Lehn v. Lehn, No. 260473 (Aug. 24, 1990)

1990 Conn. Super. Ct. 1603
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedAugust 24, 1990
DocketNo. 260473
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1990 Conn. Super. Ct. 1603 (Lehn v. Lehn, No. 260473 (Aug. 24, 1990)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lehn v. Lehn, No. 260473 (Aug. 24, 1990), 1990 Conn. Super. Ct. 1603 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.] MEMORANDUM OF DECISION The plaintiff husband has brought suit against his wife seeking a dissolution of their marriage on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown and claiming custody of the four minor children and a transfer of all the defendant's real and personal property located at the family residence. The defendant wife's answer admits all the allegations of the complaint and in a Cross Complaint she seeks a dissolution on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, custody of the four minor children, an assignment of a portion of the plaintiff's estate, support for the minor children, alimony, the plaintiff's interest in the family residence, attorney's fees and a garnishment of the plaintiff's earnings. There are four minor children of this marriage ranging in age from one and a half years to fourteen years. By their pleadings the parties agree that their marriage of fifteen years has broken down irretrievably, a conclusion with which the court agrees after a consideration of all the evidence. The court finds that while the marriage had not been a successful one for a number of years, that the defendant's conduct and action were the substantial factors in the breakdown. In the interests of the children and the parties the court will not set forth the facts on which it reached those conclusions.

In determining the custody of the minor children, the guiding principle is what is best for the benefit and welfare of the children. "The only relevant consideration. . . is the welfare of the child." Fagan v. Fagan, 131 Conn. 688, 690, Sullivan v. Sullivan, 141 Conn. 235, 242; Murphy v. Murphy,143 Conn. 600, 603; See Kelsey v. Green, 69 Conn. 291, 299, "In making or modifying any order with respect to custody or visitation, the court shall be guided by the best interests of the child, giving consideration to the wishes of the child if he is of sufficient age and capable of forming an intelligent preference, provided in the making the initial order, the court may take into consideration, the causes for dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, if such causes are relevant in a determination of the best interests of the child." Section46b-56 (b) C.G.S. The court finds that it is in the best interests of the minor children that their custody be awarded CT Page 1604 to the defendant mother with whom they have resided for approximately fifteen months since the plaintiff left. The plaintiff has made an urgent plea for joint custody, which this court is compelled to deny since the wife and the father are unable to agree at this time, on most things particularly the rearing of the children. Custody of one parent, the mother, is in their best interests and welfare. However the father is to be consulted with respect to the matters of their education, religious upbringing and health. Decisions on the enumerated matter are to be joint with the parents keeping in mind the welfare and interests of the children. In the event they are unable to agree the contested matter shall be submitted to this court. The plaintiff father shall have liberal and flexible right of visitation including but not limited to the following. The plaintiff shall have the children on alternate weekends from 6:00 P.M. Friday to 6:00 P.M. Sunday. He is to give at least twenty-four hours notice to the defendant of his inability to take the children on any weekend. The defendant shall have the children every Wednesday from their school dismissal to 7:30 P.M. The plaintiff shall have Samantha each Monday following a weekend that he has no visitation with the children however, Samantha's agreement shall be a requisite of such visits. The plaintiff shall have the four children on alternate holidays beginning with the first holiday following this decision. Those holidays are defined as New Years Day, Easter, Memorial Day, Fourth of July, Labor Day, Thanksgiving and Martin Luther King Day. The plaintiff shall have the children on Christmas Day from 1 P.M. to 8 P.M. He shall also have the children on the birthday of each child from 5:30 P.M. to 8:30 P.M. The plaintiff shall have the children on Father's Day and the defendant on Mother's Day and this visitation shall prevail over any conflict in visitation ordered hereinbefore or hereafter. The plaintiff's visitation on Father's Day shall be from 9:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. The plaintiff shall have the children for one week in July and one week in August. He shall notify the defendant by Memorial Day of each year of the weeks selected. The plaintiff and defendant shall alternate the childrens midterm school vacations occurring during the winter, spring and at Christmas. In the event the plaintiff has them during Christmas vacation, then the defendant shall have them Christmas Day from 1:00 P.M. to 8:00 P.M. The plaintiff shall not be permitted to have Jane Tavella present during visitation for a period of two months only, following the date of the decision. Thereafter the plaintiff is permitted to have her present during visitations. The two months period is provided so that the parties and the children shall be prepared for her visitation, however, the plaintiff is not to force the children to visit with her, and the visit shall be with the agreement of the children CT Page 1605

With respect to alimony, support and a division of the property of the parties, the law to be considered has been stated as follows:

To begin with, our alimony statute does not recognize an absolute right to alimony. General Statutes 46b-82. Thomas v. Thomas, 159 Conn. 477, 486, 171 A.2d 42 (1970). `This court has reiterated time and again that awards of financial settlements ancillary to a marital dissolution rest in the sound discretion of the trial court.' Posada v. Posada, 179 Conn. 568, 576. Although the court is required to consider the statutory criteria of length of marriage, causes for dissolution, the age, health, station in life, occupation, amount and sources of income, assets and opportunity for future acquisition of assets, of each of the parties, Fucci v. Fucci, 179 Conn. 174, no single criterion is preferred over all the others. In weighing the factors in a given case the court is not required to give equal weight to each of the specified items. Nevertheless, it is rather obvious that in making financial determination the financial circumstances, both actual and potential, are entitled to great weight.

Valente v. Valente, 180 Conn. 528, 530.

Since "[i]t would serve no useful function to require the trial court ritualistically to rehearse the statutory criteria that it has taken into account," Scherr v. Scherr, 183 Conn. 366,368, this court will not recount those statutory criteria and the evidence, other than has been previously stated. "The court is not obligated to make express findings on each of these statutory criteria. (46b-82 and 46b-81 (c))" Weiman v. Weiman, 188 Conn. 232,

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Related

Posada v. Posada
427 A.2d 406 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1980)
Fucci v. Fucci
425 A.2d 592 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1979)
Valante v. Valante
429 A.2d 964 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1980)
Scherr v. Scherr
439 A.2d 375 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1981)
Sullivan v. Sullivan
104 A.2d 898 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1954)
Weiman v. Weiman
449 A.2d 151 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1982)
Thomas v. Thomas
271 A.2d 62 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1970)
Murphy v. Murphy
124 A.2d 891 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1956)
Fagan v. Fagan
42 A.2d 41 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1945)
Rath Packing Co. v. Pittsburgh
171 A.2d 42 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1961)
Kelsey v. Green
38 L.R.A. 471 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1897)

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Bluebook (online)
1990 Conn. Super. Ct. 1603, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lehn-v-lehn-no-260473-aug-24-1990-connsuperct-1990.