Opinion issued July 17, 2025
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00050-CV ——————————— LEO D. ROBINSON, Appellant V. ISAAC JONES, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 3 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1197539
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This in an appeal from a default judgment in a breach-of-contract action. The
plaintiff in the justice court below appealed a take-nothing judgment to the county
court. He then failed to appear at the de novo trial. The county court rendered a
default judgment against him on the defendant’s counterclaim. The plaintiff now appeals that default judgment—complaining that the
pleadings and evidence in support are insufficient. Because the pleadings are
sufficient and he did not file the reporter’s record of the de novo trial, we affirm the
county court’s judgment.
Background
Isaac Jones hired Leo D. Robinson to remodel a house for $41,000. During
the project, a dispute arose. According to Robinson, Jones paid only half of the
agreed amount and then just stopped paying. Jones maintains that Robinson’s work
was substandard and that he failed to complete the job. Jones hired another
contractor to finish the project.
Robinson sued Jones in justice court for breach of contract, seeking $14,000
in damages. Jones answered and counterclaimed for breach of contract. He sought
$13,680 in damages—the difference between what he paid Robinson and the value
of the work performed—along with attorney’s fees. The justice court rendered a
take-nothing judgment against both parties.
Robinson appealed to the county court for a trial de novo. Before trial,
Robinson filed photographs and copies of receipts. Jones filed a letter from
Robinson memorializing their agreement; copies of quotes, invoices, and receipts;
photographs; contractors’ affidavits regarding the alleged deficiencies in Robinson’s
work; and an affidavit and billing in support of Jones’s request for attorney’s fees.
2 After Robinson failed to appear at trial, the county court rendered a default
judgment against him on Jones’s counterclaim. The county court awarded Jones
$13,680 in damages and $13,230 in attorney’s fees—a total of $26,9101—against
Robinson.
Pleadings
In his first issue, Robinson argues that Jones “failed to give fair notice” of his
counterclaim because he “never filed an answer, counter-claim or appeal as it relates
to the matter before the county court.” The record does not support his argument.
A trial court may not grant relief in the absence of pleadings to support the
requested relief. Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 682–83 (Tex. 1979). A
pleading setting forth a claim for relief must contain, among other things, a demand
for judgment for all relief sought. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 47. Texas follows a “fair
notice” pleading standard, which considers whether it can be ascertained from the
pleading the controversy’s nature, the basic issues, and what testimony will be
relevant. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 896 (Tex. 2000).
When no special exceptions are filed, like here, we construe the pleadings liberally
in favor of the pleader. Id. at 897; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 90.
1 The county court’s Second Amended Default Judgment stated a total award of $29,910. The county court later corrected the sum of the award to $26,910 in a judgment nunc pro tunc. 3 When an appeal has been perfected from the justice court to the county court,
the justice court “must immediately send to the clerk of the county court a certified
copy of all docket entries, a certified copy of the bill of costs, and the original papers
in the case.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.2 (emphasis added). Thus, “the petition from the
justice court is effectively carried forward to the county court at law on appeal for
the trial de novo.” Williams v. Bayview-Realty Assocs., 420 S.W.3d 358, 362 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). “[T]he written pleadings of record in
the justice court will generally constitute an appearance by the respective parties of
record in the county court.” Withrow v. Schou, 13 S.W.3d 37, 40 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). “Additional pleadings are not necessary for
a trial de novo in the county court where the pleadings in the justice court are in
writing.” Id. at 39.
Here, Jones filed a combined answer and counterclaim in the justice court. In
his pleading, Jones presented factual allegations and stated that he:
seeks and is entitled to recovery of the sum of $13,680 owed for breach of contract by [Robinson] for the difference between the work [Robinson] was paid for and the work actually performed ($20,500 of work paid for minus $8,500 of estimated work performed = $12,000) and the additional interest expense incurred by [Jones] in his construction loan as a result of [Robinson’s] lengthy project delays ($1,680).
Jones also requested attorney’s fees.
