Leichsenring v. Feeeman

103 F.2d 378, 26 C.C.P.A. 1153
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedMay 1, 1939
DocketNo. 4109
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 103 F.2d 378 (Leichsenring v. Feeeman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Leichsenring v. Feeeman, 103 F.2d 378, 26 C.C.P.A. 1153 (ccpa 1939).

Opinion

Gaeeett, Presiding Judge,

delivered tlie opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office reversing the decision of the Examiner of Interferences in an interference proceeding involving a device designed to be associated with the brake applying system of an automotive vehicle to prevent unintended retrograde movement, or rolling backwards, of the vehicle. Its especial usefulness appears to be in situations where it becomes necessary to stop and then start the vehicle on an upgrade, but the counts do not so limit it. Such devices are frequently referred to in the record as “no roll-back” devices. The brief on behalf of appellant says:

“No roll-back” devices are primarily used when the driver of a vehicle finds it necessary to do three things with only two feet: In other words, to (1) step on the clutch pedal to disengage the clutch, (2) step on the brake pedal to hold the car against coasting, and (3) step on the accelerator.

The device of the issue, by bringing about coordination between the release of the clutch and the application of the foot brake, combines the first two of the foregoing acts, placing them for a time under the control of the clutch mechanism.

The interference embraces seven counts of which all except count 1 are limited to the application of the device to fluid actuated brake systems. Counts 1 and 2 read:

1. The combination with the brake and clutch mechanisms of a vehicle, of means connected for actuation by the clutch mechanism for holding the brakes [1154]*1154applied after the operator has set the brakes, and means for limiting the maximum force with which the brakes may be held by said clutch mechanism.
2. In a motor vehicle having a fluid -actuated braking system and disengageable power transmission mechanism, the combination of means for applying the brakes, control means for said first mentioned means connected with said mechanism for maintaining the brakes in applied condition while said mechanism is disengaged, and means for determining the maximum force under which said brakes may be maintained in applied condition.

In view of the issue of the case no further description than that already given is essential.

Freeman is the senior party, his application having been filed February 15, 1933; that of Leichsenring, Jr., was filed August 23, 1933. Freeman took no testimony and concededly is restricted to his filing date for conception and reduction to practice. Leichsenring in his preliminary statement claimed conception on or about June 10, 1932, and reduction to practice on or about July 15, 1932. As the junior party it was incumbent upon appellant to establish his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

It is not questioned that Leichsenring embodied the invention in a device which responds to the counts and tested same in the summer of 1932, but the claim of appellee is that the tests made did not constitute a reduction to practice and that appellant failed to establish diligence during the critical period from just prior to appellee’s filing date until his (appellant’s) own filing date.

The Examiner of Interferences reviewed the testimony offered on appellant’s behalf in extenso and concluded that the tests made in August 1932 did constitute reduction to practice at that time and awarded priority to him. Upon appeal the board took the view that the tests then made did not demonstrate the device to be successful | and that there was no showing of diligence during the critical period. | Hence, it reversed the examiner’s decision.

The device which appellant made and tested is in evidence as Leichsenring’s Exhibit 2.

The principal controversy grows out of the fact, which was admitted, that during the tests there was a certain leakage of brake fluid around what the Examiner of Interferences describes as “the swing cock of Exhibit 2.” It is contended that as a result of this leakage the brakes were released and did not hold the vehicle for a sufficient time to prove success.

It appears from the record that the purpose of the swing cock valve was to trap fluid in the system. Leichsenring testified that he found the brass piece from which he fashioned the body of Exhibit 2, and also the cock valve that he used, which is conventional in type, in a heap of discarded scrap at a plant in which he was employed. Evi[1155]*1155dently the swing cock did not thoroughly seal the opening and there was some leakage at the bearing of it.

It is urged by appellant that it is immaterial, so far as demonstrating the success of the invention is concerned, that the leakage occurred; that the function of the swing cock was well known; that it had “only incidental bearing upon the operativeness of the essence of the invention here in issue, namely, the maximum pressure limiting means,” and that leakage in the valve did not destroy the operativeness of the device but was a fault readily overcomable without the exercise of inventive ingenuity.

Since, from our viewpoint, the only question of importance here is the matter of reduction to practice there is no necessity for a general review of all the evidence. In addition to his own testimony appellant introduced the testimony of three persons who witnessed, in fact participated in, the tests. These were John J. Krez, the president and treasurer of a company whose business was not shown; Otto Spevak, connected with a Ford motor sales company, and Harry Jacobsen, a civil engineer. So far as appears, no one of these persons had any financial interest in the outcome of the case.

The witnesses Krez and Jacobsen seem to have aided appellant in procuring the loan of a Plymouth car upon which the device was installed for making the tests and they accompanied him when some demonstrations were made. One of these demonstrations took place on a hill on Lake Shore Drive, in or near the city of Chicago, Illinois, and Krez drove the car during a part of that demonstration. He testified as follows:

I drove the car and started and stopped it several times. The device functioned, to my mind, very good, with the exception that it, after it had stopped for a while, it seemed to slide back just a little bit. So Leiehsenring would get out and raise the hood and make some adjustment on a lever, at which time the car would hold, and he said that he had some more work to do on a valve which was not sealing properly, and an adjustment on a lever before it would be perfect.
Q. 14. Did you drive the car and stop and start it on the hill, yourself?
A. Yes, X did; many times.
Q. 15. When there was no interval between the stopping and the starting of the car, or only a short interval, did the device operate perfectly?
A. Yes, it did.
Q. 16. State whether, when the brake was applied while going up the hill, the car would be held for a brief interval, enabling you to start it again by throwing in the clutch and stepping on the gas.
A. Oh, yes, certainly the car held. It was only after an interim of possibly, it would seem to me, a minute or so, that there would be — you would notice a slight sliding back, but the car held stationary.

Krez was not cross-examined.

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Bluebook (online)
103 F.2d 378, 26 C.C.P.A. 1153, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/leichsenring-v-feeeman-ccpa-1939.