Lenora Bonds v. Department of Housing and Urban Development

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedApril 3, 2024
DocketCH-0752-18-0246-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Lenora Bonds v. Department of Housing and Urban Development (Lenora Bonds v. Department of Housing and Urban Development) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lenora Bonds v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

LENORA BONDS, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, CH-0752-18-0246-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND DATE: April 3, 2024 URBAN DEVELOPMENT, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Lenora Bonds , Chicago, Illinois, pro se.

Christopher C. Ligatti , Esquire, Chicago, Illinois, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her removal appeal as settled. For the reasons set forth below, the appellant’s petition for review is DISMISSED as untimely filed without good cause shown. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e), (g).

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

BACKGROUND The agency removed the appellant from her position as a GS-7 Equal Opportunity Assistant. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 8-12, Tab 6 at 32, 34, 36-40, 48-58, 106-16. She appealed her removal to the Board, and the parties subsequently reached an agreement to settle the appeal. IAF, Tabs 1, 13. In a May 3, 2018 initial decision, the administrative judge entered the settlement agreement into the record for purposes of enforcement by the Board and dismissed the appeal as settled. IAF, Tab 14, Initial Decision (ID) at 1-2. The administrative judge notified the appellant that the initial decision would become final on June 7, 2018, unless a petition for review was filed by that date. ID at 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW On August 20, 2018, the appellant mailed to the Board a letter addressed to both agency counsel and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC); the body of the letter stated that the submission constituted a “Conjunction Settlement Agreement for Relief.” Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. Thereafter, the Clerk of the Board requested that the appellant provide clarity as to whether her submission constituted a petition for review or whether she was providing the Board with a copy of an EEOC filing. PFR File, Tab 2 at 1. The appellant confirmed that her August 20, 2018 submission constituted a petition for review of the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 3 at 1. The Clerk of the Board subsequently notified the appellant that her petition for review was untimely and explained that she must file a motion asking the Board to accept the petition for review as untimely and/or to waive the time limit for good cause. PFR File, Tab 4 at 1-2. The appellant responded, asking the Board to excuse her late filing because, among other things, she “did not receive the initial decision within 5 days of its issuance.” PFR File, Tab 5 at 2. The agency has responded in opposition to the appellant’s petition for review, arguing that it is untimely 3

with no good cause shown and that the appellant has not shown a basis for disturbing the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 6. A petition for review must be filed within 35 days after the issuance of the initial decision, or, if the petitioner shows that she received the initial decision more than 5 days after the date of the issuance, within 30 days after the date she received the initial decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e). Here, the initial decision was issued on May 3, 2018, and sent to the appellant via U.S. mail the same day. IAF, Tab 15 at 1. The appellant avers that she did not receive the initial decision within 5 days of its issuance; however, she fails to indicate the date on which she did receive the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 5 at 2. Of note, the appellant’s petition for review contains a handwritten notation of “5/30/18,” suggesting that the appellant received the initial decision on or before May 30, 2018, in which case, her petition for review was due no later than June 29, 2018. PFR File, Tab 1 at 1; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e). As she did not file her petition for review until August 20, 2018, her submission is untimely by at least 52 days. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3. The Board will waive the time limit for filing a petition for review only upon a showing of good cause for the delay in filing. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(g). To establish good cause for an untimely filing, the appellant must show that she exercised due diligence or ordinary prudence under the particular circumstances of the case. Alonzo v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 180, 184 (1980). In determining whether there is good cause, the Board considers the length of the delay, the reasonableness of the excuse and showing of due diligence, whether the appellant is proceeding pro se, and whether she has presented evidence of the existence of circumstances beyond her control that affected her ability to comply with the time limits or of unavoidable casualty or misfortune that similarly shows a causal relationship to her inability to file a timely petition. See Wyeroski v. Department of Transportation, 106 M.S.P.R. 7, ¶ 7, aff’d, 253 F. App’x 950 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 4

In her motion for the Board to accept her untimely filed petition for review, the appellant seemingly alleges that she provided various documents associated with her petition to the agency in lieu of the Board. PFR File, Tab 5 at 2. However, an appellant’s failure to follow explicit filing instructions generally does not constitute good cause for an ensuing delay, and we find no indication that the appellant mistakenly sent a petition to another entity within the time limit. See Tress v. Office of Personnel Management, 109 M.S.P.R. 126, ¶ 5 (2008). Accordingly, the appellant’s assertion in this regard is unavailing. In her petition for review, the appellant appears to allege that the agency should pay her an additional $57,000 because she is ineligible for social security benefits until next year. PFR File, Tab 1 at 1-2. To this end, she suggests that she was unaware of her ineligibility for benefits until after she executed the settlement agreement. Id. However, the appellant’s allegations in this regard relate to information of which she was aware, or could have been aware, at the time she entered into the agreement; her apparent misunderstanding does not constitute good cause for her delay. See Ford v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 99 M.S.P.R. 338, ¶ 7 (2005) (explaining that the appellant’s claimed misunderstanding of, or dissatisfaction with, the terms of a settlement agreement did not constitute good cause for her filing delay). In a similar vein, the appellant also suggests that, at some point, the agency offered her $20,000 instead of $2,000. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2. To the extent she contends that the agency fraudulently induced her to sign the settlement agreement based on this alleged offer, we note that the executed settlement agreement clearly states that the appellant would receive a lump sum of “two-thousand dollars ($2,000.00).” IAF, Tab 13 at 4. Additionally, she appears to concede in her petition for review that the parties’ signed agreement did, in fact, state $2,000.

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Related

Wyeroski v. Merit Systems Protection Board
253 F. App'x 950 (Federal Circuit, 2007)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Lenora Bonds v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lenora-bonds-v-department-of-housing-and-urban-development-mspb-2024.