Leo Alexander Jones v. James Crosby, Harry K. Singletary

Eleventh Circuit

Leo Alexander Jones v. James Crosby, Harry K. Singletary

137 F.3d 1279, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 5728, 1998 WL 130163

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

DecidedMarch 23, 1998

Docket98-2342

StatusPublished

Cited by13 cases

This text of 137 F.3d 1279 (Leo Alexander Jones v. James Crosby, Harry K. Singletary) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Leo Alexander Jones v. James Crosby, Harry K. Singletary, 137 F.3d 1279, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 5728, 1998 WL 130163 (11th Cir. 1998).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Jones presented to the district court a claim that the State’s current practice of inadequately funding post-conviction counsel for Jones denies Jones his federal Constitution rights (ineffective assistance of counsel and due process of law). In connection with this claim, Jones sought a stay of his imminent execution. The district court denied the application for stay. Jones appeals to this court.

Jones acknowledges in his complaint that his inadequate funding claim has been presented to the state courts. Jones also acknowledges that the Supreme Court of Florida on March 20, 1998, denied Jones’ petition seeking relief based on this claim. It is well settled that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction to review, reverse, or invalidate a final state court decision. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303; 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the authority to review final decisions from the highest court of the state is reserved to the Supreme Court of the United States. Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624 (11th Cir.1997). Jones cannot utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to recast his claim and thereby obtain collateral review in federal court of the state court decision. Berman v. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 794 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1986).

Moreover, it is well established that Jones has no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). 1

Accordingly, Jones’ emergency motion for stay of his execution is DENIED.

1

. Jones also seems to argue that he has a state-created right to adequately-funded counsel, and that he has been denied same without due process of law. We see no likelihood of success for such claim; • contrary to his assertion, the Florida courts are available to entertain such a claim.

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PER CURIAM:

Jones presented to the district court a claim that the State’s current practice of inadequately funding post-conviction counsel for Jones denies Jones his federal Constitution rights (ineffective assistance of counsel and due process of law). In connection with this claim, Jones sought a stay of his imminent execution. The district court denied the application for stay. Jones appeals to this court.

Jones acknowledges in his complaint that his inadequate funding claim has been presented to the state courts. Jones also acknowledges that the Supreme Court of Florida on March 20, 1998, denied Jones’ petition seeking relief based on this claim. It is well settled that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction to review, reverse, or invalidate a final state court decision. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303; 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the authority to review final decisions from the highest court of the state is reserved to the Supreme Court of the United States. Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624 (11th Cir.1997). Jones cannot utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to recast his claim and thereby obtain collateral review in federal court of the state court decision. Berman v. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 794 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1986).

Moreover, it is well established that Jones has no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). 1

Accordingly, Jones’ emergency motion for stay of his execution is DENIED.

1

. Jones also seems to argue that he has a state-created right to adequately-funded counsel, and that he has been denied same without due process of law. We see no likelihood of success for such claim; • contrary to his assertion, the Florida courts are available to entertain such a claim.

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137 F.3d 1279, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 5728, 1998 WL 130163, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/leo-alexander-jones-v-james-crosby-harry-k-singletary-ca11-1998.

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