Leo Blas v. Bank of America, N.A.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 24, 2023
• Docket: 21-35832
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 24 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LEO BLAS, No. 21-35832

Appellant, D.C. No. 3:20-cv-00271-RRB

v. MEMORANDUM* BANK OF AMERICA, NA; KENNETH W. BATTLEY, Trustee,

Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska Ralph R. Beistline, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 18, 2023**

Before: SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Chapter 7 debtor Leo Blas appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

affirming the bankruptcy court’s order approving the Chapter 7 trustee’s settlement

of an adversary proceeding. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Blas’s requests for oral argument, set forth in the opening and reply briefs, are denied. review de novo a district court’s decision on appeal from a bankruptcy court, and

we apply the same standard of review the district court applied to the bankruptcy

court’s decision. Christensen v. Tucson Ests., Inc. (In re Tucson Ests., Inc.), 912

F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1990). We affirm.

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by approving the

settlement agreement because the facts in the record establish that the compromise

was fair, reasonable, equitable, and adequate. See Martin v. Kane (In re A & C

Props.), 784 F.2d 1377, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 1986) (setting forth standard of review

and factors the bankruptcy court must consider in determining the “fairness,

reasonableness and adequacy of a proposed settlement agreement”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Blas’s requests for

oral argument because it determined that oral argument was unnecessary, and Blas

did not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the denial. See Fed. R. Bankr. P.

8019 (providing that a district court may dispense with oral argument if the court

determines that it is unnecessary); Spradlin v. Lear Siegler Mgmt. Servs. Co., 926

F.2d 865, 867, 869 (9th Cir. 1991) (setting forth standard of review and requiring a

showing of prejudice).

We reject as unsupported by the record Blas’s contention that the district

court denied him due process.

AFFIRMED.

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