L.E.O. v. A.S.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: June 13, 2025
• Docket: A-3382-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3382-23

L.E.O.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

A.S.,

Defendant-Appellant. ________________________

Submitted June 5, 2025 – Decided June 13, 2025

Before Judges Mawla and Walcott-Henderson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County, Docket No. FV-13-1892-24.

Berse Law, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Samuel J. Berse, on the briefs).

Law Office of Steven P. Monaghan, LLC, attorneys for respondent (Kristin S. Pallonetti, on the brief).

PER CURIAM Defendant A.S.1 appeals from the entry of a June 13, 2024 final restraining

order (FRO) against her in favor of plaintiff L.E.O. pursuant to the Prevention

of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. We affirm.

The parties had a long-term marriage and had been divorced for nearly

seven years when plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO). The

marriage produced one child, who was an adult at the time of the TRO.

Plaintiff's domestic violence complaint alleged defendant committed

harassment on April 1, 19, and 20, 2024, and asserted an eight-year history of

stalking and harassment. The parties testified at trial and adduced limited

documentary evidence.

Plaintiff testified that a year prior to the first predicate act, he paid for an

intervention with defendant's family "to try to get [her] help because she has a

very volatile relationship[ with her family] . . . and lost most of her relationships

[with them]." The intervention was unsuccessful.

On March 31, 2024, the day prior to the first predicate incident, plaintiff

met defendant in a public park "pleading with her to . . . get help and that [he]

wanted to support her." Defendant had been accusing plaintiff of being involved

with Russian organized crime, committing tax fraud, and involving their son in

1 We utilize initials pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(d)(9) and (10). A-3382-23 2 it all. The purpose of the meeting was to show her that none of these accusations

were true, to express his concern about her mental health, and explain how the

accusations she was making were affecting him and their son. The meeting

ended when defendant "went into a wild rage and left."

On April 1, defendant appeared at plaintiff's home unannounced and "rang

the doorbell incessantly." Plaintiff did not answer the door but knew it was

defendant because her car was parked adjacent to his home. After defendant left

plaintiff's home, she sent him forty-two text messages, including expletives,

which plaintiff described as "[a] stream of consciousness," regarding plaintiff's

female business partner and threatening to call the police and have plaintiff sent

to jail. The parties' marriage ended in part because of an affair plaintiff had with

his business partner. Defendant was angry the business partner was at plaintiff's

home and claimed she should not be around their son.

Defendant threatened to have plaintiff incarcerated. She said she would

call the police, FBI, and IRS because of his perceived criminal conduct.

Defendant also claimed plaintiff had broken into her home and planted listening

devices; hacked her computer; sabotaged her car; and was tracking her through

his iPad, her television, and her Ring camera. She also believed plaintiff was

A-3382-23 3 communicating with her through her Alexa device. Plaintiff described the texts

as "the standard threats that [he has] been getting for years."

On April 19, the texting continued when defendant sent plaintiff twelve

texts within a two-and-one-half-hour period. Defendant enlisted her brother-in-

law to dismantle her Ring camera to search for listening devices, and when he

failed to find any, defendant began texting plaintiff accusing him of involving

the brother-in-law in spying on her. When plaintiff responded to one of

defendant's texts, she responded with eight more texts accusing him of hacking

her phone and bugging her. Defendant's texts also referred to the business

partner and the parties' son.

The texting escalated on April 20 and was similar to the day before in

content and volume. Plaintiff described it as "delusional in nature." Defendant

continued texting plaintiff after he received a TRO and approached him in court

to tell him she would never stop.

Plaintiff testified he needed an FRO because defendant's conduct has

"continued and escalated" and "after six-and-a-half years of divorce [he] simply

can't take it anymore. . . . It's constant."

During cross-examination, defense counsel confronted plaintiff with

evidence purporting to show that plaintiff was electronically tracking defendant.

A-3382-23 4 However, plaintiff explained that one program was a Bluetooth device that

defendant's vehicle utilizes, and the other was a location sharing program on

defendant's phone, which showed the location of an old iPad belonging to

plaintiff that had not worked in ten years. Plaintiff testified that he told

defendant how to remove his iPad's location from her device.

Defendant testified the March 31 meeting in the park occurred because

she believed plaintiff was involving their son in a financial crime . She claimed

that, at the meeting, plaintiff told her he borrowed money from organized crime.

Defendant told plaintiff she was "like a champagne bottle ready to pop. And

[she was] about to drive into the next police station [she] pass[ed]." She gave

plaintiff "two weeks to write a letter of apology to [their] son for teaching him

how to get caught up in the criminal system." The parties did not come to a

resolution during their meeting because plaintiff wanted her to say she had

mental problems, and she believed they had a "parenting problem."

