Lena Wilson-Jefferson v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMarch 15, 2024
DocketDE-1221-18-0079-W-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Lena Wilson-Jefferson v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Lena Wilson-Jefferson v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lena Wilson-Jefferson v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

LENA JEFFERSON-WILSON, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DE-1221-18-0079-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: March 15, 2024 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Matthew Brinegar , Esquire, Oakland, California, for the appellant.

Scott MacMillan , Esquire, Phoenix, Arizona, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeal as untimely filed. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). Under 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3)(A), an appellant may file an IRA appeal with the Board once the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) closes its investigation into her complaint and no more than 60 days have elapsed since notification of the closure was provided to her. See Heimberger v. Department of Commerce , 121 M.S.P.R. 10, ¶ 6 (2014). Under the Board’s regulations implementing that statutory time limit, an IRA appeal must be filed no later than 65 days after the date that OSC issues its close-out letter, or if the letter is received more than 5 days after its issuance, within 60 days of the date of receipt. Id.; 5 C.F.R. § 1209.5(a)(1). This deadline may be extended when the appellant, despite having diligently pursued her rights, was unable to make a timely filing. 5 C.F.R. § 1209.5(b). Notwithstanding the implementing provisions of 5 C.F.R. § 1209.5, the filing period for an IRA appeal is statutory—not regulatory. 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a) (3)(A); Heimberger, 121 M.S.P.R. 10, ¶ 9. Unlike the Board’s regulatory time limits for appeals filed under 5 U.S.C. § 7701, the statutory time limit for filing an IRA appeal cannot be waived for good cause shown because there is no statutory mechanism for doing so. Id. However, the filing deadline might be subject to equitable tolling, under which the filing period is suspended for 3

equitable reasons, such as when the complainant has actively pursued her judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading within the statutory period, or when she has been induced or tricked by her adversary’s misconduct into allowing the deadline to pass. Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Bauer v. Department of the Army, 88 M.S.P.R. 352, ¶ 9 (2001); Wood v. Department of the Air Force, 54 M.S.P.R. 587, 592 (1992); 5 C.F.R. § 1209.5(b). On review, the appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s determination that her IRA appeal was untimely filed. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 8, Initial Decision (ID) at 3-4. She opines that the administrative judge erred in finding that, “because the misdirected fax was not sent to a wrong administrative agency (as opposed to a third party), [she] waived her right to appeal.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 7. The appellant maintains that 5 C.F.R. § 1209.5(b), which addresses the applicability of equitable tolling in untimely IRA appeals, was not meant to be read so narrowly. Id. at 5. We discern no error in the administrative judge’s ultimate determination that equitable tolling does not apply in this case. ID at 7. Equitable tolling is a rare remedy that is to be applied in unusual circumstances and generally requires a showing that the litigant has been pursuing her rights diligently and some extraordinary circumstances stood in her way. Heimberger, 121 M.S.P.R. 10, ¶ 10. It does not extend to a garden variety claim of “excusable neglect.” Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96; Wood, 54 M.S.P.R. at 593. The failure of the appellant’s attorney to timely file the IRA appeal with the Board, while unfortunate, more closely resembles a case of garden variety neglect rather than the type of extraordinary circumstance that warrants tolling a statutory deadline. See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96; Heimberger, 121 M.S.P.R. 10, ¶¶ 10–12; Pacilli v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 526, ¶¶ 10–11, aff’d, 404 F. App’x 466 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The appellant’s attorney used the wrong number in faxing the appeal and then failed to ensure that it was received. IAF, Tab 7 at 8-9. The action of the appellant’s attorney to file the appeal with the Board was triggered only by the 4

notification of the private party who received the appeal, after the deadline had already passed. Id. at 9, 16. We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant’s failure to timely file an appeal was the result of her own lack of due diligence in preserving her legal rights, which is not enough to merit the application of equitable tolling. ID at 7; see Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96. We have considered the appellant’s allegation that the filing deadline should be equitably tolled because she filed a defective pleading when she mistakenly faxed the appeal to a private party. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5.

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Lena Wilson-Jefferson v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lena-wilson-jefferson-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2024.