MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 21 2020, 8:55 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE William T. Myers Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Grant County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana Marion, Indiana Megan M. Smith Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Lemere Joseph Jones, December 21, 2020 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CR-840 v. Appeal from the Grant Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Appellee-Plaintiff. Jeffrey D. Todd, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 27D01-1901-MR-3
Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-840 | December 21, 2020 Page 1 of 7 [1] After being tried at a bench trial, Lemere Joseph Jones (“Jones”) was convicted
of three counts of murder,1 and one count of conspiracy to commit armed
robbery2 as a Level 3 felony. The trial court sentenced Jones to sixty-five years
for each of the three murder counts to run consecutive with each other and
fifteen years for conspiracy to commit armed robbery to run concurrent to the
murder counts, for an aggregate sentence of 195 years executed. Jones appeals
his sentence, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing
consecutive sentences because he alleges that the trial court failed to state
reasons for the consecutive sentences.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [3] Jones and his friends Demetrius Jackson (“Jackson”), Jasmine Drake
(“Jasmine”), and Brittany Drake (“Brittany”), believed that Javon Blackwell
(“Javon”) was a drug dealer and that he would have drugs and money stashed
in his residence. Supp. Tr. at 137; State’s Ex. 123 at 156-57. The four of them
devised a plan to rob Javon. Supp. Tr. at 84, 137-38; State’s Ex. 123 at 156-57.
On December 30, 2018, Jones and Jackson met Brittany and Jasmine at
Jasmine’s home just a block away from Javon’s residence. Supp. Tr. at 132-33,
137; State’s Ex. 119-21, 123 at 157. They drove over to Javon’s house, and
1 See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. 2 See Ind. Code §§ 35-42-5-1(a), 35-41-5-2.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-840 | December 21, 2020 Page 2 of 7 Jasmine dropped off Brittany and Jackson at the rear of Javon’s house. Supp.
Tr. at 138; State’s Ex. 123 at 157, 170. Brittany was supposed to serve as a look-
out in the alley behind Javon’s house. State’s Ex. 123 at 157. Jasmine drove
around to the front of Javon’s residence and parked so Jones could go to the
front door. Supp. Tr. at 138; State’s Ex. 123 at 157.
[4] Jones knocked on the front door and was let into the house by Javon. Supp. Tr.
at 138; State’s Ex. 123 at 157, 170. Jones asked for a glass of water and went to
the kitchen, where he unlocked the door to allow Jackson in through the back
door. Supp. Tr. at 138; State’s Ex. 123 at 157, 170-71. Jackson entered and
opened fire killing Javon and his two sons, 12-year-old J.B.1 and 11-year-old
J.B.2, who were present at the home. Supp. Tr. at 25-26, 123-26, 138; State’s Ex.
123 at 157, 170-71. Jones stole an “assault-style rifle,” a handgun, and a
Michael Kors bag before fleeing Javon’s residence. Supp. Tr. at 84, 101-02, 138-
39; State’s Ex. 123 at 157. Afterwards, Jones and Jasmine returned to Jasmine’s
residence and burned their clothes in a burn barrel in the backyard. Supp. Tr. at
139; State’s Ex. 123 at 175. Jones also cut off his dreadlocks. Supp. Tr. at 139;
State’s Ex. 113-15, 123 at 180.
[5] Javon’s mother arrived at his residence around 1:00 p.m. to pick up J.B.1 and
J.B.2. Supp. Tr. at 27-28. When she entered the residence, it was dark inside,
and she noticed Javon on the couch and J.B.1 and J.B.2 huddled together in the
chair in the living room. Id. at 29-30, 98. She thought that they were asleep, so
she attempted to wake them up. Id. at 29. A handyman who had arrived to
work on Javon’s bathroom entered the living room and turned on the lights. Id. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-840 | December 21, 2020 Page 3 of 7 Javon’s mother noticed the boys were not breathing and called 911. Id. at 29-
30.
[6] Jones was later arrested, and on January 28, 2019, the State charged him with
three counts of felony murder, armed robbery, and conspiracy to commit armed
robbery. Id. at 93; Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 7-10, 20. Jones was tried in a bench
trial, and the trial court found him guilty on all charges but vacated the armed
robbery conviction due to double-jeopardy concerns. Tr. Vol. 2 at 20; Supp. Tr.
at 158; Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 46-47. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court
found as aggravating factors Jones’s criminal history and the fact that prior
attempts at rehabilitation had failed, one of the murders was committed in the
presence of children, one of the victims was less than twelve years old, and
Jones was on parole at the time he committed the present crimes. Tr. Vol. 2 at
20; Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 46-47. The trial court found no mitigating factors.
