Lemke-Vega v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: February 2, 2024
• Docket: 4:23-cv-01408
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 CHEYENNE LEMKE-VEGA, Case No. 23-cv-01408-DMR

8 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS 9 v. AND/OR STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 10 MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, Re: Dkt. No. 37 11 Defendant.

12 In this lemon law case, Plaintiff Cheyenne Lemke-Vega alleges violations of state and 13 federal law related to her July 2022 purchase of an allegedly defective 2019 Mercedes-Benz. 14 Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“MBUSA”) now moves pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 15 Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(f) to dismiss and/or strike portions of the second amended complaint. 16 [Docket No. 37.] This matter is suitable for determination without oral argument. Civ. L.R. 7- 17 1(b). For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted. The motion to strike is denied 18 as moot. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 The second amended complaint (“SAC”) contains the following allegations.1 On July 18, 21 2022, Lemke-Vega purchased a 2019 Mercedes-Benz A220 (“the vehicle”) from Mercedes-Benz 22 of Walnut Creek, an MBUSA-authorized dealership and repair facility. [Docket No. 34 (SAC) ¶¶ 23 8, 17.] The total sale price was $62,427.04. Id. at ¶ 3, Ex. A (Retail Installment Sales Contract, 24 “Sales Contract”). Lemke-Vega alleges that “[e]xpress warranties accompanied the sale of the 25 Subject Vehicle . . . by which [MBUSA] undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or 26

27 1 When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 1 performance” of the vehicle or to provide compensation in the event of “failure in such utility or 2 performance.” FAC ¶ 18. She further alleges that “the Subject Vehicle was sold with a 4-Year 3 and 50,000 mile Basic Warranty, which covered the vehicle parts and powertrain, a Federal 4 Emissions Performance/Control Warranty, which ran for 8-years and 80-000 [sic] miles, and a 5 California Emissions Control Warranty, which ran for 7-years and 70,000-miles.” Id. at ¶ 19. 6 The Sales Contract lists the vehicle as “used.” Sales Contract 1. Lemke-Vega alleges that 7 “it is unknown to [her] whether the vehicle was inspected and designated as ‘Certified Pre-Owned’ 8 or a Demonstrator vehicle by” MBUSA and/or its dealerships. She further alleges that “it is 9 unknown” “whether or not the vehicle was previously sold or registered to a consumer,” and that 10 she “intends to conduct discovery on the vehicle’s ownership and registration history and amend 11 her complaint at the time of trial in order to conform to proof.” SAC ¶ 26. 12 Lemke-Vega appears to allege that a warranty manual containing an express warranty “was 13 provided with” the vehicle. Id. at ¶ 20.2 She alleges that the express warranty “comprised 14 affirmations of fact and promises as to the quality of Defendant’s goods and Defendant’s promises 15 to maintain said goods and conform said goods to a warrantable condition” and that these 16 statements “comprised part of the basis of the bargain that was entered into” when Lemke-Vega 17 purchased the vehicle. Id. at ¶¶ 21, 22. Lemke-Vega alleges that the vehicle had “serious defects 18 and nonconformities to warranty and developed other serious defects and nonconformities to 19 warranty,” including defects in the powertrain, engine, transmission, steering, and HVAC systems. 20 Id. at ¶ 28. She alleges that she presented the vehicle for “warranty repairs” on July 26, 2022, 21 August 4, 2022, September 30, 2022, November 1, 2022, December 10, 2022, and February 16, 22 2023 but “the vehicle still had not been conformed to warranty.” Id. at ¶¶ 29-34, 37. 