Lenny B. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, E.D. Washington
• Decided: March 31, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00264
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 FILED IN THE 2 EASTER U N . S D . I S D T I R S I T C R T I C O T F C W O A U S R H T I NGTON 3 Mar 31, 2026 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 6 LENNY B., No. 2:24-CV-00264-JAG 7 Plaintiff, ORDER REMANDING FOR 8 FURTHER PROCEEDINGS v. 9 10 FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security,1 11 12 Defendant. 13 14 BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiff’s Opening Brief, the Commissioner’s 15 Brief in Response, and Plaintiff’s Reply. ECF Nos. 9, 10, 11. Attorney Chad L. 16 Hatfield represents Lenny B. (Plaintiff); Special Assistant United States 17 Attorney David Burdett represents the Commissioner of Social Security 18 (Defendant). The parties have consented to proceed before a magistrate judge by 19 operation of Local Magistrate Judge Rule (LMJR) 2(b)(2), as no party returned a 20 Declination of Consent Form to the Clerk’s Office by the established deadline. 21 ECF No. 2. After reviewing the administrative record and briefs filed by the 22 parties, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and 23 24 25 26 1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security May 6,

27 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Frank 28 Bisignano is substituted as the Defendant in this suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and REMANDS for further 1 2 proceedings. 3 I. JURISDICTION 4 Plaintiff filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and 5 Supplemental Security Income on February 24, 2021, alleging disability since 6 August 1, 2019 due to Bipolar, Depression, Anxiety, Hallucinations, Insomnia, 7 Panic Attacks, and headaches. Tr. 63. Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially and 8 on reconsideration. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Jesse Shumway held a 9 hearing on May 30, 2023, and issued an unfavorable decision on July 30, 2023. 10 Tr. 26-48. The Appeals Council denied review on May 29, 2024. Tr. 1-6. The 11 ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner, which is 12 appealable to the district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff filed this 13 action for judicial review on July 30, 2024. ECF No. 1. 14 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 15 The facts of the case are set forth in detail in the transcript of proceedings 16 and the ALJ’s decision and are only briefly summarized here. Plaintiff was born in 17 July 1974 and was 45 years old on the alleged onset date. Tr. 41. 18 Plaintiff’s past jobs include line cook. Tr. 32. 19 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 20 The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in 21 medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 22 23 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ’s determinations of law are reviewed de novo, with 24 deference to a reasonable interpretation of the applicable statutes. McNatt v. Apfel, 25 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). The decision of the ALJ may be reversed 26 only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error. 27 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is 28 defined as being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. at 1098. Put another way, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a 1 2 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. 3 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). If the evidence is susceptible to more than one 4 rational interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 5 ALJ. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 6 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). If substantial evidence supports the administrative 7 findings, or if conflicting evidence supports a finding of either disability or non- 8 disability, the ALJ’s determination is conclusive. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 9 1226, 1229-1230 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, a decision supported by 10 substantial evidence will be set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied 11 in weighing the evidence and making the decision. Brawner v. Secretary of Health 12 and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988). 13 IV. SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 14 The Commissioner established a five-step sequential evaluation process for 15 determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); 16 see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). In steps one through four, the 17 burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish a prima facie case of 18 entitlement to disability benefits. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99. This burden is 19 met once a claimant establishes that a physical or mental impairment prevents him 20 from engaging in past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). 21 If a claimant cannot do his past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to step five, and 22 23 the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that (1) the claimant can make an 24 adjustment to other work; and (2) the claimant can perform specific jobs that exist 25 in the national economy. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 26 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2004). If a claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work in 27 the national economy, the claimant will be found disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 28 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). 1 V. ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS 2 On July 20, 2023, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff was not 3 disabled as defined in the Social Security Act. Tr. 26-48. 4 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial 5 gainful activity since December 2020. Tr. 32. 6 At step two, he found Plaintiff had the severe impairments of Mood disorder, 7 panic disorder, antisocial personality disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity 8 disorder (“ADHD”), and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). Tr. 33. 9 At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment 10 or combination of impairments that meets or medically equal one of the listed 11 impairments in 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 12 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). Tr. 34. The ALJ also 13 found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full 14 range of work at all exertional levels, but with the following limitations: 15 [H]e is limited to simple, routine tasks; he can have no contact with the 16 public; he can have superficial interaction with coworkers and 17 supervisors with no collaborative tasks; he needs a routine, predictable work environment with no more than occasional changes; and he would 18 be absent from work eight-to-ten days per year. 19 Tr. 36. 20 At step four, the ALJ found that a finding regarding Plaintiff’s capacity for 21 past relevant work is not material because there is insufficient information about 22 the claimant’s past work and all potentially applicable Medical-Vocational 23 Guidelines would direct a finding of “not disabled” given the individual’s age, 24 education, and residual functional capacity. Tr. 41. 25 At step five, the ALJ found that, based on the testimony of the vocational 26 expert, and considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, 27 Plaintiff was capable of performing jobs that existed in significant numbers in the 28 national economy, including the jobs of hand packager, dishwasher, and janitor. 1 2 Tr. 47 3 The ALJ thus concluded Plaintiff was not under a disability within the 4 meaning of the Social Security Act at any time from the alleged onset date through 5 the date of the decision. Tr. 42. 6 VI. ISSUES 7 The question presented is whether substantial evidence exists to support the 8 ALJ's decision denying benefits and, if so, whether that decision is based on proper 9 legal standards. 10 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by: (1) improperly evaluating the 11 medical opinion evidence; (2) rejecting Plaintiff’s severe impairments of mild 12 intellectual disability and schizophrenia as groundless at step two; (3) failing to 13 conduct an adequate step three evaluation and failing to find the claimant disabled 14 as meeting or equaling Listings 12.03, 12.04, 12.05, 12.06, 12.08, 12.11, and 15 12.15; (4) rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and the lay witness 16 statements of his former employers; and (5) falling to conduct an adequate 17 analysis at step five. ECF No. 9 at 3. 18 VII. DISCUSSION 19 A. Medical Opinions. 20 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by improperly evaluating the opinions of 21 Debra Brown, Ph.D.; John Arnold Ph.D.; Patrick Metoyer, Ph.D.; and Luci 22 23 Carstens, Ph.D. ECF No. 9 at 6-16. For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, 24 the ALJ must consider and evaluate the persuasiveness of all medical opinions or 25 prior administrative medical findings from medical sources. 20 C.F.R. §§ 26 404.1520c(a) and (b), 416.920c(a) and (b). The factors for evaluating the 27 persuasiveness of medical opinions and prior administrative findings include 28 supportability, consistency, the source’s relationship with the claimant, any specialization of the source, and other factors (such as the source’s familiarity with 1 2 other evidence in the file or an understanding of Social Security’s disability 3 program). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5), 416.920c(c)(1)-(5). 4 Supportability and consistency are the most important factors, and the ALJ 5 must explain how both factors were considered. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 6 416.920c(b)(2). The ALJ may explain how the ALJ considered the other factors, 7 but is not required to do so, except in cases where two or more opinions are equally 8 well-supported and consistent with the record. Id. Supportability and consistency 9 are explained in the regulations: 10 (1) Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence 11 and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical 12 finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior 13 administrative medical finding(s) will be.