Defendant reiterated her belief that plaintiff had bugged her residence.

She claimed she found a listening device in a smoke detector and had her home

scanned four times and has been paying professionals $125 per hour to help

combat the hacking of her devices. Defendant asserted one of the computer

specialists she hired shared a suite with plaintiff's business partner and

A-3382-23 5 deliberately crashed and erased her computer data. She claimed plaintiff

controlled her iCloud account and could see messages sent between her and their

son.

Defendant explained she went to plaintiff's home on April 1 after she saw

his mother, who mentioned the parties' meeting in the park the day before. She

then decided to go to plaintiff's home to resolve the dispute, but when he did not

appear at the door, she left.

Defendant admitted texting plaintiff after she was served with the TRO.

She claimed she misunderstood the restraints and believed they did not control

until after the parties appeared in court.

During summations, defense counsel urged the trial judge to find the

parties' disputes were domestic contretemps and a parenting dispute. Plaintiff

reiterated he had no interest in surveilling defendant and "just want[ed] to be

left alone."

The trial judge credited plaintiff's testimony and found defendant not

credible. Given the parties' history, the judge found it not credible that plaintiff

would have admitted to taking money from organized crime during their meeting

on March 31.

A-3382-23 6 The judge also disbelieved defendant's evidence of the alleged bugging of

her home. She noted defendant adduced a picture of a device she claimed she

found in the smoke detector. However, the judge had "no idea what that was. It

could have been part of the smoke detector. There's no testimony otherwise."

None of "the people that were with her when she found it" testified to

corroborate her claims. No one testified the object was a listening device and

"even if it were[,] there's no indication as to how it got there, or that . . . plaintiff

in any way got it there." Defendant offered no proof her Ring camera had been

hacked. The judge noted defendant had testified plaintiff did not have keys to

her house and that defendant had changed the locks.

There was likewise no proof plaintiff had involved the parties' son in a

crime. Defendant's testimony "corroborated [plaintiff's] claims that she's

making these wild accusations against him without any basis for them and that

it's non-stop."

The judge credited plaintiff's testimony showing defendant's behavior was

unceasing and that he could no longer bear her threats to report him to the

authorities. Defendant's text messages and trial testimony were "non-linear in

thought" and corroborative of plaintiff's "point that she is making these demands

on him knowingly, and with the intent that it gets a reaction out of him and . . .

A-3382-23 7 puts him in fear . . . that she's going to report him to police, [and] he's going to

jail." The judge concluded defendant had committed harassment and given the

history of "continuous accusations and threats to go to the" authorities, the judge

could not see defendant "stopping this line of communication . . . unless she's

told she has to."

As part of the relief granted in the FRO, based on the evidence presented,

the judge ordered defendant to have a psychological examination. She also

continued the restraints against defendant's ability to communicate or contact

plaintiff's mother, which he had obtained in the TRO.

I.

On appeal, defendant argues plaintiff did not prove she intended to harass

him. Her communications were borne of a sincere belief plaintiff was engaging

in criminality and dragging their son into it. Moreover, the parties were

mutually texting one another, which does not support a conclusion that

defendant was targeting plaintiff for harassment. Also, plaintiff did not establish

the need for the protection of an FRO because there was no evidence he feared

defendant. She points to the March 31 meeting as evidence he was not afraid of

her.

A-3382-23 8 Alternatively, defendant argues that, if we do not vacate the FRO, we

should vacate the provision including plaintiff's mother as a protected party. She

asserts there was no testimony or findings as to why the mother was listed as a

protected party.

II.

Our review of a trial judge's fact-finding function is limited. Cesare v.

Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). A judge's findings of fact "are binding on

appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, [and] credible evidence." Id.

at 411-12 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484

(1974)). We will not disturb a judge's factual findings unless "convinced that

they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent,

relevant[,] and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice."

Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484 (quoting Fagliarone v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 78 N.J.

Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 1963)).

Deference is particularly warranted where, as here, "the evidence is

largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility." Cesare, 154 N.J. at

412 (quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)).

This is "because the trial [court] 'hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses,

and hears them testify,' affording it 'a better perspective than a reviewing court

A-3382-23 9 in evaluating the veracity of a witness.'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428

(2015) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412). We accord deference to the Family

Part's fact-finding "[b]ecause of the family courts' special jurisdiction and

expertise in family matters." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413.

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, a person commits harassment if, "with

purpose to harass another," they: "(a) Make[], or cause[] to be made, one or

more communications . . . [in] any other manner likely to cause annoyance or

alarm; . . . or (c) [e]ngage[] in any other course of alarming conduct or of

repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other

person." A purpose to harass must be supported by "some evidence that the

actor's conscious object was to alarm or annoy; mere awareness that someone

might be alarmed or annoyed is insufficient." J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 487

(2011) (citing State v. Fuchs, 230 N.J. Super. 420, 428 (App. Div. 1989)).