23 Lemke-Vega filed the complaint on March 24, 2023. MBUSA moved to dismiss the 24 complaint and/or strike portions thereof. The court granted the motion to dismiss and denied the 25 motion to strike as moot on May 22, 2023, and granted Lemke-Vega leave to amend. Lemke-Vega 26 v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 23-CV-01408-DMR, 2023 WL 3604318 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 27 1 2023). Lemke-Vega timely filed the first amended complaint (“FAC”) and MBUSA again moved 2 to dismiss. The court granted the motion to dismiss the FAC on September 12, 2023 and granted 3 Lemke-Vega leave to amend, warning her to “plead her best case.” Lemke-Vega v. Mercedes- 4 Benz USA, LLC (“Lemke-Vega II”), No. 23-CV-01408-DMR, 2023 WL 5957175, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 5 Sept. 12, 2023) (emphasis removed). 6 Lemke-Vega timely filed the SAC, alleging two claims for relief: 1) violation of the 7 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”), 15 U.S.C. § 2310; and 2) breach of express warranty 8 under California Commercial Code section 2313. MBUSA now moves to dismiss the SAC and/or 9 strike portions thereof. 10 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 11 A. Rule 12(b)(6) 12 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in 13 the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). 14 When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all 15 of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, and may dismiss a 16 claim “only where there is no cognizable legal theory” or there is an absence of “sufficient factual 17 matter to state a facially plausible claim to relief.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 18 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Navarro v. Block, 250 19 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009)). A claim 20 has facial plausibility when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 21 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 22 678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged must demonstrate “more than labels and 23 conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. 24 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007). 25 Taken together, Iqbal and Twombly require well-pleaded facts, not legal conclusions, that 26 “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Whitaker v. Tesla Motors, Inc., 985 F.3d 1173, 27 1176 (9th Cir. 2021) (quotations and internal citations omitted). B. Rule 12(f) 1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that a court “may strike from a pleading an 2 insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” A matter is 3 “immaterial” when it “has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or the 4 defenses being pleaded, while ‘[i]mpertinent’ matter consists of statements that do not pertain, and 5 are not necessary, to the issues in question.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th 6 Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds by Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994). The function 7 of a Rule 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that arises from 8 litigating spurious issues by dispensing of those issues before trial, and such a motion may be 9 appropriate where it will streamline the ultimate resolution of the action. Fantasy, 984 F.2d at 10 1527-28. “A motion to strike should be granted if it will eliminate serious risks of prejudice to the 11 moving party, delay, or confusion of issues.” Lee v. Hertz Corp., 330 F.R.D. 557, 560 (N.D. Cal. 12 2019) (citing Fantasy, 984 F.2d at 1528). “Motions to strike are regarded with disfavor [ ] 13 because of the limited importance of pleadings in federal practice and because they are often used 14 solely to delay proceedings.” Capella Photonics, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 850, 858 15 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (quotation omitted). “The grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face 16 of the pleading under attack,” and “the Court must view the pleading under attack in the light more 17 favorable to the pleader when ruling upon a motion to strike.” Amini Innovation Corp. v. 18 McFerran Home Furnishings, Inc., 301 F.R.D. 487, 489 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (citations omitted). 19 III. DISCUSSION 20 A. Motion to Dismiss3 21 1. Breach of Express Warranty- California Commercial Code4 22 California Commercial Code section 2313 sets forth the methods by which a seller creates 23

