Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. v. Intel Corp. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.)

502 B.R. 376, 2013 WL 6671557, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 5315, 58 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 257
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York
DecidedDecember 19, 2013
DocketCase No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Jointly Administered); Adv. Proc. No. 13-01340 (JMP)
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 502 B.R. 376 (Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. v. Intel Corp. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. v. Intel Corp. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), 502 B.R. 376, 2013 WL 6671557, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 5315, 58 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 257 (N.Y. 2013).

Opinion

Chapter 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AND DETERMINING THAT CONTRACT CLAIM IS NON-CORE

JAMES M. PECK, United States Bankruptcy Judge

Introduction

Defendant Intel Corporation (“Intel”) seeks dismissal of two counts of the adversary complaint filed by Lehman Brothers OTC Derivatives Inc. (“LOTC”) and Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI,” and, together with LOTC, “Lehman”) and a determination that the sole remaining count for breach of contract is a non-core count that may not be finally adjudicated by the bankruptcy court under the authority of Stern v. Marshall, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011). The complaint seeks damages from Intel in relation to the early termination and unwinding of a swap agreement dated August 29, 2008 that was structured to enable Intel to acquire by indirect means a significant quantity of its own publicly-traded securities before the end of the third quarter of 2008. In effect, LOTC undertook by contract to execute purchases of securities for Intel’s account that Intel, as an entity in possession of vast quantities of material nonpublic information, could not have obtained directly without exposing itself to potential claims under the securities laws. LBHI’s only obligations under the swap agreement were as credit support provider.

To complicate matters, this complex transaction to enable Intel to acquire its own shares was arranged only a few weeks before the bankruptcy of LBHI. Under the agreement, LOTC was to purchase Intel shares during the period from September 2, 2008 through September 26, 2008 (the “Calculation Period”) for eventual delivery [378]*378to Intel on September 29, 2008 (the “Settlement Date”). The complaint alleges that approximately 50.5 million Intel shares were supposed to have been delivered on the Settlement Date in accordance with an agreed formula of volume-weighted average prices (“VWAP”) of the shares to be acquired during the Calculation Period. Without mentioning any of the well-known market disruptions and volatility that occurred in the aftermath of LBHI’s bankruptcy, the complaint goes on to allege that, as of the Settlement Date, LOTC had purchased approximately 89.7 million shares at a cost of approximately $803 million but that the value on that date had fallen to approximately $686 million.

The architecture of the agreement provided for the transfer of $1 billion from Intel to LOTC in exchange for the contemporaneous transfer of $1 billion from LOTC to Intel. The funds transferred to LOTC served as a prepayment of the cash needed to clear periodic purchases of the Intel shares during the Calculation Period. The reciprocal transfer of $1 billion from LOTC to Intel constituted a posting of collateral by LOTC, and, under the Credit Support Annex, Intel had the right to set off from this collateral amounts owed by LOTC in accordance with the swap agreement. Thus, the $1 billion in cash collateral was property of LOTC that functioned as security to protect Intel against the risk of default by LOTC.

LOTC alleges that it purchased Intel shares during the Calculation Period as contemplated by the swap agreement, but no purchased shares were delivered on the Settlement Date as a consequence of the bankruptcy filing by LBHI as Credit Support Provider on September 15, 2008 and the resulting financial upheaval within the enterprises managed by LBHI. Two weeks later, on the Settlement Date, Intel sent a letter to LOTC referring to the bankruptcy of LBHI as an Event of Default and designating September 29, 2008 as the Early Termination Date of the agreement. The following day, Intel exercised its remedies as secured party and set off against the entire $1 billion in collateral of LOTC plus accrued interest. That setoff was a prepetition act that occurred on September 30, 2008, just three days before commencement of LOTC’s own chapter 11 case. Issues surrounding the proper characterization of this setoff frame the procedural contest now before the Court.

LOTC alleges that in setting off the collateral, Intel failed to make a reasonable, good faith determination of its loss under the swap agreement and wrongfully seized all of the collateral in its possession, thereby exercising control over debtor property in violation of the automatic stay and exposing itself to a cause of action for turnover. The amounts claimed allegedly exceed amounts that LOTC would have owed to Intel under provisions of the agreement that govern the calculation of loss due to LOTC’s own default. LOTC asserts that this loss, if determined based on the market value of the undelivered shares, would be $873 million, not the $1 billion plus interest taken by Intel.

From the point of view of the plaintiffs, this adversary proceeding involves an alleged improper seizure of collateral by Intel of amounts greater than what Intel could have recovered under the terms of the agreement. The amount in dispute is not less than $127 million, although as much as $312 million may be claimed by LOTC under an alternative damage calculation based on future open market purchases of Intel shares when prices were depressed even further. From the perspective of Intel, it acted reasonably in accordance with the agreement, has no liability whatsoever and properly exercised [379]*379prepetition setoff rights that converted the collateral to Intel cash.

The motion practice before the Court raises the question of whether LOTC and LBHI have remedies under the Bankruptcy Code or simply have claims for breach of contract that do not arise within their bankruptcy cases. This question, while sophisticated, is actually one of very limited substantive importance because plaintiffs ■will retain a cause of action for breach of contract against a financially strong defendant regardless of how the Court decides Intel’s motion to dismiss. When viewed in this practical light, the parties conspicuously are jockeying over the pleadings as a means to obtain what each side no doubt perceives to be an advantage in forum selection.

If LOTC prevails, it is foreseeable that the bankruptcy court will retain control over all counts of a complaint that was drafted with obvious attention to including causes of action grounded in provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. That drafting was intentional and designed to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. However, if Intel is successful in obtaining dismissal of Count II and Count III (seeking turnover and asserting a stay violation, respectively) and a related ruling that Count I is non-core, the defendant will then have the option to move for withdrawal of the reference, thereby possibly enabling it to press contractual defenses in the district court. The tactical aspects, thus, are undeniable and transparent to any experienced observer.

That having been noted, the above procedural backdrop does not affect the merits of this decision, although it does diminish the real importance of what is at stake here. Regardless of the outcome of Intel’s motion, LOTC and LBHI will have their opportunity to challenge the propriety of Intel’s loss calculation, and Intel will have the ability to defend itself and claim that it acted strictly in accordance with the requirements of the contract governing the VWAP purchases of its shares.

As described in this decision, the Court grants Intel’s motion to dismiss. Even after accepting the truth of all allegations of the complaint, LOTC is unable to maintain claims for a stay violation or for turnover.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
502 B.R. 376, 2013 WL 6671557, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 5315, 58 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 257, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lehman-bros-holdings-inc-v-intel-corp-in-re-lehman-bros-holdings-nysb-2013.