Lenhal Realty, Inc. v. Transamerica Commercial Finance Corp.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Lenhal Realty, Inc. v. Transamerica Commercial Finance Corp.

611 So. 2d 79, 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 13060, 1992 WL 385516

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedDecember 30, 1992

DocketNo. 92-1736

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 611 So. 2d 79 (Lenhal Realty, Inc. v. Transamerica Commercial Finance Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Lenhal Realty, Inc. v. Transamerica Commercial Finance Corp., 611 So. 2d 79, 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 13060, 1992 WL 385516 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Lenhal Realty appeals from an order that denies its motion to vacate a default. We reverse.

Appellees’ motion for default was set for hearing on March 17, 1992, at 8:45 a.m. Appellants did not attend the hearing, but filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint and motion to strike at 9:15 a.m. on March 17, as evidenced by the clerk’s stamp. At the hearing, the trial court granted appellees’ motion for default against appellants; however, that order was not stamped in by the Clerk of the Court until the following day, March 18, 1992. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(c) provides that “a party may plead or otherwise defend at any time before default is entered.” In Graves v. Giordano, 590 So.2d 1113 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), we agreed with our sister court in Chester, Blackburn & Roder, Inc. v. Marchese, 383 So.2d 734, 735 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), that “an order may not be deemed to have been entered, notwithstanding its having been signed by the court, until it is actually filed with the clerk.” Since at the time the order granting default was entered, appellant had already filed its motion to dismiss, entry of default was error. Graves.

Accordingly, we reverse the order denying appellant’s motion to set aside the default and remand for further proceedings.

GUNTHER, POLEN and FARMER, JJ., concur.

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PER CURIAM.

Lenhal Realty appeals from an order that denies its motion to vacate a default. We reverse.

Appellees’ motion for default was set for hearing on March 17, 1992, at 8:45 a.m. Appellants did not attend the hearing, but filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint and motion to strike at 9:15 a.m. on March 17, as evidenced by the clerk’s stamp. At the hearing, the trial court granted appellees’ motion for default against appellants; however, that order was not stamped in by the Clerk of the Court until the following day, March 18, 1992. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(c) provides that “a party may plead or otherwise defend at any time before default is entered.” In Graves v. Giordano, 590 So.2d 1113 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), we agreed with our sister court in Chester, Blackburn & Roder, Inc. v. Marchese, 383 So.2d 734, 735 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), that “an order may not be deemed to have been entered, notwithstanding its having been signed by the court, until it is actually filed with the clerk.” Since at the time the order granting default was entered, appellant had already filed its motion to dismiss, entry of default was error. Graves.

Accordingly, we reverse the order denying appellant’s motion to set aside the default and remand for further proceedings.

GUNTHER, POLEN and FARMER, JJ., concur.

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611 So. 2d 79, 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 13060, 1992 WL 385516, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lenhal-realty-inc-v-transamerica-commercial-finance-corp-fladistctapp-1992.

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