Tr. Vol. 2 at 20; Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 47. The trial court imposed
consecutive sentences of sixty-five years each on the three murder convictions
and a concurrent sentence of fifteen years on the conspiracy to commit armed
robbery conviction, which resulted in an aggregate sentence of 195 years
executed. Tr. Vol. 2 at 21; Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 47. Jones now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [7] Sentencing determinations are within the trial court’s discretion and will be
reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Harris v. State, 964 N.E.2d 920, 926
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-840 | December 21, 2020 Page 4 of 7 is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn
therefrom.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans.
denied. A trial court abuses its discretion if it: (1) fails “to enter a sentencing
statement at all”; (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for
imposing a sentence -- including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors
if any -- but the record does not support the reasons”; (3) enters a sentencing
statement that “omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and
advanced for consideration”; or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a
matter of law.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-91 (Ind. 2007), clarified
on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). If the trial court has abused its discretion,
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MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 21 2020, 8:55 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE William T. Myers Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Grant County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana Marion, Indiana Megan M. Smith Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Lemere Joseph Jones, December 21, 2020 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CR-840 v. Appeal from the Grant Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Appellee-Plaintiff. Jeffrey D. Todd, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 27D01-1901-MR-3
Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-840 | December 21, 2020 Page 1 of 7 [1] After being tried at a bench trial, Lemere Joseph Jones (“Jones”) was convicted
of three counts of murder,1 and one count of conspiracy to commit armed
robbery2 as a Level 3 felony. The trial court sentenced Jones to sixty-five years
for each of the three murder counts to run consecutive with each other and
fifteen years for conspiracy to commit armed robbery to run concurrent to the
murder counts, for an aggregate sentence of 195 years executed. Jones appeals
his sentence, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing
consecutive sentences because he alleges that the trial court failed to state
reasons for the consecutive sentences.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [3] Jones and his friends Demetrius Jackson (“Jackson”), Jasmine Drake
(“Jasmine”), and Brittany Drake (“Brittany”), believed that Javon Blackwell
(“Javon”) was a drug dealer and that he would have drugs and money stashed
in his residence. Supp. Tr. at 137; State’s Ex. 123 at 156-57. The four of them
devised a plan to rob Javon. Supp. Tr. at 84, 137-38; State’s Ex. 123 at 156-57.
On December 30, 2018, Jones and Jackson met Brittany and Jasmine at
Jasmine’s home just a block away from Javon’s residence. Supp. Tr. at 132-33,
137; State’s Ex. 119-21, 123 at 157. They drove over to Javon’s house, and
1 See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. 2 See Ind. Code §§ 35-42-5-1(a), 35-41-5-2.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-840 | December 21, 2020 Page 2 of 7 Jasmine dropped off Brittany and Jackson at the rear of Javon’s house. Supp.
Tr. at 138; State’s Ex. 123 at 157, 170. Brittany was supposed to serve as a look-
out in the alley behind Javon’s house. State’s Ex. 123 at 157. Jasmine drove
around to the front of Javon’s residence and parked so Jones could go to the
front door. Supp. Tr. at 138; State’s Ex. 123 at 157.
[4] Jones knocked on the front door and was let into the house by Javon. Supp. Tr.
at 138; State’s Ex. 123 at 157, 170. Jones asked for a glass of water and went to
the kitchen, where he unlocked the door to allow Jackson in through the back
door. Supp. Tr. at 138; State’s Ex. 123 at 157, 170-71. Jackson entered and
opened fire killing Javon and his two sons, 12-year-old J.B.1 and 11-year-old
J.B.2, who were present at the home. Supp. Tr. at 25-26, 123-26, 138; State’s Ex.
123 at 157, 170-71. Jones stole an “assault-style rifle,” a handgun, and a
Michael Kors bag before fleeing Javon’s residence. Supp. Tr. at 84, 101-02, 138-
39; State’s Ex. 123 at 157. Afterwards, Jones and Jasmine returned to Jasmine’s
residence and burned their clothes in a burn barrel in the backyard. Supp. Tr. at
139; State’s Ex. 123 at 175. Jones also cut off his dreadlocks. Supp. Tr. at 139;
State’s Ex. 113-15, 123 at 180.