4 After Robinson appealed to the county court, the justice court sent the papers
in this case—including Jones’s answer and counterclaim—to the county court.2 See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.2. This carried Jones’s counterclaim forward into the county
court’s record for the trial de novo. See Williams, 420 S.W.3d at 362. As a result,
the record simply does not support Robinson’s claim that Jones “had no pleadings
on file for purposes of the appeal” in the county court.3
We overrule Robinson’s first issue.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Next, Robinson argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient
to support the amount of damages and attorney’s fees awarded. He argues that the
damages were unliquidated and that Jones failed to “present competent evidence” of
the amount of his “lost profits.”
Jones responds that this issue should be overruled because Robinson failed to
file the reporter’s record of the de novo trial.
2 In his “Pre-Trial Filings” supplement in the county court, Jones also restated his answer and counterclaim. 3 Robinson did not file special exceptions in the courts below and does not challenge the substance of Jones’s pleading in this appeal. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 90; Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 896 (Tex. 2000). 5 A post-answer default4 “constitutes neither an abandonment of the
defendant’s answer nor an implied confession of any issues thus joined by the
defendant’s answer.” Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 372 S.W.3d
177, 183 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Stoner, 578 S.W.2d at 682). “Because the merits of
the plaintiff’s claim remain at issue, judgment cannot be rendered on the pleadings,
and the plaintiff must prove its claim.” Id.
We review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a post-answer default
judgment under the same standards that govern the sufficiency of the evidence at a
contested trial. Reagins v. Walker, 524 S.W.3d 757, 762 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
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Opinion issued July 17, 2025
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00050-CV ——————————— LEO D. ROBINSON, Appellant V. ISAAC JONES, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 3 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1197539
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This in an appeal from a default judgment in a breach-of-contract action. The
plaintiff in the justice court below appealed a take-nothing judgment to the county
court. He then failed to appear at the de novo trial. The county court rendered a
default judgment against him on the defendant’s counterclaim. The plaintiff now appeals that default judgment—complaining that the
pleadings and evidence in support are insufficient. Because the pleadings are
sufficient and he did not file the reporter’s record of the de novo trial, we affirm the
county court’s judgment.
Background
Isaac Jones hired Leo D. Robinson to remodel a house for $41,000. During
the project, a dispute arose. According to Robinson, Jones paid only half of the
agreed amount and then just stopped paying. Jones maintains that Robinson’s work
was substandard and that he failed to complete the job. Jones hired another
contractor to finish the project.
Robinson sued Jones in justice court for breach of contract, seeking $14,000
in damages. Jones answered and counterclaimed for breach of contract. He sought
$13,680 in damages—the difference between what he paid Robinson and the value
of the work performed—along with attorney’s fees. The justice court rendered a
take-nothing judgment against both parties.
Robinson appealed to the county court for a trial de novo. Before trial,
Robinson filed photographs and copies of receipts. Jones filed a letter from
Robinson memorializing their agreement; copies of quotes, invoices, and receipts;
photographs; contractors’ affidavits regarding the alleged deficiencies in Robinson’s
work; and an affidavit and billing in support of Jones’s request for attorney’s fees.
2 After Robinson failed to appear at trial, the county court rendered a default
judgment against him on Jones’s counterclaim. The county court awarded Jones
$13,680 in damages and $13,230 in attorney’s fees—a total of $26,9101—against
Robinson.
Pleadings
In his first issue, Robinson argues that Jones “failed to give fair notice” of his
counterclaim because he “never filed an answer, counter-claim or appeal as it relates
to the matter before the county court.” The record does not support his argument.
A trial court may not grant relief in the absence of pleadings to support the
requested relief. Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 682–83 (Tex. 1979). A
pleading setting forth a claim for relief must contain, among other things, a demand
for judgment for all relief sought. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 47. Texas follows a “fair
notice” pleading standard, which considers whether it can be ascertained from the
pleading the controversy’s nature, the basic issues, and what testimony will be
relevant. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 896 (Tex. 2000).
When no special exceptions are filed, like here, we construe the pleadings liberally
in favor of the pleader. Id. at 897; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 90.
