Lendos v. Attorney General
This text of Lendos v. Attorney General (Lendos v. Attorney General) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MARIO R. LENDOS, : : Petitioner, : Civil Action No.: 07-1898 (RMU) : v. : Document Nos.: 1, 7 : : ATTORNEY GENERAL et al, : : Respondents. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; DENYING AS MOOT THE MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO AMEND THE PETITION
The petitioner, who was recently transferred to the Federal Correctional Complex in
Coleman, Florida, moves for an extension of time to amend the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. As the court previously recognized, the petition presents issues reviewable only by the
sentencing court via a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Order (May 28, 2008).
Because the petitioner states that he has had one such petition denied by the United States
District Court for the Central District of Illinois, see Pet. at 3-4, no district court can entertain
his successive petition without authorization. Pursuant to § 2255, "[a] second or successive
motion must be certified as provided in section 2244,” which states that “[b]efore a second or
successive [habeas] application . . . is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the
appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the
application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). The petitioner therefore must seek certification from
the Seventh Circuit to file a successive habeas petition. See In re Moore, 196 F.3d 252, 254
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that “§ 2255 mandates” such certification). To the extent that the petitioner is seeking relief under the general habeas corpus statute,
28 U.S.C. § 2241, this court lacks jurisdiction because the proper respondent in habeas corpus
cases is the petitioner’s warden or immediate custodian. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 438-
39 (2004); Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1998). “[A] district court may not
entertain a habeas petition involving present physical custody unless the respondent custodian is
within its territorial jurisdiction.” Stokes v. U.S. Parole Commission, 374 F.3d 1235, 1239 (D.C.
Cir. 2004); accord Rooney v. Secretary of Army, 405 F.3d 1029, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting,
“jurisdiction is proper only in the district in which the immediate, not the ultimate, custodian is
located:) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Middle District of Florida is the
court properly situated to entertain such a petition.
Finding no basis for maintaining this habeas corpus action in the District of Columbia,
the court denies the petition, denies as moot the motion for an extension of time and dismisses
the case without prejudice. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately
and contemporaneously issued this 31st day of March 2009.
RICARDO M. URBINA United States District Judge
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