text of Leodan Cruz-Hernandez v. U,S, Attorney General (Leodan Cruz-Hernandez v. U,S, Attorney General) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
USCA11 Case: 25-12030 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 11/05/2025 Page: 1 of 3
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-12030 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
LEODAN CRUZ-HERNANDEZ, Petitioner, versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. ____________________ Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Agency No. A098-948-457 ____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Leodan Cruz-Hernandez, proceeding pro se, petitions for re- view of a July 3, 2007, ruling by an immigration judge (“IJ”) order- ing him removed to Honduras in absentia. The government USCA11 Case: 25-12030 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 11/05/2025 Page: 2 of 3
2 Opinion of the Court 25-12030
moves to dismiss Cruz-Hernandez’s petition for review because (1) it is untimely, and (2) Cruz-Hernandez failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies. The government is correct that Cruz-Hernandez has failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies in connection with the July 3, 2007, removal order. See Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (requiring that a non-citizen exhaust all administrative remedies available to him be- fore he may seek review of a removal order in a court of appeals). Cruz-Hernandez did not move to reopen the removal proceedings or appeal the removal order to the Board of Immigration of Ap- peals (“BIA”), as he was required to do. See INA § 240(b)(5)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) (describing procedure for moving to reopen removal proceedings after an in absentia removal order is issued); Dacostagomez-Aguilar v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 40 F.4th 1312, 1314-20 (11th Cir. 2022) (reviewing a BIA order affirming an IJ’s denial of a motion to reopen challenging an in absentia removal order based on lack of notice). Because the government raised the exhaustion issue in its motion to dismiss, we must enforce it. See Santos-Zacaria v. Gar- land, 598 U.S. 411, 416-23 (2023) (holding that § 1252(d)(1)’s exhaus- tion requirement is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule); Hamer v. Neighborhood Servs. of Chicago, 583 U.S. 17, 20 (2017) (“If properly invoked, mandatory claim-processing rules must be en- forced.”). USCA11 Case: 25-12030 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 11/05/2025 Page: 3 of 3
25-12030 Opinion of the Court 3
Accordingly, we GRANT the government’s motion to dis- miss and DISMISS the petition. All other pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
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