14 (2) Consistency. The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior 15 administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other 16 medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical 17 finding(s) will be. 18 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(2), 416.920c(c)(1)-(2). 19 The Ninth Circuit has addressed the issue of whether the regulatory 20 framework displaces the longstanding case law requiring an ALJ to provide 21 specific and legitimate reasons to reject an examining provider’s opinion. Woods 22 v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2022). The Court held that the 2017 23 regulations eliminate any hierarchy of medical opinions, and the specific and 24 legitimate standard no longer applies. Id. at 788-89, 792. The Court reasoned the 25 “relationship factors” remain relevant under the new regulations, and thus the ALJ 26 can still consider the length and purpose of the treatment relationship, the 27 frequency of examinations, the kinds and extent of examinations that the medical 28 source has performed or ordered from specialists, and whether the medical source 1 2 has examined the claimant or merely reviewed the claimant’s records. Id. at 790, 3 792. Even under the new regulations, an ALJ must provide an explanation 4 supported by substantial evidence when rejecting an examining or treating doctor’s 5 opinion as unsupported or inconsistent. Id. at 792. 6 1. Debra Brown, Ph.D.: 7 Dr. Brown was the psychologist that examined claimant on December 24, 8 2013, and January 7, 2014. Dr. Brown conducted an examination and 9 administered several tests, including the Wechler IQ test, WAIS-IV. Tr. 404-413. 10 Dr. Brown’s testing found claimant’s Full-Scale IQ (FSIQ) to be 61. Tr. 410. Dr. 11 Brown also conducted the Rey Test of Malingering where claimant “completed 12 12 of 15 items successfully, indicating he was not feigning memory loss.” Tr. 409. 13 Claimant argues the ALJ committed harmful legal error by rejecting Dr. 14 Brown’s findings as unsupported by the record. ECF No. 9 at 6-9. The ALJ was 15 unpersuaded by Dr. Brown’s findings for the following reasons: 1) the opinion was 16 several years prior to the alleged onset date, 2) Dr. Brown’s note that claimant may 17 not have given his best effort on cognitive testing, 3) Dr. Brown’s inclusion of rule 18 out malingering in the diagnosis, and 4) inconsistency with the record. Tr. 40-41. 19 Though Dr. Brown’s assessment occurred prior to the alleged onset date, it 20 must still be considered. While medical opinions predating an alleged onset date 21 may be of limited relevance, the ALJ must still consider all medical evidence. 22 23 “Medical opinions that predate the alleged onset of disability are of limited 24 relevance.” Carmickle v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th 25 Cir.2008). “However, it is clear from our precedent and the Social Security 26 Regulations that ‘[t]he ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence.’” 27 Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir.2008); Smolen v. Chater, 80 28 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir.1996) (ALJ errs in completely ignoring medical evidence); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b) (“In determining whether you are disabled, we 1 2 will always consider the medical opinions in your case record together with the rest 3 of the relevant evidence we receive.”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) (“Regardless of its 4 source, we will evaluate every medical opinion we receive.”). Further, this 5 medical evidence concerns IQ testing, which is generally considered stable and 6 current after the age of 16. (POMS DI 24583.055; https://secure.ssa.gov/ 7 poms.nsf/lnx/0424583055). Though it is within an ALJ’s authority to determine if 8 an IQ score is invalid (see Thresher v. Astrue, 283 F. App'x 473, 475 (9th Cir. 9 2008)(finding an ALJ may decide an IQ score is invalid and remanding for 10 clarification)), here, the ALJ did not find the IQ score to be invalid but discounted 11 the evidence due to the exam taking place prior to the alleged onset. In this case, 12 the IQ test was administered when claimant was 39 years old, and an IQ test is 13 considered valid after the age of 16, therefore it can be deemed relevant to 14 claimant’s mental status during the relevant period of issue absent a finding by the 15 ALJ that the score is invalid. On remand, the ALJ shall consider the validity of Dr. 16 Brown’s IQ test results and assess the relevance of the results in consideration of 17 the record as a whole. 18 The ALJ did not find Dr. Brown’s opinion persuasive in part because it is 19 not consistent with current evidence in the record concerning the claimant’s overall 20 improvement with routine and conservative treatment. Tr. 401. The ALJ’s 21 reasoning is not supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ failed to provide 22 23 proper reasons for discounting Dr. Brown’s opinion and did not discuss the 24 consistency of Dr. Brown’s opinion with other medical opinions, specifically Dr. 25 Arnold’s, Dr. Metoyer’s, and Dr. Carstens’ opinions. The ALJ also failed to 26 provide specific reasoning and examples as to why he found Dr. Brown’s opinion 27 inconsistent with the record as a whole. The ALJ is further ordered to reconsider 28 Dr. Brown’s opinion in light of the record as a whole, considering the consistency 1 2 of Dr. Brown’s opinion with other medical opinions. 