Lentini v. Hager

73 Pa. D. & C.2d 71, 1975 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 247
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Northumberland County
DecidedSeptember 4, 1975
Docketno. 1096 of 1972
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 73 Pa. D. & C.2d 71 (Lentini v. Hager) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Northumberland County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lentini v. Hager, 73 Pa. D. & C.2d 71, 1975 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 247 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975).

Opinion

KIVKO, P. J.,

Plaintiffs and defendants are owners of the western and eastern “halves” respectively of a 30-foot lot in the Borough of Kulpmont. The matter before us involves a dispute over the interpretation of an easement reserved over the eastern portion of the land conveyed by the common grantor to defendants in favor of the western parcel of land conveyed to plaintiffs.

The language of the easement reserved the “right. . . to use a passageway, Fifteen (15') feet in width,” from the northern side of the parcel conveyed “for any and all purposes connected with the use and occupation of other land now owned by the Grantors adjoining the parcel conveyed.” The deed describes the parcel as 150 feet long and 15 feet wide.

Plaintiffs brought an action in equity to enjoin defendants from erecting a fence along the common boundary line and from, in any way, interfering with the 15-foot passageway reserved in the deed. Defendants deny plaintiffs’ claim of an unlimited passageway over the land. They also deny that the proposed erection of a fence would consti[73]*73tute an infringement upon plaintiffs’ rights. Defendants brought the common grantor of both of these parcels as an additional defendant, alleging that defendants purchased their portion of the property under a mutual understanding that the property would be subjected to an easement limited to a passageway for a coal truck to deliver coal to the western one half of the dwelling unit erected on the southern end of the lot owned by plaintiffs; that the language of the easement inserted in the deed was erroneous; that the deed should be reformed to reflect the true understanding of the parties, and that, if defendants are in any way hable to plaintiff, the additional defendant is jointly hable with them.

After hearing held and due consideration of the testimony taken, we make the following

FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiffs, Antonio Lentini and Maria Francesca Lentini, his wife, by deed dated August 30, 1969, recorded on September 12, 1969, in deed book 482, page 467, conveyed to their son, Peter S. Lentini, the additional defendant, as trustee for them, lot 10 in block No. 27 in the Borough of Kulpmont, 30 feet in width on Spruce Street and extending of that width northward 150 feet to Walnut Street, on which is erected a double frame-dwelling fronting on Spruce Street, No. 624-626 Spruce Street, and a single dwelhng fronting on Walnut Street, No. 627 Walnut Street.

By deed dated October 16, 1971, recorded on October 26, 1971, in deed book 497, page 236, additional defendant conveyed to defendants, Joseph G. Hager and Mary Ann Hager, his wife, the eastern one half of said lot, described as extending for a width of 15 feet a distance of 150 feet from [74]*74Spruce Street to Walnut Street, on which is erected the eastern one half of the double dwelling, No. 624 Spruce Street. Following the description of the land conveyed, the deed contains the following clause which gives rise to the instant dispute:

“EXCEPTING AND RESERVING unto the Grantors, their heirs and assigns, the free liberty and right at all times hereafter forever to have and use a passageway, Fifteen (15) feet in width, extending from the southern line of Walnut Street and the northern end of the Lot hereby granted, for any and all purposes connected with the use and occupation of other land now owned by the Grantors adjoining the parcel hereby granted.”

By deed dated April 5, 1972, recorded on April 12, 1972, in deed book 500, page 447, additional defendant reconveyed to his parents, plaintiffs, the western one half of lot No. 10, described as extending for a width of 15 feet a distance of 150 feet from Spruce Street to Walnut Street, on which is erected the western one half of the double dwelling, No. 626 Spruce Street, and the single dwelling No. 627 Walnut Street.

A survey of lot No. 10, made by Harry Jones, a registered professional engineer, on July 30, 1974, at the request of the court and consented to by the parties, discloses the following:

Each side of the double dwelling fronting on Spruce Street is 12 feet, 7 inches wide. An open passageway leading from Spruce Street alongside the western side of plaintiffs’ house to the rear of the house is 2 feet, 10 inches wide. The passageway on the eastern side of defendants’ house is 2 feet wide. The center line of the partition wall of the double dwelling is, therefore, five inches east of the center line of lot No. 10, making the physical front[75]*75age along Spruce Street of defendants’ eastern “one half’ of the lot 14 feet, 7 inches in width and plaintiffs’ western “one half’ of the lot 15 feet, 5 inches in width.

The center line of the lot from the northern side of the double dwelling — 15 feet from the eastern and western boundaries of the lot — extends northward to Walnut Street for 105 feet free from obstructions, except for three overhead awnings on the eastern side of plaintiffs single dwelling which extend 1 foot, 2 inches and one which extends 9 inches over the eastern one half of the lot.

The dwellings on this and other lots fronting on Walnut Street are not entirely within their respective lot lines shown on the official borough plan. The single dwelling, with a basement door in its eastern side, is 14 feet, 10 inches wide, butit comes to within 14 inches west of the center fine of the lot. This allows a clearance of only 14 inches on plaintiffs’ half of the lot as a passageway alongside the house to and from the basement door and either Walnut Street on the north or Spruce Street on the south.

Between plaintiffs’ two dwellings — the single on the north side of the lot and half of a double on the southern side — is a raised portion of land used as a garden and protected by an eight-inch high curb. Along the eastern side of this curb is a concrete sidewalk five and one-half feet in width, extending from the double to the single dwelling. The western portion of this sidewalk, varying in width from approximately 27 inches to 29 inches is on plaintiff’s side of the center fine. Defendants placed five one-inch iron posts in defendants’ portion of this sidewalk, from two inches to four inches east of the center fine, intending to erect a fence thereon.

The entire lot slopes downward from Walnut [76]*76Street to Spruce Street. A concrete ramp, ten feet wide, adjoining plaintiffs’ land, extends from Walnut Street for a distance of eight feet over defendants’ property. An extension of the ramp, narrowing unevenly to approximately five feet, covered by macadam and in various stages of disrepair, continues northward to a sidewalk which adjoins and runs across the rear of the double dwelling. The concrete ramp at the Walnut Street end has arise of two feet in eight feet, a 25 percent grade, presenting a hazard for vehicle and pedestrian use.

Plaintiffs use the portion of defendants’ lot opposite the single dwelling for picnic and other recreational purposes.

Both sides of the double dwelling are heated with coal. The coal bins are located on the northern side of their basements. The only practical means of delivering the coal to both sides is by truck from Walnut Street over the vacant portion of defendant’s lot. This has been done for years and the concrete and macadam in the lot were placed there to provide a hard surface to support such loads. The parties intended that this use should be preserved for the benefit of the western half of the double dwelling.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

RHN CORP. v. Veibell
2004 UT 60 (Utah Supreme Court, 2004)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
73 Pa. D. & C.2d 71, 1975 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 247, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lentini-v-hager-pactcomplnorthu-1975.