Lehigh Valley Railroad v. Mayor of Jersey City

78 A. 215, 80 N.J.L. 298, 1910 N.J. LEXIS 212
Supreme Court of New Jersey·Decided November 14, 1910·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

The opinion of: the court was delivered by

Gummere, Chief Justice.

The Lehigh Valley Railroad Company of New Jersey owns and operates a railroad extending across the state from the Delaware river to the Hudson. At its terminal upon the shore of the Hudson it has constructed a serios of piers extending into the river, upon which tracks are laid, and from which freight is transhipped from their cars to barges and lighters. In the years 1904 and 1905 both the state board of assessors and the local taxing authorities of Jersey City assessed and taxed one of these piers known as Pier E. Application having been made by the company to the Supreme Court, under the twenty-eighth section of the Railroad Tax act (Gen. Stat., p. 3332), for a summary determination of the character of tho property thus doubly assessed, and whether or not it was used for railroad purposes, and by which assessors the same was lawfully assessed, that court, upon the testimony submitted to it, found “that said property was not in fact used exclusively for railroad purposes, but was in part used for other purposes,” and ordered and adjudged that the taxes assessed upon it by the state hoard of assessors he set aside and annulled, and those assessed by the local taxing authorities of Jersey City be affirmed. The railroad company has [300] sued out the present writ of error for the purpose of reviewing that judgment.

It is entirely settled that, in a proceeding under the twenty-eighth section of the Railroad Tax act the determination of the Supreme Court of a question of fact, sustained by competent testimony, is a finality. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Co. v. Newark, 34 Vroom 310. We, therefore, are not concerned with the proofs submitted to the Supreme Court, except for the purpose of ascertaining whether they support the fact determined by it. That they do is made clear from the following accurate summary of the proofs contained 'in its opinion. “The evidence shows that it (i. e., Pier E) is used as a warehouse pier for the handling of freight which is discharged from cars preparatory to being transhipped by lighters and barges to different points in New York harbor. Elour is about the only commodity put on Pier E, and the flour delivered there is (for the most part) consigned to a single firm of consignees who use the pier for the purpose of blending flour that comes consigned to them. The consignees have no lease of the pier, but are charged for demurrage just the same as other consignees, and they are allowed to have machinery upon the pier without any charge therefor. Some flour for other parties also goes on this pier, but it is a small percentage. The original packages are sometimes emptied on the pier, no doubt for the purpose of blending.” The question, therefore, which the case presents for determination is whether a piece of property owned by a railroad company, and used partly for railroad purposes and partly for other purposes is. assessable and taxable by the state board of assessors or by the taxing authorities of the taxing district in which it is located.

The present Railroad Tax law was enacted in 1884. By its first section the property of railroad companies is separated into two classes for the purpose of taxation, viz., “all property not used for railroad purposes,” and “all other property.” The act then provides that the property of any railroad company not used for railroad purposes shall be [301] assessed and taxed by the same assessors, and in the same manner, and at the same rate, as the property oí other owners in the same municipal division or taxing district; and that all other property of any railroad company shall be assessed and taxed as therein directed. The act then constitutes the machinery for assessing and taxing the latter class of property, and creates the state board of assessors as the agency for operating that machinery.

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Lehigh Valley Railroad v. Mayor of Jersey City, 78 A. 215, 80 N.J.L. 298, 1910 N.J. LEXIS 212 (N.J. 1910).

78 A. 215 (Lehigh Valley Railroad v. Mayor of Jersey City) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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