Lembo v. Federici

385 P.2d 312, 62 Wash. 2d 972, 1963 Wash. LEXIS 417
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 26, 1963
Docket36487
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 385 P.2d 312 (Lembo v. Federici) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lembo v. Federici, 385 P.2d 312, 62 Wash. 2d 972, 1963 Wash. LEXIS 417 (Wash. 1963).

Opinion

Donworth, J.

This is an action by the payee of a promissory note against the estate of the maker for the balance due thereon in the sum of $1,030.80, together with interest and reasonable attorneys’ fee.

The testimony of the payee, C. A. Lembo (appellant herein) was that he had known the deceased, Thomas Federici, approximately 40 years; that, for several years after coming to this country from Italy, he had worked for the deceased in the barbering trade; and that they had been good friends. Appellant also testified that he had loaned money a hundred times to the deceased without any note, but that he required a note in this instánce because of a business transaction he had had with another party who had died and there was no written memorandum embodying their leasing agreement, which resulted in its unenforcibility.

The note in question is dated November 5, 1957. The due date is December 5, 1957, and there is a provision that the principal should bear interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum thereafter. The note is made out on a printed form for a negotiable promissory note provided by the Seattle-First National Bank.

A claim was filed against the estate of Thomas Federici, based upon the note in question, was disallowed by the ad-ministratrix, and this action followed.

At the trial, respondent objected to the admittance in evidence of the promissory note sued upon on the ground that alterations apparent on its face made it incompetent in the absence of an explanation of the alterations. The trial court admitted the note in evidence, but reserved his ruling on respondent’s objection. At the close of the trial, the court concluded that the note had been altered on its *974 face within the meaning of the Negotiable Instrument Law, and that the court would have to find for respondent because appellant had been unable to explain the alterations because of the dead man’s statute, i.e. appellant was prevented, by respondent’s objection, from testifying to a transaction with the decedent. The court then ruled that respondent’s objection to admitting the note in evidence would be sustained.

The trial court made the following findings of fact in regard to the alleged alterations:

“III. The Defendant claims and the Court finds by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the note described in Paragraph I appears, on its face, to have been altered or changed with regard to the amount thereof due and payable to Plaintiff. The specific changes or alterations of said note appear to have occurred in the upper right corner of the note in and around the printed dollar sign where a figure originally appearing on the note has apparently been erased and overwritten. The erased figure appears to have been in the same ink as the dates and signature of the maker, all appearing on the face of the note. Some apparent unexplained alterations or changes also appear to have occurred in the space provided for writing out in words the amount due on the note. Expert testimony adduced by the Defendant confirmed the alteration or changing of this note and revealed that the note had been written in at least four different inks and with four different pens, all of which is also apparent upon the face of this note. Such testimony further confirmed that the figures in the note plainly written on the face of the note $1,200.00 were in different ink than the dates or the signature on the note and different ink from either ink used in the space provided after the dollar sign in the upper right corner of the note.

“IV. The Court finds that the alterations described above constitute a material alteration of the amount payable under the note and that the same are unexplained by the payee in the note.”

From the above findings, the court concluded:

“I. That the apparent change or alteration of the amount payable under the note described in the Findings, above constitute material alterations of the note as described under R.C.W. 62.01.124 and R.C.W. 62.01.125, being the Washington version of the negotiable instrument law-. '1

*975 “II. The alterations described being material alterations of a negotiable instrument apparent upon the face of the instrument, therefore, under the quoted section of the statute under Paragraph I, the note should be declared to be void.”

The assignments of error raise only two issues: (1) Was there a material alteration? (2) Assuming that there was such an alteration, was the burden upon the payee to explain it?

RCW 62.01.125 provides:

“Any alteration which changes—

“(2) The sum payable, either for principal or interest;

“. . . or any other change or addition which alters the effect of the instrument in any respect, is a material alteration.”

Whether there was an alteration is a question of fact, and we shall not disturb the findings of the trial court when they are supported by substantial evidence. We find such evidence in this case.

Appellant contends that, in any event, there was no material alteration evidenced, since the sum written in words controls rather than the sum written in numbers in the margin, under the provision of RCW 62.01.017(1). He then concluded that the “2”, overwritten by a hieroglyphic which could be construed as a symbol for “and”— which appears between the words “One thousand”, and “two hundred dollars”—could not change the amount of the note. The problem is that this is not the only apparent alteration where the sum has been written in words. It appears from the record that the trial judge believed that, among other alterations, the “t” in the “two” was an alteration and had been written over a symbol for “and,” and that the “w” was really an “n.” Thus, he concluded that there was an alteration changing “& no hundred dollars” to “two hundred dollars.”

While the court was giving its oral decision, it was' asked by counsel: ' «•

*976 “Mr. Lanza: Your Honor, would you care to explain what you consider were the material alterations so that we can propose findings? The Court: I think that I have talked about it enough on the record. I have stated what my original reaction was when I looked at it.”

When the oral decision is consistent with the findings of fact, such findings are to be read in light of the oral decision. El Cerrito, Inc. v. Ryndak, 60 Wn. (2d) 847, 376 P. (2d) 528 (1962). Thus, we attribute the alteration in the word that now reads “two” as among the alterations referred to by the court in its findings of fact and conclusions of law.

We now consider the second issue, i.e. when there is an apparent alteration in a promissory note, is the burden upon the payee to explain the alterations? The holdings of this court, in Wolferman v. Bell, 6 Wash. 84, 32 Pac. 1017 (1893), and Yakima Nat. Bank v. Knipe, 6 Wash. 348, 33 Pac.

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Bluebook (online)
385 P.2d 312, 62 Wash. 2d 972, 1963 Wash. LEXIS 417, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lembo-v-federici-wash-1963.