Lenore Kagen v. Richard J Kagen

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedJuly 14, 2015
Docket318459
StatusUnpublished

This text of Lenore Kagen v. Richard J Kagen (Lenore Kagen v. Richard J Kagen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lenore Kagen v. Richard J Kagen, (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).

Opinion

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

LENORE KAGEN a.k.a. LENORE GAURINO, UNPUBLISHED July 14, 2015 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 318459 Oakland Circuit Court RICHARD J. KAGEN, LC No. 2010-779424-DM

Defendant-Appellant.

AFTER REMAND

Before: O’CONNELL, P.J., and BORRELLO and GLEICHER, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

We previously remanded this matter to the circuit court for reconsideration of whether securing vaccinations for the parties’ minor children was in the children’s best interests. Kagen v Kagen, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued December 18, 2014 (Docket No. 318459) (Kagen I). Our opinion described in considerable detail the circuit court’s several legal errors and clearly erroneous factual findings. At its conclusion, we set forth a course of action to be undertaken on remand.

We first directed the circuit court to verify that the vaccination decision would not affect the children’s established custodial environment. The court complied. Next, we instructed that Mr. Kagen needed to present only an evidentiary preponderance to prove that updating the children’s vaccinations would serve their best interests. Because the circuit court had not previously considered on the record the statutory best-interest factors of MCL 722.23 as required by binding precedent of this Court and our Supreme Court, we directed the court to identify and apply all relevant factors. We also clarified for the circuit court the evidentiary principles governing the admissibility of vaccine-related evidence.

On remand, the circuit court again determined that Mr. Kagen had not met his burden of proving that vaccination was in the children’s best interests. Unfortunately, the circuit court rested its decision on patently inadmissible evidence. Because the admissible evidence before the court established by more than a preponderance that updating the children’s standard vaccinations would be in their best interests, we reverse and remand for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.

-1- I. EVIDENTIARY ERROR

In our prior opinion, we held that the circuit court erred by excluding Mr. Kagen’s proffered reports from the Center for Disease Control (CDC), National Institute of Health (NIH), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and Michigan Department of Community Health (MDCH). Although hearsay, these reports were admissible under the catch-all exception of MRE 803(24). Vital to our decision was that “[a]ll four reports are official (formal) statements by government agencies.” Kagen I, unpub op at 5. That the reports were prepared in the declarants’ official capacities and were presented in a public forum assured that the declarants had verified the accuracy of the information before its dissemination. Id. at 5-6.

On remand, the circuit court allowed Mrs. Kagen equal opportunity to present rebuttal evidence. This was the correct course of action. However, the circuit court completely abandoned its duty to assess the admissibility of the evidence. The circuit court accurately recited the four elements outlined in People v Katt, 468 Mich 272, 290; 662 NW2d 12 (2003), underlying admissibility pursuant to MRE 803(24): “To be admitted under MRE 803(24), a hearsay statement must: (1) demonstrate circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to the categorical exceptions, (2) be relevant to a material fact, (3) be the most probative evidence of that fact reasonably available, and (4) serve the interests of justice by its admission.” However, the circuit court failed to consider in any meaningful way whether Mrs. Kagen’s proffered evidence met these requirements.

In Katt, 468 Mich at 291 n 11, our Supreme Court quoted with approval various factors that federal courts have adopted in analyzing a statement’s trustworthiness. Of particular relevance here are the following factors:

(3) The personal truthfulness of the declarant. If the declarant is an untruthful person, this cuts against admissibility, while an unimpeachable character for veracity cuts in favor of admitting the statement. The government cannot seriously argue that the trust due an isolated statement should not be colored by compelling evidence of the lack of credibility of its source: although a checkout aisle tabloid might contain unvarnished truth, even a devotee would do well to view its claims with a measure of skepticism.

(4) Whether the declarant appeared to carefully consider his statement.

***

(8) Whether the declarant had personal knowledge of the event or condition described.

(11) Whether the statement was made under formal circumstances or pursuant to formal duties, such that the declarant would have been likely to consider the accuracy of the statement when making it.

-2- In relation to several pieces of Mrs. Kagen’s evidence, the court bypassed its duty to consider the document’s trustworthiness, a prerequisite to admissibility, reasoning that such considerations affected only the weight of the evidence. This was error. We need not remand to give the circuit court a third chance, however, as the record permits only one resolution of the issue presented.

We first note that the court admitted an article presented on a website managed by the United States Department of Health and Human Services (USDHHS), and another from the CDC. In Kagen I, we discussed at length why such documents are admissible despite being hearsay. Such reports “were prepared by experts in the field of child immunizations and were based on scientific study,” we reasoned, and “it would impose an unreasonable burden to expect [the party] to present the testimony of the government agents who compiled or prepared the reports.” Kagen I, unpub op at 5. Accordingly, such reports produced by government agents are “the most probative evidence of [a material] fact [that is] reasonably available.” See Katt, 468 Mich at 290. As noted, such formal reports are also reliable as required under the first Katt factor as they are created by individuals in their official capacities and for public dissemination, invoking a special duty to ensure accuracy. Kagen I, unpub op at 5-6. Accordingly, we need look no further to conclude that the circuit court properly admitted these documents presented by Mrs. Kagen.

However, the circuit court also admitted several documents bearing absolutely no indicia of reliability. We will address each document in turn, reviewing de novo the preliminary question of whether an evidentiary rule precludes admission of the proffered document. People v Gursky, 486 Mich 596, 606; 786 NW2d 579 (2010).

A. WIKIPEDIA.COM

Mrs. Kagen presented a list of vaccine ingredients from Wikipedia.com. Mr. Kagen’s counsel objected to the admission of this document based “on the substance of the proposed exhibit” and the failure to “identify any author or the source of the information.” The court ruled that Mr. Kagen’s objections went “to weight rather than admissibility.” Considering the trustworthiness of a document cannot be punted when analyzing admissibility under MRE 803(24). And documents from Wikipedia.com are not inherently trustworthy.1 The site

1 See, e.g., Badasa v Mukasey, 540 F3d 909, 910 (CA 8, 2008); Bing Shun Li v Holder, 400 Fed Appx 854, 857 (CA 5, 2010) (“We agree with those courts that have found Wikipedia to be an unreliable source of information.”); United States v Lawson, 677 F3d 629, 650 (CA 4, 2012) (“Given the open-access nature of Wikipedia, the danger in relying on a Wikipedia entry is obvious and real.

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Bluebook (online)
Lenore Kagen v. Richard J Kagen, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lenore-kagen-v-richard-j-kagen-michctapp-2015.