1 The county court’s Second Amended Default Judgment stated a total award of $29,910. The county court later corrected the sum of the award to $26,910 in a judgment nunc pro tunc. 3 When an appeal has been perfected from the justice court to the county court,
the justice court “must immediately send to the clerk of the county court a certified
copy of all docket entries, a certified copy of the bill of costs, and the original papers
in the case.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.2 (emphasis added). Thus, “the petition from the
justice court is effectively carried forward to the county court at law on appeal for
the trial de novo.” Williams v. Bayview-Realty Assocs., 420 S.W.3d 358, 362 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). “[T]he written pleadings of record in
the justice court will generally constitute an appearance by the respective parties of
record in the county court.” Withrow v. Schou, 13 S.W.3d 37, 40 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). “Additional pleadings are not necessary for
a trial de novo in the county court where the pleadings in the justice court are in
writing.” Id. at 39.
Here, Jones filed a combined answer and counterclaim in the justice court. In
his pleading, Jones presented factual allegations and stated that he:
seeks and is entitled to recovery of the sum of $13,680 owed for breach of contract by [Robinson] for the difference between the work [Robinson] was paid for and the work actually performed ($20,500 of work paid for minus $8,500 of estimated work performed = $12,000) and the additional interest expense incurred by [Jones] in his construction loan as a result of [Robinson’s] lengthy project delays ($1,680).
Jones also requested attorney’s fees.
4 After Robinson appealed to the county court, the justice court sent the papers
in this case—including Jones’s answer and counterclaim—to the county court.2 See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.2. This carried Jones’s counterclaim forward into the county
court’s record for the trial de novo. See Williams, 420 S.W.3d at 362. As a result,
the record simply does not support Robinson’s claim that Jones “had no pleadings
on file for purposes of the appeal” in the county court.3
We overrule Robinson’s first issue.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Next, Robinson argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient
to support the amount of damages and attorney’s fees awarded. He argues that the
damages were unliquidated and that Jones failed to “present competent evidence” of
the amount of his “lost profits.”
Jones responds that this issue should be overruled because Robinson failed to
file the reporter’s record of the de novo trial.
2 In his “Pre-Trial Filings” supplement in the county court, Jones also restated his answer and counterclaim. 3 Robinson did not file special exceptions in the courts below and does not challenge the substance of Jones’s pleading in this appeal. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 90; Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 896 (Tex. 2000). 5 A post-answer default4 “constitutes neither an abandonment of the
defendant’s answer nor an implied confession of any issues thus joined by the
defendant’s answer.” Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 372 S.W.3d
177, 183 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Stoner, 578 S.W.2d at 682). “Because the merits of
the plaintiff’s claim remain at issue, judgment cannot be rendered on the pleadings,
and the plaintiff must prove its claim.” Id.
We review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a post-answer default
judgment under the same standards that govern the sufficiency of the evidence at a
contested trial. Reagins v. Walker, 524 S.W.3d 757, 762 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (reviewing legal and factual sufficiency in post-answer-default
context); see also Norman Commc’ns v. Tex. Eastman Co., 955 S.W.2d 269, 270
(Tex. 1997).
When a party challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting an
adverse finding on an issue on which he did not have the burden of proof, he must
show that no evidence supports the finding. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co.,
L.C., 348 S.W.3d 194, 215 (Tex. 2011); see City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d
802, 809–10, 827 (Tex. 2005). In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence
4 Although Robinson did not answer the counterclaim until after trial in the county court, he had already appeared in the lawsuit (as plaintiff) and is therefore deemed to have pleaded a general denial. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 92; Kaswatuka v. Stoneridge Homeowners’ Ass’n, No. 02-24-00051-CV, 2024 WL 3714995, at *2 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth Aug. 8, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.). 6 supporting the adverse finding, we “consider and weigh all of the evidence” and set
aside the judgment only if the evidence supporting the finding is so weak as to make
the judgment clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Tamuno Ifiesimama v. Haile, 522
S.W.3d 675, 683–84 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). Thus, our
review requires us to consider all the evidence.
