Lemmon Education Ass'n v. Lemmon School District No. 52-2

478 N.W.2d 821, 1991 S.D. LEXIS 183, 1991 WL 269690
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 18, 1991
Docket17423
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 478 N.W.2d 821 (Lemmon Education Ass'n v. Lemmon School District No. 52-2) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering South Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lemmon Education Ass'n v. Lemmon School District No. 52-2, 478 N.W.2d 821, 1991 S.D. LEXIS 183, 1991 WL 269690 (S.D. 1991).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Lemmon Education Association (teachers) appeals a declaratory judgment in fa *822 vor of Lemmon School District and Lem-mon Board of Education (Board) in a dispute over Board’s method of offering teaching contracts for the 1990/91 school year. We are confronted, basically, with this question: Did Board comply with South Dakota’s continuing contract law (SDCL ch. 13-43)? Under the facts of this appeal, we hold it did. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.

FACTS

From 1974 to April 1990, Board offered separate contracts to teachers for their teaching duties and extracurricular activities. Although there was a clause in the teaching contracts providing that, [t]he [teacher] agrees to perform the duties of teaching the grade or subjects and directing the activities assigned by the [Board] ...,” (emphasis added ours) there was no other linkage between the two contracts and, they were often not offered at the same time.

SDCL 13-43-9.1 and 13-43-10 provide that tenured teachers are entitled to renewal of their contracts under the same terms and conditions as in their previous contracts, unless the board gives a teacher notice of nonrenewal of a contract. No notices of nonrenewal were given to the teachers affected in this case. However, on April 9, 1990, Board voted to change its procedure for offering teaching and extracurricular activity contracts. Both contracts were offered at the same time. Language was added to the teaching contracts providing that, “[t]o be accepted, this contract and the contractual agreement in regard to [the extracurricular activity], representing your [continuing] contract from the previous year, must both be signed and in the hands of the school board on or before May 10, 1990.” (emphasis original). Similar language was added to the extracurricular activity contracts providing that, “[t]o be accepted, this contract and the contractual agreement in regard to the teaching position representing your continuing contract from the previous year must both be signed and in the hands of the school board on or before May 10, 1990.” (emphasis original). Thus, a teacher’s acceptance of one contract was contingent on his acceptance of both contracts.

On May 4, 1990, teachers filed a complaint in a declaratory judgment action against Board. Teachers alleged that the change in Board’s manner of offering their contracts altered past practices that allowed teachers to reject an extracurricular activity without losing their teaching contract and allowed them to continue their teaching duties regardless of how they performed an extracurricular activity. In their complaint, teachers asserted Board’s linkage of teaching contracts with extracurricular activity contracts violated the continuing contract law provision requiring Board to renew contracts under the same terms and conditions as in the previous year. SDCL 13-43-10. Accordingly, teachers sought a declaratory judgment that: The changes in the requirements relative to the extracurricular activity contracts constituted a variance from the previous year’s terms and conditions of employment; Board could not condition an offer of a teaching position for the 1990/91 school year on the acceptance of an extracurricular activity contract; and, Board could not nonrenew a teaching contract based upon a teacher’s performance of an extracurricular activity.

The matter was tried before the trial court on August 6, 1990. On October 9, 1990, the trial court entered its memorandum opinion holding that Board did not act improperly in tying the teaching and extracurricular activity contracts together. Findings of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment were subsequently entered in favor of Board and teachers appeal.

DECISION

We are confronted with this specific issue: Did Board violate the provisions of the continuing contract law by changing its method of offering teaching and extracurricular activity contracts for the 1990/91 school year?

Teachers argue that the continuing contract law requires Board to continue offering separate contracts for their teaching *823 duties and extracurricular activities. Teachers assert that Board’s action in linking the two contracts altered prior practice in two key respects: First, teachers no longer have a right to reject an extracurricular activity without losing their teaching contract; and, second, teachers can now have their teaching contracts nonrenewed for deficient performance of an extracurricular activity.

This case can be resolved based upon settled law and reference to the facts. Teaching contracts, in the settled record for years prior to 1990/91, all contain clauses providing that, “... [t]he [teacher] agrees to perform the duties of teaching the grade or subjects and directing the activities assigned by the [Board] ...” (emphasis added ours). Thus, Board always retained the authority to assign teachers extracurricular activities and, in essence, make acceptance of their teaching contracts contingent on their acceptance of an extracurricular activity contract. Even in those years prior to 1990/91, a teacher’s refusal of an extracurricular activity constituted a breach of the explicit provisions of the teaching contract.

Although teachers cite MEA/AFSCME Local 519 v. Sioux Falls, 423 N.W.2d 164 (S.D.1988) for the proposition that the past practice of Board in allowing them to refuse an extracurricular activity reflects the actual understanding of the parties, MEA involved the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. Such cases apply a narrow standard of review and do not necessarily utilize, “ordinary principles of contract construction[.]” Loveless v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 681 F.2d 1272, 1280 (11th Cir.1982) (cited in MEA, supra). Ordinary principles of contract construction provide that:

If and when the instrument is found by the court to be ambiguous, then the admission of parol or extrinsic evidence shall be governed by these rules:
If the intention of the parties is not clear from the writing, then it is necessary and proper for the court to consider all the circumstances surrounding the execution of the writing and the subsequent acts of the parties[.]

Haggar v. Olfert, 387 N.W.2d 45, 48 (S.D.1986) (emphasis added ours) (quoting Jensen v. Pure Plant Food Intern., Ltd., 274 N.W.2d 261, 263-64 (S.D.1979)).

Here, teachers’ contracts prior to 1990/91 were clear, certain, and unambiguous in requiring that they accept extracurricular activity assignments.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
478 N.W.2d 821, 1991 S.D. LEXIS 183, 1991 WL 269690, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lemmon-education-assn-v-lemmon-school-district-no-52-2-sd-1991.