Lei Yin v. Robert H. Barry.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: April 17, 2026
• Docket: 25-P-0891
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-891

LEI YIN

vs.

ROBERT H. BARRY.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Lei Yin,2 appeals from the order denying his

second motion for reconsideration. We affirm.

Background. This appeal concerns the plaintiff's claims

for malpractice, breach of contract, and negligence arising out

of the defendant's representation of the plaintiff before the

Massachusetts Department of Industrial Accidents (DIA).3 The

plaintiff claimed that the defendant, his former attorney Robert

1In his individual capacity and doing business as his legal malpractice insurance company.

2 A self-represented litigant.

3In a separate appeal, a different panel of this court affirmed the DIA's decision. Lei Yin's Case, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 1118 (2021), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 384 (2023). H. Barry, had refused to submit 110 pages of e-mail messages and

the plaintiff's time card to the DIA, and that the defendant had

refused to present to the DIA the plaintiff's claim that the

plaintiff's employer had tampered with evidence.

On April 25, 2025, a Superior Court judge allowed the

defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims against the

defendant, on the grounds that the plaintiff's claims were time

barred by the three-year statute of limitations4 and that the

plaintiff's mental health disability did not toll the statute of

limitations. See G. L. c. 260, §§ 4, 7. In response, the

plaintiff filed various postjudgment motions challenging the

court's allowance of the motion to dismiss. Relevant here is

that the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration on May 28,

2025, the motion was denied by an order entered on June 2, 2025,

and the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on June 9, 2025.

Discussion. The plaintiff's June 9, 2025 notice of appeal

states that the plaintiff appeals from "the decision entered on

June 2nd 2025 that denied my Further Motion of Reconsideration

4 The judge found that the plaintiff had "actual knowledge of the facts giving rise to his claim as early as December 3, 2018, but did not file his complaint until October 1, 2024," and because the "gist" of the plaintiff's cause of action was an action for malpractice, the three-year statute of limitations set out in G. L. c. 260, § 4, applied. See Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. Crandall Dry Dock Eng'rs, Inc., 396 Mass. 818, 823 (1986).

2 filed on May 28th, 2025." We therefore confine our discussion

to the denial of the May 28, 2025 motion for reconsideration.

See Mass. R. A. P. 3 (c) (1), as appearing in 491 Mass. 1601

(2023) ("The notice of appeal shall designate . . . in civil

cases, the judgment, decree, adjudication, or separately

appealable order from which the appeal is taken"). See also

Brown v. Chicopee Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 1710, IAFF, 408

Mass. 1003, 1004 n.4 (1990) ("Although some leniency is

appropriate in determining whether pro se litigants have

complied with rules of procedure, the rules nevertheless bind

pro se litigants as all other litigants"). "We review a

decision on a motion for reconsideration for abuse of

discretion." Kauders v. Uber Techs., Inc., 486 Mass. 557, 568

(2021).

General Law c. 260, § 7, states that if a person commencing

an action "is a minor, or is incapacitated by reason of mental

illness when a right to bring an action first accrues, the

action may be commenced within the time hereinbefore limited

after the disability is removed."

The plaintiff contends that the judge's denial of his

motion for reconsideration ignored evidence that the plaintiff

had a mental disability, and that the plaintiff did not

3 understand that his cause of action had accrued until 2024,

after his appeal of the DIA decision concluded.

In fact, the judge acknowledged that the plaintiff "has a

mental disability." However, the judge noted that the plaintiff

communicated that he would submit the contested evidence after

the DIA hearing (against the defendant's advice) as early as

December 3, 2018. The judge also noted that the plaintiff

continued to pursue his appeal of the DIA decision even after

the defendant withdrew from representing the plaintiff. See Lei

Yin's Case, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 1118 (2021), cert. denied, 144

S. Ct. 384 (2023).5 We agree with the judge that "[t]hese facts

do not plausibly suggest that [the plaintiff's] mental health

disability incapacitated him." See G. L. c. 260, § 7.

Accordingly, the judge did not abuse her discretion by denying

5 A petition for rehearing later was denied, see 144 S. Ct. 632 (2024).

4 the plaintiff's May 28, 2025, motion for reconsideration. See

Kauders, 486 Mass. at 568.

Order dated June 2, 2025, affirmed.

By the Court (Desmond, Tan & Wood, JJ.6),

Clerk

Entered: April 17, 2026.

6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.