Lehigh Valley Railroad v. United States

149 F. Supp. 884, 138 Ct. Cl. 166, 1957 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 64
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedApril 3, 1957
DocketNo. 49897
StatusPublished

This text of 149 F. Supp. 884 (Lehigh Valley Railroad v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lehigh Valley Railroad v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 884, 138 Ct. Cl. 166, 1957 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 64 (cc 1957).

Opinion

Opinion

per curiam;

This case was heard by the Honorable Wilson Cowen, a trial commissioner of this court, who rendered a report of his findings of fact. By an order of the court dated February 10, 1956, the court, pursuant to Rule 45 (c), directed Commissioner Cowen to submit recommendations for conclusions of law in the case. He has done so in the form of an opinion giving reasons and citing precedents. The court adopts the opinion and conclusions of Commissioner Cowen which are printed below and plaintiff’s petition is dismissed [169]*169and judgment is entered for the defendant on its counterclaim in the sum of $15,395.26.

OPINION BY THE COMMISSIONER

During September, October, November and December 1942, the defendant shipped 238 cars of ammunition over the lines of plaintiff and its connecting carriers. The shipments were intended for export overseas from New York Harbor, but they were not originally consigned for export. Instead, they were consigned to the Baritan Arsenal at Nixon, New Jersey, which the Government used during the war period, both as a storage and shipping depot from which the ammunition was moved on barges to ships in New York Harbor, and as a control point for ammunition moving by rail to Caven Point Terminal on the New Jersey Shore, where the ammunition was loaded aboard ships and exported to foreign countries. The 238 cars were included in plaintiff’s trains with cars containing other commodities consigned to the Perth Amboy, New Jersey, area, and were hauled by plaintiff to its Perth Amboy yards, which it used as a breakup and classification yard for cars containing freight consigned to Perth Amboy and Nixon. Plaintiff had previously delivered ammunition cars to the arsenal after first transporting them to the Perth Amboy yards, where the ammunition cars were separated from other cars in plaintiff’s trains, but in July 1942, plaintiff was instructed not to deliver any more ammunition cars to the arsenal without first supplying requested information regarding each car and to hold the cars until the defendant gave disposition instructions. While the cars were held for orders short of destination at Perth Amboy, defendant diverted and reconsigned them to Caven Point Terminal at Jersey City, where the ammunition was loaded aboard ships for export to foreign countries. To make delivery at Caven Point, it was necessary for plaintiff to backhaul the cars from its Perth Amboy yards over its Perth Amboy Branch to its main line at South Plainfield, and thence eastward to plaintiff’s railroad station at Caven Point.

The question to be decided is whether the freight charges should be computed on the basis of a combination of rates [170]*170from the various points of origin to Perth Amboy and from Perth Amboy to Caven Point, pursuant to the provisions of plaintiff’s Special Services Tariff,1 or whether such charges should be computed at the through export rate from the points of origin to final destination, plus reconsignment charges, pursuant to the provisions of Curlett’s tariff.2

The diversion and reconsignment of railway freight is a practice widely followed and required in the conduct of modern business. Since it gives the shipper the advantage of fluidity and regularity of movement and often enables the carrier to relieve terminal congestion by holding the freight at points short of terminals, it is regarded as a commercial necessity. Consequently, it is a common practice for carriers to hold cars short of the billed destination upon the shipper’s order and to permit reconsignment to a new destination upon payment of the through rate, plus a reconsignment charge, and such demurrage or storage charges as may be specified in the applicable tariffs. Detroit Traffic Association v. L. S. & M. S. RR. Co., 21 I. C. C. 257; Central Commercial Co. v. L. & N. RR. Co., 27 I. C. C. 114.

Plaintiff’s Special Services Tariff, in effect during the time involved here, sets forth the rules and charges that are generally applicable to the diversion and reconsignment of freight on plaintiff’s lines, but that tariff specifically provides that it does not apply when diversion or reconsignment is made under the rules contained in Curlett’s tariff.

Curlett’s tariff states that its rules and charges apply to a list of designated stations, docks, and terminals on both the New York and New Jersey sides of New York Harbor. One of the stations so listed is “New York Harbor, N. Y.”, and for explanation of this designation there is a reference to Items 515 and 520, which define the location of New York Harbor as the area within the free lighterage limits and extra towage limits prescribed in Rules A-20 and A-80 of the same tariff. Rule A-20, contained in Supplement 1 of Curlett’s tariff and in effect at the time these shipments were made, specifies the free lighterage and floatage limits of New York Harbor and states that these limits include Perth [171]*171Amboy, New Jersey, on Staten Island Sound. Since the reconsignments here were made at Perth Amboy, New Jersey, Curlett’s tariff is clearly applicable to the shipments in suit. Plaintiff’s argument that this tariff is inapplicable, because plaintiff had no arrangements for providing lighterage service at Perth Amboy and because Curlett’s tariff prohibited the lighterage of ammunition, is untenable. Items 515 and 520 and other provisions in the tariff make it clear that the tariff applies to freight which is not to be lightered as well as to that for which lighterage is to be furnished.

Rule A-30 of Curlett’s tariff sets forth the charges and conditions under which eastbound freight may be reconsigned and diverted, and Item 2663 of the rule states in explicit and unambiguous language that the export rate (the same rate charged when the freight is originally consigned for export), plus a specified reconsignment charge, applies to eastbound freight not originally consigned for export, provided it is ordered for export after the shipment arrives at points named in Note 16 of the tariff and provided further that the shipment has not passed from possession of the carrier. It is undisputed that the 238 cars in suit were eastbound freight and that they remained in the possession of the carrier from the dates of shipment until deliveries were made at Caven Point. Note 16, referred to in the above-mentioned rule, states that the points thereby covered are “South Plainfield, New Jersey, and east thereof.” Plaintiff contends that this provision of the tariff can only be construed to apply to points on its main line running directly through South Plainfield to its New York Harbor stations. A similar contention made with respect to tariff provisions comparable to those stated in Note 16 quoted above was rejected by the Interstate Commerce Commission in James B. Berry Sons’ Co. v. B. & O. RR. Co., 140 I. C. C. 406. There a shipment of petroleum was made from West Alexander, Pennsylvania, to Bradford, Pennsylvania, and the shipper claimed the benefit of rates in a tariff providing that Bradford was a destination to which the Rochester rates applied in connection with the following reference:

[172]*172Bases herein provided will apply only from points on the Baltimore <& Ohio Railroad (in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, also points in Pennsylvania west of Gallery, Pa.)

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Bluebook (online)
149 F. Supp. 884, 138 Ct. Cl. 166, 1957 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 64, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lehigh-valley-railroad-v-united-states-cc-1957.