A court does "not measure the effect of the speech upon the victim; [it]

look[s] to the purpose of the actor in making the communication." E.M.B. v.

R.F.B., 419 N.J. Super. 177, 182 (App. Div. 2011) (citing State v. L.C., 283 N.J.

Super. 441, 450 (App. Div. 1995)). A purpose to harass may be inferred from

the evidence. State v. McDougald, 120 N.J. 523, 566-67 (1990). Common sense

and experience may also inform the determination or finding of purpose. State

A-3382-23 10 v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 577 (1997) (citing State v. Richards, 155 N.J. Super.

106, 118 (App. Div. 1978)).

Although a single communication may be sufficient to establish a

defendant's liability under the harassment statute, a trial court must,

nevertheless, "consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether

the harassment statute has been violated." H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309, 326

(2003) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 404). After finding a predicate act of

domestic violence, a trial court must next consider whether "a restraining order

is necessary, upon an evaluation of the [factors] set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-

29(a)(1) to -29(a)(6), to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to

prevent further abuse." J.D., 207 N.J. at 475-76 (quoting Silver v. Silver, 387

N.J. Super. 112, 126-27 (App. Div. 2006)).

Although the trial judge's findings do not indicate whether she found

harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) or (c), we are satisfied harassment was

established under both parts of the statute. The evidence in the record showed

defendant's communications had no valid purpose other than to alarm plaintiff

and that her conduct was a part of the course of conduct designed to alarm or

seriously annoy plaintiff. Although defendant couched her communications as

A-3382-23 11 a concern for the parties' son, he is an adult, and her concerns could have been

communicated without threatening plaintiff.

The record supports both plaintiff's testimony that defendant lacked self-

control and the judge's conclusions regarding defendant's "non-linear" thinking

and erratic behavior. We note that, during defendant's testimony, the judge had

to instruct her to sit down on one occasion and separately instructed her to stop

staring at plaintiff. The totality of the circumstances, including old scars from

the demise of the marriage, which have in part fueled defendant's beliefs about

plaintiff since then, convince us there was no answer he could give her when

they met on March 31 or afterwards that would have abated her conduct.

"At its core, the [PDVA] effectuates the notion that the victim of domestic

violence is entitled to be left alone. To be left alone is, in essence, the basic

protection the law seeks to assure these victims." Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 584. We

are satisfied the facts and evidence warranted the entry of an FRO to achieve

this basic protection for plaintiff.

Finally, we reject defendant's argument that we should vacate the

inclusion of plaintiff's mother as a protected party on the FRO, even though the

trial judge made no specific findings why she included her as a protected party.

A-3382-23 12 The New Jersey Domestic Violence Procedures Manual (DV Manual)2 explains

a protected party is "[a] third[-]party that is included under the protections of an

active restraining order. The protected party does not need to qualify as a victim

in order to be added to the restraining order, however the judge must set forth

the reason for the protection." Sup. Ct. of N.J. & Att'y Gen. of N.J., New Jersey

Domestic Violence Procedures Manual, § I(A) at 13 (Apr. 22, 2022).

At the outset, we note the TRO, which initially listed plaintiff's mother as

a protected party, was entered by the same judge who tried the FRO.

Additionally, at trial defendant testified the catalyst for her going to plaintiff's

home on April 1 was her chance encounter with his mother at the supermarket

earlier that day.

The PDVA was intended "to assure the victims of domestic violence the

maximum protection from abuse the law can provide." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. In

this regard, Family Part judges are afforded the discretion to extend the

protections of an FRO to others including "family members . . . or others with

whom communication would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the

victim." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(7).

2 The DV Manual is found at https://www.njcourts.gov/sites/default/files/courts/family/dvprcman.pdf. A-3382-23 13 "[I]t is well-settled that appeals are taken from orders and judgments and

not from opinions . . . or reasons given for the ultimate conclusion." Do-Wop

Corp. v. City of Rahway, 168 N.J. 191, 199 (2001) (citing Heffner v. Jacobson,

100 N.J. 550, 553 (1985)). We review orders, not opinions. Ibid.

Pursuant to these legal principles and the circumstances of this case, it

was reasonable for the FRO to continue to include plaintiff's mother as a

protected party. Given that a chance meeting led defendant to commit a

predicate act of harassment and its sequalae, it was necessary to extend the

FRO's protections to plaintiff's mother to protect plaintiff.

Affirmed.

A-3382-23 14