3 2. John Arnold, Ph.D.: 4 The ALJ did not find Dr. Arnold’s opinion persuasive. Tr. 39-40. The ALJ 5 stated Dr. Arnold only examined the claimant one time and did not review all of 6 claimant’s medical evidence and was therefore not supported by a longitudinal 7 picture of the claimant’s medical history, but relied heavily on the subject reports 8 of claimant. Tr. 39-40. The ALJ further found Dr. Arnold’s opinion to be 9 unsupported by his own findings and observations and was inconsistent with the 10 record as a whole. Tr. 40. 11 The finding that Dr. Arnold relied heavily on the subject reports of the 12 claimant is not supported by the record. Dr. Arnold is a clinical psychologist, who 13 performed an exam, including history and mental status exam, as well as 14 psychological testing. Dr. Arnold made clinical findings, completed an MSE, and 15 specifically included review of other medical records, in addition to considering 16 self-reports by claimant. Tr. 548-556. Dr. Arnold included the following under 17 the heading “Diagnostic Impression”: 18 • Cyclothymic Disorder, currently depressed, Moderate 19 • Unspecified Anxiety Disorder, with Panic Features, Moderate 20 • Antisocial Personality Disorder with Borderline and 21 Schizotypal Features, Severe 22 • Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Chronic, Moderate 23 • Alcohol Use Disorder, Severe, in Substantial Remission 24 • Cannabis Use, Probable Use Disorder 25 • Mild Intellectual Disorder (by history) 26 • R/O ADHD 27 Tr. 553-554. 28 The conclusion that Dr. Arnold relied primarily on Plaintiff’s self-report is 1 2 not supported by the record. The Ninth Circuit in Ghanim contemplated that 3 medical sources rely on self-reports to varying degrees and held that an ALJ may 4 reject a medical source’s opinion as based on unreliable self-reports only when the 5 medical source relied “more heavily on a patient’s self-reports than on clinical 6 observations.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2014). There is 7 no indication that Dr. Arnold relied more heavily on Plaintiff’s self-reports than 8 clinical observations. The ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Arnold’s opinion, is therefore, 9 not supported. 10 The ALJ’s finding that Dr. Arnold’s opinion is not supported by a 11 longitudinal picture of the claimant’s medical history and inconsistent with the 12 record as a whole is not supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ failed to 13 provide proper reasons for discounting Dr. Arnold’s opinion and did not discuss 14 the consistency of Dr. Arnold’s opinion with other medical opinions, specifically 15 Dr. Brown’s, Dr. Metoyer’s, and Dr. Carsten’s opinions. The ALJ also failed to 16 provide specific reasoning and examples as to why he found Dr. Arnold’s opinion 17 inconsistent with the record as a whole. On remand, the ALJ is further ordered to 18 reconsider Dr. Arnold’s opinion in light of the record as a whole, considering the 19 consistency of Dr. Arnold’s opinion with other medical opinions, and taking into 20 consideration the factors required by the regulations. 21 22 3. Dr. Metoyer and Dr. Carstens: 23 The ALJ found the opinions of Dr. Metoyer and Dr. Carstens unpersuasive 24 because they “provided no meaningful explanation of the objective evidence to 25 support the extent and severity of limitations assessed in these checkbox type 26 forms.” Tr. 40. The use of a check-box form is not a sufficient reason to discount 27 the opinions of Dr. Metoyer and Dr. Carstens. “[T]here is no authority that a 28 ‘check-the-box’ form is any less reliable than any other type of form.” Trevizo v. 1 2 Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 677 n.4 (9th Cir. 2017). 3 Dr. Metoyer evaluated claimant on November 24, 2021, and conducted a 4 clinical interview, Beck Depression Inventory, Beck Anxiety Inventory, PTSD 5 checklist, and provided an explanation of his findings. Tr. 695. Dr. Metoyer found 6 claimant had marked limitations in: understanding, remembering, and persisting in 7 tasks by following detailed instructions; performing activities within a schedule, 8 maintaining regular attendance, and being punctual within customary tolerances 9 without special supervision; learning new tasks; performing routine tasks without 10 special supervision; adapting to changes in a routine work setting; communicating 11 and performing effectively in a work setting; completing a normal work day and 12 work week without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms; and 13 setting realistic goals and planning independently. Tr. 696. Dr. Metoyer assessed 14 an overall severity rating as marked. Tr. 696. 15 The ALJ did not find Dr. Metoyer’s opinion persuasive because it was 16 expressed in a checkbox form, did not include meaningful explanation of objective 17 evidence, lacked psychometric testing, was based on a one-time examination of the 18 claimant, and appeared to be based heavily on the self-reports of claimant. Tr. 40. 19 Dr. Metoyer is a mental health specialist, who performed an exam, including 20 history and mental status exam, as well as psychological testing. Dr. Metoyer 21 recorded results on psychological tests, including Beck Depression Inventory, 22 23 Beck Anxiety Inventory, and PTSD checklist. Tr. 695. Dr. Metoyer’s evaluation 24 notes included significant notes, as well as explanations for findings. The 25 conclusion that Dr. Metoyer that Dr. Metoyer relied primarily on Plaintiff’s self- 26 report, did not include meaningful explanation, and lacked psychometric testing is 27 therefore not supported by the record. 