Lehigh Valley Railroad v. Mayor of Jersey City

78 A. 215, 80 N.J.L. 298, 1910 N.J. LEXIS 212
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
DecidedNovember 14, 1910
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 78 A. 215 (Lehigh Valley Railroad v. Mayor of Jersey City) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lehigh Valley Railroad v. Mayor of Jersey City, 78 A. 215, 80 N.J.L. 298, 1910 N.J. LEXIS 212 (N.J. 1910).

Opinion

The opinion of: the court was delivered by

Gummere, Chief Justice.

The Lehigh Valley Railroad Company of New Jersey owns and operates a railroad extending across the state from the Delaware river to the Hudson. At its terminal upon the shore of the Hudson it has constructed a serios of piers extending into the river, upon which tracks are laid, and from which freight is transhipped from their cars to barges and lighters. In the years 1904 and 1905 both the state board of assessors and the local taxing authorities of Jersey City assessed and taxed one of these piers known as Pier E. Application having been made by the company to the Supreme Court, under the twenty-eighth section of the Railroad Tax act (Gen. Stat., p. 3332), for a summary determination of the character of tho property thus doubly assessed, and whether or not it was used for railroad purposes, and by which assessors the same was lawfully assessed, that court, upon the testimony submitted to it, found “that said property was not in fact used exclusively for railroad purposes, but was in part used for other purposes,” and ordered and adjudged that the taxes assessed upon it by the state hoard of assessors he set aside and annulled, and those assessed by the local taxing authorities of Jersey City be affirmed. The railroad company has [300]*300sued out the present writ of error for the purpose of reviewing that judgment.

It is entirely settled that, in a proceeding under the twenty-eighth section of the Railroad Tax act the determination of the Supreme Court of a question of fact, sustained by competent testimony, is a finality. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Co. v. Newark, 34 Vroom 310. We, therefore, are not concerned with the proofs submitted to the Supreme Court, except for the purpose of ascertaining whether they support the fact determined by it. That they do is made clear from the following accurate summary of the proofs contained 'in its opinion. “The evidence shows that it (i. e., Pier E) is used as a warehouse pier for the handling of freight which is discharged from cars preparatory to being transhipped by lighters and barges to different points in New York harbor. Elour is about the only commodity put on Pier E, and the flour delivered there is (for the most part) consigned to a single firm of consignees who use the pier for the purpose of blending flour that comes consigned to them. The consignees have no lease of the pier, but are charged for demurrage just the same as other consignees, and they are allowed to have machinery upon the pier without any charge therefor. Some flour for other parties also goes on this pier, but it is a small percentage. The original packages are sometimes emptied on the pier, no doubt for the purpose of blending.” The question, therefore, which the case presents for determination is whether a piece of property owned by a railroad company, and used partly for railroad purposes and partly for other purposes is. assessable and taxable by the state board of assessors or by the taxing authorities of the taxing district in which it is located.

The present Railroad Tax law was enacted in 1884. By its first section the property of railroad companies is separated into two classes for the purpose of taxation, viz., “all property not used for railroad purposes,” and “all other property.” The act then provides that the property of any railroad company not used for railroad purposes shall be [301]*301assessed and taxed by the same assessors, and in the same manner, and at the same rate, as the property oí other owners in the same municipal division or taxing district; and that all other property of any railroad company shall be assessed and taxed as therein directed. The act then constitutes the machinery for assessing and taxing the latter class of property, and creates the state board of assessors as the agency for operating that machinery.

The legislature, by dividing the property of railroad companies into these two classes for the purpose of taxation, did not originate any new scheme. Erom the very beginning of their existence the property of these companies, used for the accomplishment of the purposes for which they were created, has been set apart as a means of raising state revenue to meet state expenditures. Prior to the year 1873 all railroad companies of this state were incorporated by special charter. Without exception every such charter provided that the company incorporated by it should pay into the state treasury an annual tax of one-half of one per cent, upon its capital stock, or upon the cost of its railroad and appendages, or a fixed sum in commutation thereof, and that no other tax should be imposed upon it. This exemption from other taxation, however, was held not to apply to all the property of these incorporated companies, but only to such as was suitable and proper for their operations, and the accomplishment of the purposes of their charters. State v. Hancock, 6 Vroom 536. Property owned by such companies, but not suitable and proper for carrying into execution the powers granted to them, was taxable at the same rates and by the same machinery as the general mass of property in the state. In the year last mentioned the legislature of the state, perceiving that, under the method of taxation created by these special charters, the property of railroad corporations did not contribute to the funds needed for governmental purposes to the same extent as that owned by individuals, passed a law providing for a more equitable and uniform method of taxing it. Pamph. L. 1873, p. 112. By that statute all railroad companies occupying and using railroads in this [302]*302state were required to pay a state tax at the rate of one-half of one per cent, upon the cost, equipment and appendages of their railroads respectively. They were also required to pay “upon all the real property by them as aforesaid occupied, used or owned, for the purposes of their road, or otherwise, except their main stem, or roadbed and track, not exceeding one hundred feet in width, a count}"- and municipal tax for the benefit of the counties, townships and cities respectively where the same was situate, after the rate of one per cent., upon a valuation thereof, and of all improvements thereon.” The office of commissioner of railroad taxation was created by the act, and the incumbent of' that office was required to make a separate valuation once in every three years of all the railroad property of every railroad company in the state, used or owned by, or for the purposes of, such corporation, in any county, city or township of the state, and made subject by the act to county, township or municipal taxation, and to return a statement of such valuations to the state comptroller. The act further provided that such valuations should be final, that the county, township and municipal tax of one per cent, should be calculated- thereon, and should be collected by the same machinery used for the collection of ordinary county, township and municipal taxes. In 1876 the legislature altered this scheme of taxation to some extent—principally by requiring that the state tax should be paid upon the true value of the railroad, its equipment and appendages, rather than upon its cost; and by requiring the valuation to be made by a board of railroad commissioners composed of the state comptroller, the state treasurer, and the commissioner of railroad taxation, instead of by the latter officer alone.

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Bluebook (online)
78 A. 215, 80 N.J.L. 298, 1910 N.J. LEXIS 212, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lehigh-valley-railroad-v-mayor-of-jersey-city-nj-1910.