When a party raises an issue on appeal that relies on the evidence presented
to the trial court—but there is no reporter’s record filed in the appeal—we must
presume that the trial court heard sufficient evidence to make all necessary findings
in support of its judgment. See Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 229–30 (Tex.
2002); Nicholson v. Fifth Third Bank, 226 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (“[An appellant] cannot prevail in any evidentiary challenge
without first meeting his burden of presenting a sufficient record on appeal.”).
Here, the county’s court’s judgment states that Jones appeared at trial and
“presented all exhibits of evidence.” Robinson argues that the evidence is
insufficient to support the damages and attorney’s fees awarded against him, but he
did not file a reporter’s record in this appeal. The court reporter has certified to this
Court that a record was made of the county court’s bench trial but that Robinson did
not request that it be prepared and filed in the appeal.
Because Robinson did not file the reporter’s record of the trial, we do not
know what evidence was admitted and must presume that the county court heard
7 sufficient evidence to make all necessary findings in support of its judgment. See
Bennett, 96 S.W.3d at 229–30; Nicholson, 226 S.W.3d at 583.5 We therefore must
conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the county
court’s default judgment.6
With respect to the amount of the judgment, we note that a county court
generally may not issue an award that exceeds the jurisdictional limits of the justice
court from which the appeal is taken. See Crumpton v. Stevens, 936 S.W.2d 473, 476
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no writ). A justice court’s jurisdiction is limited to
cases in which the amount in controversy is not more than $20,000, exclusive of
interest. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 27.031(a)(1).
However, this “general rule does not apply to additional sums that are
sustained as a result of the passage of time, such as attorney’s fees.” Carnegie Homes
& Constr. LLC v. Turk, No. 14-16-00260-CV, 2017 WL 3927290, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 7, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (internal quotations
5 See, e.g., Onwubuche v. Olowolayemo, No. 01-10-00945-CV, 2012 WL 1067950, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 29, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting appellant failed to file reporter’s record of de novo trial, presuming evidence sufficient, and upholding county court’s post-answer default judgment); Brazle v. Meadows on the Mews Owners Ass’n, No. 14-10-01016-CV, 2011 WL 6141587, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 8, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Because we have no record of what th[e] evidence consisted of, we have no basis to review the trial court’s decisions based on that evidence.”). 6 See, e.g., Henderson v. Altura Realty LLC, No. 05-21-00860-CV, 2023 WL 3860428, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 7, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). 8 omitted); see Lost Creek Ventures, LLC v. Pilgrim, No. 01-15-00375-CV, 2016 WL
3569756, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 30, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(“[T]he county court may award attorney’s fees in excess of the jurisdictional limits
of the small claims court on appeal, because fees increase as litigation continues over
time.”). In other words, “[i]f a [pleading] is properly brought in a particular court,
but an amendment increases the amount in controversy above the court’s
jurisdictional limits, the court will continue to have jurisdiction if the additional
damages accrued because of the passage of time.” Cont’l Coffee Prods. Co. v.
Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Tex. 1996).
Here, Jones alleged in his January 2023 counterclaim in the justice court that
he had incurred $13,680 in damages and “ha[d] incurred or expected to incur
$3,500–$4,000 in attorney’s fees”—a total within the $20,000 jurisdictional limit of
the justice court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 27.031(a)(1).
Over a year later, in March 2024, the county court awarded Jones a total of
$26,910—which is $6,910 beyond the jurisdiction of the underlying justice court.
See id. The judgment awards Jones $13,680 in damages—the amount he originally
requested. The award of attorney’s fees increased to $13,230.
Because the additional $6,910 can be attributed to the increase in attorney’s
fees over the year-long course of litigation in this case, we hold that the county
court’s award is within its appellate jurisdiction. See Crumpton, 936 S.W.2d at 477
9 (attorney’s fees claim that exceeded jurisdictional limit of justice court was due to
increased attorney’s fees incurred in prosecuting suit and did not divest county court
of jurisdiction).
We overrule Robinson’s second issue.
Conclusion
Based on the record before us, we affirm the county court’s judgment in all
things.
Terry Adams Chief Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Gunn and Guiney.