24 3 Lemke-Vega submitted a declaration by her attorney in support of her opposition to the motion. [Docket No. 38-1 (Oppenheim Decl. Oct. 31, 2023).] The court cannot consider it. See Lee, 250 25 F.3d at 688 (“when the legal sufficiency of a complaint’s allegations is tested by a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), review is limited to the complaint.” (cleaned up)). 26

4 The parties agree that Lemke-Vega’s MMWA claim “stand[s] or fall[s] with [her] express . . . 27 warranty claim[ ] under state law.” See Opp’n 12 (citing Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 1 express warranties. In relevant part, it states:

2 (a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain 3 creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise. 4 (b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of 5 the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description. 6 . . . 7 Cal. Com. Code § 2313(1)(a), (b). See Opp’n 5 (clarifying that Lemke-Vega’s claim is under 8 subsections (a) and (b)). “A plaintiff pleading a breach of express warranty claim must allege 9 facts that sufficiently show: ‘(1) the seller’s statements constitute an affirmation of fact or promise 10 or a description of the goods; (2) the statement was part of the basis of the bargain; and (3) the 11 warranty was breached.’” Scott v. Saraya USA, Inc., ---F. Supp. 3d---, No. 22-CV-05232-WHO, 12 2023 WL 3819366 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2023) (quoting Zeiger v. WellPet LLC, 304 F. Supp. 3d 837, 13 853 (N.D. Cal. 2018)); Hastings v. Ford Motor Co., 495 F. Supp. 3d 919, 924 (S.D. Cal. 2020) 14 (same). 15 The court previously dismissed this claim on the ground that the FAC failed to allege facts 16 to support the required elements. In particular, the court held that the FAC failed to “allege that 17 MBUSA made ‘statements constitute[ing] [sic] an affirmation of fact or promise or a description 18 of the goods,’” did not “identify any . . . written warranties or include facts about their terms,” and 19 did not “allege that MBUSA issued such warranties,” among other shortcomings. Lemke-Vega II, 20 2023 WL 5957175, at *5. The SAC does not remedy these deficiencies. The SAC’s allegation 21 about an express warranty is confusing: “The Express Warranty by Defendant, which was 22 contained in the Warranty Manual, which was provided with the Subject Vehicle.” SAC ¶ 20. 23 The SAC then alleges that a copy of the warranty manual is attached as Exhibit C, but as MBUSA 24 points out in its opening brief, the exhibit is not actually attached to the SAC. The SAC does not 25 allege when the alleged express warranty was issued, who issued it, or what it covers, and offers 26 no details about its terms. The SAC also alleges that the express warranty “comprised 27 affirmations of facts and promises as to the quality of [MBUSA’s] goods and [MBUSA’s] 1 promises to maintain said goods and conform said goods to a warrantable condition,” SAC ¶ 21, 2 but this allegation simply parrots the language of the California Commercial Code without 3 providing any details in support of the allegation or describing the relevant terms of the warranty. 4 The court also found that the FAC “fail[ed] to allege facts about how the warranty was 5 breached, other than generally alleging that the vehicle ‘suffered [unspecified] defects, 6 malfunctions, and nonconformities covered by the Subject Vehicle’s express warranties’ and that 7 ‘Defendant failed to service or repair the Subject Vehicle to conform to the express written 8 warranties . . .’” Lemke-Vega II, 2023 WL 5957175, at *5. The SAC, which repeats these 9 allegations verbatim, see SAC at 8, ¶ 28, 30, fares no better. It adds allegations about several 10 occasions on which Lemke-Vega presented the vehicle to MBUSA’s authorized dealership and 11 alleges that the dealership “performed warranty repairs” to various systems and “addressed 12 [various issues] under warranty.” See SAC ¶¶ 30-34. It is not clear how these allegations support 13 an inference that MBUSA breached any express warranty; rather, they support the inference that 14 MBUSA complied with any obligations under the warranty by addressing issues with the vehicle. 15 The SAC also alleges that there were two occasions on which the dealership was “unable to 16 duplicate” issues and so did not address them, see SAC ¶¶ 31, 32, but does not allege how these 17 incidents constituted breaches of the alleged express warranty. Finally, the SAC alleges that “the 18 vehicle still had not been conformed to warranty” and still suffered from defects, see SAC ¶ 37, 19 but offers no details in support. 20 In sum, the SAC fails to state a claim for breach of express warranties under California 21 Commercial Code sections 2313(1)(a) or (b). As Lemke-Vega has already been given an 22 opportunity to amend the complaint to state a claim for breach of express warranties but failed to 23 do so, and because in the last round, the court granted leave to Plaintiff to “plead her best case,” 24 the claim is dismissed with prejudice. 25 2. MMWA Claim 26 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d) provides that “a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a 27 supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this chapter, or 1 other legal and equitable relief... .” 2 As noted, the parties agree that Lemke-Vega’s MMWA claim stands or falls with her state 3 law express warranty claim. The SAC fails to state a claim under the California Commercial 4 || Code. Accordingly, the MMWA claim is dismissed. As this is her second attempt to plead a 5 claim under the MMWA, any further opportunity to amend would be futile. This claim is 6 || dismissed with prejudice. 7 B. Motion to Strike 8 MBUSA moves to strike the SAC’s claim for civil penalties under California’s Song- 9 Beverly Act on the ground that the court previously dismissed Lemke-Vega’s Song-Beverly Act 10 claim with prejudice. See Lemke-Vega II, 2023 WL 5957175, at *4. The motion to strike is 11 denied as moot, as the court has concluded that the SAC fails to state a claim. 12 || Iv. CONCLUSION

13 For the foregoing reasons, MBUSA’s motion to dismiss is granted and the SAC is

v 14 || dismissed with prejudice. The motion to strike is denied as moot. The Clerk shall enter judgment © 15 and close the case. a 16 aD OS A) □□ 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. he □□□ Ay ERED □ Oo SO ORD Z 18 || Dated: February 2, 2024 2/Nyr i ~ < 19 l Dyn app Z\ \ eanA Ryu | fa? 20 O fleet Oo Sse LR © 22 VB oS ISTRIC 23 24 25 26 27 28