[5] Javon’s mother arrived at his residence around 1:00 p.m. to pick up J.B.1 and
J.B.2. Supp. Tr. at 27-28. When she entered the residence, it was dark inside,
and she noticed Javon on the couch and J.B.1 and J.B.2 huddled together in the
chair in the living room. Id. at 29-30, 98. She thought that they were asleep, so
she attempted to wake them up. Id. at 29. A handyman who had arrived to
work on Javon’s bathroom entered the living room and turned on the lights. Id. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-840 | December 21, 2020 Page 3 of 7 Javon’s mother noticed the boys were not breathing and called 911. Id. at 29-
30.
[6] Jones was later arrested, and on January 28, 2019, the State charged him with
three counts of felony murder, armed robbery, and conspiracy to commit armed
robbery. Id. at 93; Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 7-10, 20. Jones was tried in a bench
trial, and the trial court found him guilty on all charges but vacated the armed
robbery conviction due to double-jeopardy concerns. Tr. Vol. 2 at 20; Supp. Tr.
at 158; Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 46-47. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court
found as aggravating factors Jones’s criminal history and the fact that prior
attempts at rehabilitation had failed, one of the murders was committed in the
presence of children, one of the victims was less than twelve years old, and
Jones was on parole at the time he committed the present crimes. Tr. Vol. 2 at
20; Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 46-47. The trial court found no mitigating factors.
Tr. Vol. 2 at 20; Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 47. The trial court imposed
consecutive sentences of sixty-five years each on the three murder convictions
and a concurrent sentence of fifteen years on the conspiracy to commit armed
robbery conviction, which resulted in an aggregate sentence of 195 years
executed. Tr. Vol. 2 at 21; Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 47. Jones now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [7] Sentencing determinations are within the trial court’s discretion and will be
reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Harris v. State, 964 N.E.2d 920, 926
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-840 | December 21, 2020 Page 4 of 7 is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn
therefrom.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans.
denied. A trial court abuses its discretion if it: (1) fails “to enter a sentencing
statement at all”; (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for
imposing a sentence -- including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors
if any -- but the record does not support the reasons”; (3) enters a sentencing
statement that “omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and
advanced for consideration”; or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a
matter of law.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-91 (Ind. 2007), clarified
on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). If the trial court has abused its discretion,
we will remand for resentencing “if we cannot say with confidence that the trial
court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered
reasons that enjoy support in the record.” Id. at 491. The relative weight or
value assignable to reasons properly found, or those which should have been
found, is not subject to review for abuse of discretion. Id. The decision to
impose consecutive sentences lies within the discretion of the trial court. Gross,
22 N.E.3d at 869 (citing Gilliam v. State, 901 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009)). A trial court is required to state its reasons for imposing consecutive
sentences or enhanced terms. Id. A single aggravating circumstance may be
sufficient to support the imposition of consecutive sentences. Id.
[8] Jones argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him by
imposing consecutive sentences. Specifically, he contends that the trial court
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-840 | December 21, 2020 Page 5 of 7 abused its discretion because, although it listed aggravating circumstances, it
failed to articulate how it applied those circumstances to both enhance Jones’s
sentence and to impose consecutive sentences. Jones, therefore, asserts that we
should remand the case to the trial court to correct the deficiency.
[9] We disagree. The trial court found several aggravating circumstances that
could support enhanced and consecutive sentences, and Jones does not
challenge the validity of any of these aggravating circumstances. The evidence
showed that Jones had a substantial criminal history and lesser, prior attempts
at rehabilitation had failed, that one of the murders was committed in the
presence of children, that one of the victims was less than twelve years old, and
that Jones was on parole at the time he committed the present offenses. Tr. Vol.
2 at 20; Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 46-47. A trial court may rely on the same
factors to enhance a sentence and to impose consecutive sentences. Reed v.
State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1199 (Ind. 2006); Gilliam, 901 N.E.2d at 74.
Additionally, the fact of multiple crimes or victims constitutes a valid
aggravating circumstance that justifies consecutive sentences. McBride v. State,
992 N.E.2d 912, 920 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing O’Connell v. State, 742 N.E.2d
943, 952 (Ind. 2001)), trans. denied. Here, the trial court found multiple valid
aggravating circumstances to support enhancing Jones’s sentence, and his
crimes involved multiple victims. These aggravating circumstances were
sufficient to both enhance his sentence and to justify consecutive sentences.
We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
imposed enhanced, consecutive sentences.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-840 | December 21, 2020 Page 6 of 7 [10] Affirmed.
Bradford, C.J., and May, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-840 | December 21, 2020 Page 7 of 7