28 The ALJ did not find Dr. Carsten’s opinion persuasive for many of the same 1 2 reasons, though gave even less reasoning behind this finding. The ALJ found Dr. 3 Carsten’s opinion unpersuasive because she used a check-box form and did not 4 provide meaningful explanations. Tr. 40. As noted above, the use of a check-box 5 form is not a sufficient reason to discount Dr. Carsten’s opinion. Dr. Carstens 6 conducted a review of medical evidence, specifically the medical reports of Dr. 7 Metoyer. Tr. 700. Dr. Carstens gave explanations as to each of the findings and 8 found Dr. Metoyer’s conclusions to be supported by the available documentation. 9 Tr. 700-701. The only conclusion Dr. Carstens disagreed with was the duration the 10 impairment was expected to persist. Dr. Metoyer recommended a duration of 12 11 plus months, whereas Dr. Carstens found a duration of 24 months to be supported 12 by the overall medical evidence. Tr. 700-701. The conclusion that Dr. Carstens 13 did not provide meaningful explanations is not supported by the record. 14 Ultimately, the ALJ’s findings that the record as a whole is inconsistent with 15 Dr. Metoyer’s and Dr. Carstens’ opinions is not supported by substantial evidence. 16 The ALJ also erred in citing portions of the record showing milder findings while 17 the longitudinal record showed more mixed results, leading to a characterization of 18 the medical evidence as a whole that is not supported by substantial evidence. On 19 remand, the ALJ is instructed to reconsider Dr. Metoyer’s and Dr. Carstens’ 20 opinions, taking into consideration the factors required by the regulations and 21 considering the record as a whole. 22 23 B. Credibility. 24 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by finding he lacked credibility. This 25 matter must be remanded for additional proceedings to address the above noted 26 defects in consideration of the medical evidence. See supra. Therefore, the Court 27 need not reach this issue. The evaluation of a claimant's symptom statements, and 28 their resulting limitations relies, in part, on the assessment of the medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. 404.1529(c), 416.929(c); SSR 16-3p. Accordingly, on remand, the ALJ 1 2 shall also reconsider Plaintiff’s statements and testimony with the benefit of the 3 reconsidered medical evidence, and reassess what statements, if any, are not 4 credible and, if deemed not credible, what specific evidence undermines those 5 statements. 6 VII. CONCLUSION 7 “The decision whether to remand a case for additional evidence, or simply to 8 award benefits is within the discretion of the court.” Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 9 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Stone v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 10 1985)). When the Court reverses an ALJ’s decision for error, the Court “ordinarily 11 must remand to the agency for further proceedings.” Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 12 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017); Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 13 2004) (“the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency 14 for additional investigation or explanation”); Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 15 Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). However, in a number of Social 16 Security cases, the Ninth Circuit has “stated or implied that it would be an abuse of 17 discretion for a district court not to remand for an award of benefits” when three 18 conditions are met. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014) 19 (citations omitted). Under the credit-as-true rule, where (1) the record has been 20 fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful 21 purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting 22 23 evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly 24 discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the 25 claimant disabled on remand, the Court will remand for an award of 26 benefits. Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 668 (9th Cir. 2017). 27 Plaintiff urges remand for immediate benefits based on the rejection of 28 medical opinions and claimant testimony, ECF Nos. 9, 11. The Court, however, 1 || finds that further development of the record is required. As such, the first prong of || the credit-as-true doctrine is not met. Accordingly, the case is remanded for 3|| additional proceedings consistent with this Order. 4 Having reviewed the record and the ALJ's findings, the Court concludes the 5|| ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence and is based on legal error. 6|| Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 7 1. Plaintiff's Motion, ECF No. 9, is GRANTED. 8 2. The Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED and the matter is 9|| REMANDED to the Commissioner for additional proceedings consistent with this 101! Order. MW 3. An application for attorney fees may be filed by separate motion. 12 Judgment shall be entered for PLAINTIFF and the file shall be CLOSED. DATED March 31, 2026.

16 JAMES A. GOEKE 17 a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION