Leggions v. Chen

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: September 13, 2023
• Docket: 3:21-cv-08057
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Zakeeius Leggions, No. CV-21-08057-PCT-JJT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Yongchau Chen, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 At issue are Defendant Big Brother Transportation, Inc.’s (“Big Brother”) Motion 16 for Summary Judgment (Graves Amendment Defense) (Doc. 124) and Motion for 17 Summary Judgment on Independent Direct Negligence Claims and Punitive Damages 18 (Doc. 167), the latter of which was joined by Defendants Yongchau Chen and Tengfei 19 Trucking Incorporated (“Tengfei”). The Court finds oral argument unnecessary to resolve 20 the issues raised by the parties, none of them having requested oral argument in any event. 21 See LRCiv 7.2(f). The Court now resolves the Motions for Summary Judgment. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff Zakeeius Leggions initiated this action on behalf of himself and the 24 statutory beneficiaries of his mother, Sophia Green. (Doc. 1, Compl.) Ms. Green died in 25 the collision of two tractor-trailer trucks on Interstate 40 in northern Arizona on March 15, 26 2020. At the time of the collision, Ms. Green was in the sleeper portion of the tractor driven 27 by her husband, Alfred Green. Mr. Chen was driving the second tractor, traveling in the 28 same direction ahead of Mr. and Ms. Green. Mr. Leggions alleged that Mr. Chen 1 was operating his tractor-trailer at a speed considerably under the posted speed limit of 75 miles per hour when Defendant Alfred Green was unable 2 to react in time to the position of Defendant Yongchao Chen’s trailer-trailer 3 [sic] and collided with the tractor trailer driven by Defendant Yonghao Chen [sic], resulting in the death of Sophia Green. Immediately after the collision, 4 Defendant Yonghao Chen [sic] left the scene of the incident. 5 6 (Compl. ¶ 15.) Mr. Green also sustained serious injuries during the collision. 7 Mr. Leggions brought claims for negligence, wrongful death, and punitive damages 8 against Mr. Chen, Tengfei, Big Brother, Mr. Green, and Contract Freighters, Inc. (“CFI”).1 9 With respect to Tengfei and Big Brother, Mr. Leggions alleged both were vicariously liable 10 for Mr. Chen’s conduct because he was acting within the course and scope of his 11 employment by, or under the direction and control of, both companies. (Compl. ¶ 17.) 12 Mr. Leggions further alleged that both Tengfei and Big Brother were “independently 13 negligent in the hiring, training, retention, and/or supervision” of Mr. Chen. (Compl. ¶ 18.) 14 Defendants answered Mr. Leggions’s claims and brought several cross-claims 15 among them. Mr. Green brought cross-claims against Mr. Chen, Tengfei, and Big Brother 16 for negligence, wrongful death, and punitive damages. (Doc. 39.) Like Mr. Leggions, 17 Mr. Green alleged that Mr. Chen was at relevant times acting within the course and scope 18 of his employment by, or agency of, Tengfei and Big Brother, and that both companies 19 were independently negligent. (Doc. 39 ¶¶ 21–22.) Big Brother brought cross-claims 20 against Tengfei for implied indemnity and breach of contract. (Doc. 25.) For its part, 21 Plaintiff Protective Insurance Company (“Protective”) initiated a separate action against 22 Mr. Chen, Tengfei, and Big Brother for subrogation damages for the medical expenses of 23 Mr. Green and property damage. Protective Ins. Co. v. Chen, No. CV-22-8040-PCT-JJT 24 (D. Ariz. Mar. 11, 2022). The Court ordered Protective’s lawsuit be consolidated with this 25 one. 26 27 1 Pursuant to a Stipulation by the parties, the Court subsequently dismissed Mr. Leggions’s 28 claims against CFI and Mr. Green. (Doc. 178.) 1 Big Brother thereafter filed the two Motions for Summary Judgment at issue.2 In 2 the first, Big Brother argues (1) it is immunized from liability under the Graves 3 Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 30106; and (2) it was not Mr. Chen’s employer. (Doc. 124.) 4 Mr. Green filed a Response in opposition (Doc. 132), in which Protective (Doc. 134) and 5 Mr. Leggions (Doc. 137) joined. Big Brother filed a Reply (Doc. 143). 6 As relevant to Big Brother’s first Motion for Summary Judgment, the record reveals 7 the following facts. Tengfei is the entity through which Mr. Chen operates his trucking 8 business; he is Tengfei’s only owner. (Doc. 133, Ex. B, Deposition of Yongchau Chen 9 (“Chen Dep.”), at 16:10–17:13.) Big Brother and Tengfei do not share any officers or 10 directors and maintain their own corporate records. At the time of the collision, Tengfei 11 had two tractors and four employees; by the time of Mr. Chen’s deposition in January 2022, 12 it had grown to seven tractors and ten employees. At the time of the collision, Tengfei’s 13 only contract was with Big Brother. (Id. at 19:11–23, 20:14–23:19.) 14 Pursuant to their contract, Big Brother leased a semi-trailer to Tengfei for a monthly 15 fee. (Doc. 125, Ex. B, Equipment Trailer Inter-Change Agreement (“Lease Agreement”).) 16 As Mr. Chen explained the arrangement,3 Big Brother’s employees would load the trailer 17 with merchandise at a warehouse in California and a Tengfei employee would pick up the 18 trailer for hauling and delivery to another Big Brother warehouse in a different location — 19 Indiana, for example. (Chen Dep. at 41:25–45-1.) In Indiana, Big Brother employees would 20 unload the trailer and reload it with different merchandise for the return trip. (Id.) The 21 Tengfei employee would then haul and deliver the reloaded trailer back to California. (Id.) 22 As Mr. Chen explained, “[i]ts Big Brother employee unload/loaded merchandise. My 23 employee do the driving.” (Id.) Mr. Chen testified he communicated with Big Brother 24 during trips to provide updates. (Id. at 156:15–157:1.) When Mr. Chen was asked whether 25 he “communicat[ed] with Big Brother during every trip you took for them when you 26 2 Big Brother requested, and was granted, leave to file more than one Motion for Summary 27 Judgment. (Doc. 109.)

28 3 The Lease Agreement in the record in this case does not contain any provision related to the companies’ employees or to loading, unloading, hauling, or delivering merchandise. 1 were—when you were making a delivery,” he responded: “every time I communicate.” 2 (Id.) He also called Big Brother for interpreter assistance; he did so, for example, in the 3 wake of the collision. (Id. at 153:8–154:4, 156:3–10.) 4 At the time of the collision, Mr. Chen was driving Tengfei’s tractor hauling the 5 trailer it leased from Big Brother, which had been loaded with merchandise by Big Brother 6 employees at its warehouse in California to be hauled and delivered to Big Brother’s 7 warehouse in Indiana. (Id. at 43:13–46:3.) Mr. Chen testified this trip was “about the same” 8 as the previous jobs he had done for Big Brother. (Id. at 45:3–6.) He picked up the loaded 9 trailer at around 4:00 p.m. on March 14, 2020 from the warehouse in California en route to 10 Indiana. (Id. at 45:16–19.) He drove the tractor-trailer with another Tengfei employee, who 11 took the first driving shift. (Id. at 57:22–58:12.) Mr. Chen took over driving in Arizona 12 around 2:00 a.m. and was driving when the collision occurred later that morning. (Id.) 13 Big Brother’s second Motion (Doc. 167) seeks summary judgment on the 14 independent negligence and punitive damages claims asserted against it. Mr. Chen and 15 Tengfei joined in the Motion as to the punitive damages claim asserted against them. 16 (Doc. 169.) Mr. Green filed a Response in opposition as to Big Brother (Doc. 179), in which 17 Protective joined (Doc. 184) and Mr. Leggions joined in part (Doc. 188). Mr. Green filed a 18 separate Response in opposition as to Mr. Chen and Tengfei (Doc. 181), in which Mr. 19 Leggions joined (Doc. 190). Pursuant to a Stipulation by the parties, the Court thereafter 20 dismissed all independent negligence claims against Big Brother. (Doc. 194.) Big Brother, 21 Mr. Chen, and Tengfei then filed Replies in support of their requests for summary judgment 22 on the punitive damages claims asserted against them. (Docs. 195, 197.) 23 II. LEGAL STANDARD 24 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate 25 when the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 26 movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. 27 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). “A fact is ‘material’ only if it might affect the 28 outcome of the case, and a dispute is ‘genuine’ only if a reasonable trier of fact could 1 resolve the issue in the non-movant’s favor.” Fresno Motors, LLC v. Mercedes Benz USA, 2 LLC, 771 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 3 242, 248 (1986)). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 4 nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor. 5 Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011). 6 The moving party “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of 7 the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] . . . which it believes 8 demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 232. 9 When the moving party does not bear the ultimate burden of proof, it “must either produce 10 evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show 11 that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry 12 its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., 13 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party carries this initial burden of 14 production, the nonmoving party must produce evidence to support its claim or defense. 15 Id. at 1103. Summary judgment is appropriate against a party that “fails to make a showing 16 sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on 17 which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 18 In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must regard as true the 19 non-moving party’s evidence, as long as it is supported by affidavits or other evidentiary 20 material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, the non-moving party may not merely rest 21 on its pleadings; it must produce some significant probative evidence tending to contradict 22 the moving party’s allegations, thereby creating a material question of fact. Id. at 256–57 23 (holding that the plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly 24 supported motion for summary judgment); see also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 25 (9th Cir. 1989) (“A summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by relying solely on 26 conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data.” (citation omitted)). 27 28 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 A. Graves Amendment Defense 3 Big Brother first moves for summary judgment on the grounds that it is immunized 4 from all forms of liability for the conduct of either Mr. Chen or Tengfei under the Graves 5 Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 30106. The Graves Amendment was “enacted to protect the 6 vehicle rental and leasing industry against claims for vicarious liability where the leasing 7 or rental company’s only relation to the claim was that it was the technical owner of the 8 car.” Rein v. CAB East LLC, No. 08-CV-2899 (PAC), 2009 WL 1748905, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 9 2009). The statute provides, in relevant part: 10 An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State or 11 political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or 12 an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the 13 rental or lease, if— 14 (1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business 15 of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and 16 (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner). 17 18 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a). Operating through federal preemption of state laws, the immunity 19 created by the Graves Amendment is an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Johnke v. Espinal- 20 Quiroz, No. 14-CV-6992, 2016 WL 454333, at *3 (*N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2016). 21 As an initial matter, Plaintiffs4 argue Big Brother has waived any affirmative 22 defense under the Graves Amendment because it failed to raise the defense in its Answers 23 to their claims. (See Docs. 15, 36.) Big Brother concedes this, but argues its delay does not 24 prejudice Plaintiffs. The Court does not reach this threshold dispute because it finds Big 25 Brother is not entitled to summary judgment under the Graves Amendment in any event. 26 27 4 For the purposes of this Order, the Court refers to the parties opposing the pending 28 Motions for Summary Judgment as “Plaintiffs.” 1 “[F]or the Graves Amendment to apply, a defendant must meet the following four 2 elements: (1) the defendant owned the vehicle; (2) the defendant was ‘engaged in the trade 3 or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles;’ (3) the defendant committed ‘no 4 negligence or criminal wrongdoing’; and (4) the defendant ‘rent[ed] or lease[d] the 5 vehicle.’” Thayer v. Randy Marion Chevrolet Buick Cadillac, LLC, 30 F.4th 1290, 1292 6 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 30106). Plaintiffs argue there are genuine issues of 7 fact as to the second and third elements, precluding summary judgment. 8 To establish it was “engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor 9 vehicles,” Big Brother points to Mr. Leggions’s allegation that Tengfei, Big Brother, and 10 CFI “are motor carriers and the trucks involved were being operated in furtherance of a 11 commercial enterprise” (Doc. 1 at 4, ¶ 21), and Big Brother’s admission of the same in its 12 Answer. (Doc. 25 at 4, ¶ 21.) Standing alone, these pleadings do not establish the second 13 element. A company’s engagement in the “trade or business of renting or leasing motor 14 vehicles” does not necessarily follow from its status as a “motor carrier.” See, e.g., 15 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14) (defining “motor carrier” as “a person providing motor vehicle 16 transportation for compensation”). Moreover, Big Brother’s Motion cites only to its 17 admission of an allegation by Mr. Leggions and fails to explain how this binds Mr. Green.5 18 Big Brother also points to the Lease Agreement providing for Tengfei’s lease of the 19 trailer Mr. Chen was driving at the time of the collision. This evidence shows Big Brother 20 rented the trailer to Tengfei, establishing the fourth element. But even assuming it also 21 supports the inference Big Brother made similar agreements with others—supporting the 22 second element—this conclusion is not required. It is also reasonable to infer, in the 23 absence of other evidence, this was a one-off agreement. The Court is persuaded by 24 Plaintiffs’ argument that the fact Big Brother rented or leased the vehicle in question does 25 not ipso facto establish it was “engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor

26 5 Big Brother cites further pleadings in its Reply that were not cited in Motion (Doc. 124) or its supporting Separate Statement of Facts (Doc. 125) and which the Court therefore will 27 not consider. See Surowiec v. Cap. Title Agency, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 3d 997, 1002 (D. Ariz. 2011) (“It is well established in this circuit that courts will not consider new arguments 28 raised for the first time in a reply brief.” (citations omitted)). 1 vehicles,” lest the fourth element swallow the second. Put differently, Big Brother’s 2 interpretation would render the “engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing 3 motor vehicles” provision a mere surplusage to the earlier provision stating that preemption 4 applies to “[a]n owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person.” 5 49 U.S.C § 30106; see Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (discussing the 6 canonical interpretative rule against surplusage). 7 Because the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that there is a genuine dispute as to the 8 second element of Big Brother’s Graves Amendment defense, its first inquiry ends there. 9 B. Respondeat Superior Liability 10 Next, Big Brother argues it is entitled to summary judgment because it did not 11 employ or control Mr. Chen and therefore cannot be held vicariously liable for his conduct. 12 As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiffs responded to this argument in the context 13 of the fourth element of Big Brother’s Graves Amendment defense—that Big Brother 14 committed no negligence or criminal wrongdoing. However, Big Brother raised this 15 argument as an “additional reason” it is entitled to summary judgment beyond the Graves 16 Amendment. (See Doc. 124 at 7; see also id. at 1 (“[Big Brother] moves for summary 17 judgment on all of Plaintiff’s and Cross-Clamant Green’s claims because . . . Big Brother 18 was not Chen’s employer.”). In support of this argument, Big Brother has produced 19 evidence that Tengfei—not Big Brother—was Mr. Chen’s employer. 20 Big Brother having satisfied its initial burden of production, the burden therefore is 21 on Plaintiffs to show there are factual disputes precluding summary judgment on Big 22 Brother’s vicarious liability. See Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102–03. Accordingly, Plaintiffs 23 argue there is a genuine factual dispute as to whether Mr. Chen was sufficiently under Big 24 Brother’s control at the time of the collision so as to be vicariously liable as Mr. Chen’s 25 “special employer,” despite having no formal employment relationship with him. 26 In Tarron v. Bowen v. Machine & Fabricating, Inc., the Arizona Supreme Court 27 discussed the apportionment of liability between “general” and “special” employers. 28 235 P.3d 1030, 1033 (Ariz. 2010). The former refers to an employer who sends one of its 1 employees to do some work for the latter, which maintains a separate business. Id. “In 2 determining liability, courts focus on ‘which employer had control of the details of the 3 particular work being done at the time of the injury-causing accident.’” Id. (quoting Ruelas 4 v. Staff Builders Pers. Servs., Inc., 18 P.3d 138, 140 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001)). The inquiry is 5 based on the objective nature of the relationships between the tortfeasor and the employers, 6 looking to which “actually controls the work or has the right to control the accident-causing 7 conduct and is in the best ‘position to take measures to prevent the injury suffered by the 8 third party.’” Id. at 1035 (quoting Restatement (3d) of Agency § 7.03 cmt. d(2)). 9 A comparison of several Arizona cases elucidates these principles. In Santiago v. 10 Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., the plaintiff was injured when his motorcycle collided with a 11 newspaper delivery car. 794 P.2d 138, 139 (Ariz. 1990). The plaintiff sued the newspaper 12 company that contracted with the driver, arguing it was vicariously liable for his injuries. 13 Id. The Arizona Supreme Court held summary judgment was inappropriate “because 14 reasonable minds may disagree on the nature of the employment relationship.” Id. at 146. 15 The Court concluded there was sufficient evidence to find the newspaper company had the 16 right to control the details of the driver’s newspaper deliveries, noting that “[a] worker who 17 must comply with another’s instructions about when, where, and how to work is an 18 employee.” Id. at 142. By contrast, the Court upheld summary judgment in favor of an 19 employer whose employee caused an after-work car accident during an extended away- 20 from-home assignment. Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng., 280 P.3d 599, 601–04 (Ariz. 2012). 21 The Court noted that in “evaluat[ing] an employee’s away-from-work conduct, we have 22 not found the requisite control when the employee maintained the right to choose where, 23 when, and how to travel, and by what route.” Id. at 602; see Dial-A-Messenger, Inc. v. Ariz. 24 Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 648 P.2d 1053, 1059 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (finding no employment 25 relationship between company and parcel-delivery drivers where the evidence was 26 “insufficient to establish the degree of control over the manner in which the drivers perform 27 their services”). Similarly, the Arizona Court of Appeals held summary judgment was 28 appropriately entered in favor of a staffing agency on claims that nurses the agency 1 provided to a hospital abused the plaintiff while performing an enema because there was 2 no evidence the agency “actually controlled the manner in which the nurses gave the enema 3 or performed any aspect of their work at [the hospital].” Ruelas, 18 P.3d at 347. 4 Here, the relevant “accident-causing conduct” was Mr. Chen’s driving. The question 5 is thus whether there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that Big Brother exercised 6 actual control over the details of Mr. Chen’s driving at the time of the collision. 7 Plaintiffs point to the evidence of Tengfei’s exclusive, long-standing, and close 8 relationship with Big Brother. As noted, Big Brother loaded the trailer that Mr. Chen hauled 9 at Big Brother’s warehouse in California and provided the destination for its delivery— 10 another Big Brother warehouse across the country—at which the trailer was unloaded and 11 reloaded for hauling and delivery back to California. However, Mr. Chen testified the 12 distinct loading/unloading and hauling/delivery tasks were performed by employees of Big 13 Brother and Tengfei, respectively. Plaintiffs point to no evidence that Big Brother 14 exercised control over how Mr. Chen performed his tasks of hauling and delivery. 15 Although Mr. Chen testified he maintained communications with Big Brother while 16 driving, Plaintiffs point to no evidence suggesting this was anything more than keeping 17 Big Brother apprised of the status of the load and expected delivery time. Likewise, while 18 he testified Big Brother employees assisted him with interpretation, there is no evidence to 19 suggest this amounted to the exercise of control rather than the provision of a service. 20 In short, while the evidence shows Big Brother exercised some control over the 21 when and where of Mr. Chen’s driving —providing the location and timing for pick-up and 22 delivery—it does not show that Big Brother exercised control over how Mr. Chen drove 23 such that Big Brother may be deemed Mr. Chen’s special employer for purposes of the 24 torts arising from the collision. The Court therefore concludes Big Brother is entitled to 25 summary judgment on its vicarious liability for Mr. Chen’s conduct. 26 C. Punitive Damages 27 In its second Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 197), Big Brother argued the 28 evidence in this case does not support a claim for punitive damages claim against it. As 1 noted, the independent negligence claims against Big Brother have since been dismissed. 2 The Court found above that Big Brother is entitled to summary judgment on its vicarious 3 liability for Mr. Chen’s conduct. As no underlying claims for actual damages remain 4 pending against it, Big Brother cannot be held liable for punitive damages. See Edmond v. 5 Fairfield Sunrise Village, Inc., 644 P.2d 296, 298 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). 6 Mr. Chen and Tengfei argue Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claims against them fail 7 as well. They argue that even taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, 8 their level of culpability would be of negligence, and “there is no indication whatsoever in 9 the evidence that this was a willful action, by an evil mind guiding an evil hand.” (Doc. 169 10 at 2.) See Purdy as Tr. ex rel. Survivors of Jones v. Metcalf ex rel. Pima Cnty., 502 P.3d 11 36, 40 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2021) (“Summary judgment dismissing a punitive damages claim is 12 appropriate in the absence of facts sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that 13 the defendant acted with the requisite evil mind.” (citation omitted)). 14 In Swift Transportation Company of Arizona LLC v. Carman in and for the County 15 of Yavapai, the Arizona Supreme Court clarified that a punitive damages claim may only 16 be submitted to the jury upon proof the defendant engaged in tortious conduct with an “evil 17 mind.” 515 P.3d 685, 692 (Ariz. 2022) (quoting Volz v. Coleman Co., 748 P.2d 1191, 18 1194–95 (Ariz. 1987)). This is a higher standard than “reckless indifference to the rights 19 or safety of others.” Id. at 689. In a negligence case, “a plaintiff generally must show that 20 the defendant’s conduct was outrageous, oppressive or intolerable, and created a 21 substantial risk of tremendous harm, thereby evidencing a conscious and deliberate 22 disregard of the interests and rights of others.” Id. at 692 (emphasis in original and citation 23 omitted). Punitive damages are warranted if the conduct is “outrageous or quasi-criminal.” 24 Id. at 694. “[I]t will be only the rare negligence case that meets this standard.” Id. at 693. 25 Swift involved a multi-vehicle accident precipitated by the carelessness of a 26 commercial truck driver. Id. at 688, 693. The Court found that while the evidence likely 27 established the driver’s negligence, and perhaps even gross negligence, it did not establish 28 that the driver acted with “‘something more’ than gross negligence that evinces an evil 1 mind.” Id. at 694. Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs argue the evidence establishes that 2 Mr. Chen’s “outrageous and unjustified conduct rose to the level sufficient to support a 3 punitive damages award.” (Doc. 181 at 4.) They point to the following evidence in support. 4 According to a report by Arizona Department of Public Safety Trooper Justin 5 Weller, the collision occurred shortly after 5:00 a.m. on March 15, 2020. (Doc. 181, Ex. A 6 at 1.) On this stretch of Interstate 40, the speed limit was 75 miles per hour and there was 7 no artificial light. (Id. at 4.) It was dark at the time of the collision. (Id.) Based on his review 8 of the evidence, Mr. Green’s accident-reconstruction expert, Brian Andrews, opined 9 Mr. Green’s truck was traveling around 74 miles per hour as it approached Mr. Chen’s 10 from behind. (Doc. 183, Ex. B at 15.) Tire marks indicate Mr. Green took evasive action 11 prior to the collision, applying his brakes and steering to the left. (Doc. 181, Ex. A at 6.) 12 Mr. Andrews opined the speed of Mr. Green’s truck at the time of impact was around 65 13 miles per hour. (Doc. 183, Ex. B at 16.) Mr. Andrews opined the “extensive” damage to 14 Mr. Green’s truck was “consistent with a high energy impact.” (Doc. 183, Ex. B at 9.) He 15 opined the average speed of Mr. Chen’s truck at impact was only 25 to 34 miles per hour. 16 (Id.6) He concluded Mr. Chen was in violation of at least seven Federal Motor Carrier 17 Safety Regulations (“FMCSR”), including missing reflective tape and warning devices. 18 (Id. at 16.7) He opined “this crash occurred as a result of Mr. Green suddenly encountering 19 a vehicle traveling at an unsafe speed, substantially less than the posted speed limit.” (Id.) 20 Mr. Green’s trucking safety expert, Peter Philbrick, opined that 21 Mr. Chen was a professional CDL licensed diver and knew or should have known that driving at this extremely slow speed would create a hazard to 22 himself and other drivers on the highway. Had he been driving at or near the 23 speed limit, it is more likely than not that this crash would not have occurred. 24 Mr. Chen testified that he did not have his emergency flashers activated, even though he knew or should have known it would have been much safer for 25 him to do so as a professional driver. Another causal factor in this collision 26 6 At his deposition, Mr. Chen claimed he was traveling around 68 miles per hour at the 27 time of the collision. (Chen Dep. at 74:20–75:1.)

28 7 Mr. Chen testified his taillights were working at the time but were not activated. (Chen. Dep. at 75:3–9.) He suggested he was travelling at “normal” speed. (See id.) 1 is that Mr. Chen chose not to activate his emergency flashers, a standard safety precaution in the trucking industry. 2 3 (Doc. 183, Ex. A at 4.) Mr. Andrews testified the slow speed of travel “in the dark with no 4 warning flashers or anything other than just his normal running lights is—it just presents a 5 tremendous danger because of the difference in speed.” (Doc. 183, Ex. C at 78:14–18.) 6 The evidence suggests Mr. Chen left the scene after the collision. Trooper Weller 7 testified it was apparent to him when he arrived on the scene that more than one vehicle 8 was involved, yet he only saw Mr. Green’s truck when he searched the area. (Doc. 183, 9 Ex. D, Deposition of Justin Weller (“Weller Dep.”), at 22:15–18.) Contrarily, Mr. Chen 10 claimed at his deposition he never left the scene after the collision. (Chen Dep. 11 at 89:18-90:19.) When Mr. Chen’s testimony was read to him, Trooper Weller stated it was 12 not true. (Weller Dep. at 55:5–57:23.) In his report, Trooper Weller noted that Mr. Chen 13 “returned to the scene approximately one hour after the collision.” (Doc. 181, Ex. A at 5.) 14 Mr. Philbrick found this a violation of an FMCSR. (Doc. 183, Ex. A at 6.) He further 15 opined: 16 The fact that [Mr. Chen] left the scene is critical because he violated federal regulations and because it would overwrite the [Engine Control Module 17 (“ECM”)] data stored on his truck. He essentially destroyed evidence relating 18 to this crash, including evidence of any speed or hard brake events. 19 (Id.8) Plaintiffs maintain that Mr. Chen’s flight “eras[ed] black box data.” (Doc. 181 at 7.) 20 Even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court finds it 21 falls short of the high standard set forth in Swift. Simply put, this is not the “‘most egregious 22 of cases’ warranting punitive damages.” Swift, 515 P.3d at 694 (quoting Linthicum v. 23 Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675, 681 (Ariz. 1986)). Mr. Chen’s slow driving in the 24 dark in a 75-mile-an-hour zone with only his normal running lights activated was likely 25 negligent, arguably grossly so. But it does not amount to the “‘something more’ than gross

26 8 Neither Mr. Philbrick nor Plaintiffs cite to record evidence substantiating that Mr. Chen destroyed ECM data. However, during his deposition, Mr. Green’s counsel represented to 27 Mr. Chen that a download of information from his truck “found that all of the information about how fast you had been going, your braking, whether you had turned one way or the 28 other, all of that information had been erased.” (Chen Dep. at 136:13–24.) Mr. Chen responded that was “impossible,” claiming he did not know how to delete ECM data. (Id.) 1 negligence that evinces an evil mind,” akin to “outrageous or quasi-criminal conduct.” Id. 2 Even assuming that Mr. Chen lied about his speed and his flight from the scene, and that 3 Plaintiffs can prove he destroyed evidence relating to the crash, this is post-collision 4 conduct which cannot be the basis for punitive damages because it was not the cause of 5 Plaintiffs’ injuries. See id. at 694 (citing Saucedo ex rel. Sinaloa v. Salvation Army, 24 P.3d 6 1274, 1279 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (“[T]he [underlying tortious] conduct giving rise to 7 punitive damages must be a proximate cause of the harm inflicted.”)). Mr. Chen’s post- 8 collision conduct is relevant to punitive damages only to the extent it sheds light on his 9 actions and mental state at the time of the collision. Even incorporating this post-collision 10 conduct, the totality of the evidence still falls short of establishing he acted “outrageously” 11 at the time he drove so slowly in the dark, “consciously pursu[ing] a course of conduct 12 knowing that it created a substantial risk of significant injury to others.” Id. at 688. 13 In sum, the Court concludes Plaintiffs have not adduced sufficient evidence to 14 submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury in this case. Mr. Chen and Tengfei are 15 therefore entitled to summary judgment on this claim. See Purdy, 502 P.3d at 40. 16 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Defendant 17 Big Brother Transportation, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Graves Amendment 18 Defense) (Doc. 124). Big Brother is not entitled to summary judgment on its affirmative 19 defense of immunity under the Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 30106. However, Big 20 Brother is entitled to summary judgment on the claims of vicarious liability for negligence, 21 wrongful death, and punitive damages asserted against Big Brother by Plaintiff Zakeeius 22 Leggions (Doc. 1) and Cross-Claimant Alfred Green (Doc. 39). 23 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting in part and denying as moot in part Big 24 Brother’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Independent Direct Negligence Claims and 25 Punitive Damages (Doc. 167). Big Brother is entitled to summary judgment on 26 Mr. Leggions’s and Mr. Green’s claims for punitive damages. Big Brother’s request for 27 summary judgment on their independent negligence claims is moot in light of the Court’s 28 dismissal of same pursuant to the parties’ Stipulation. (Doc. 194.) 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Defendant Yongchau Chen’s and 2|| Defendant Tengfei Trucking, Inc.’s Joinder (Doc. 169) of Big Brother’s Motion for || Summary Judgment on Punitive Damages (Doc. 167). Mr. Chen and Tengfei are entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Leggions’s and Mr. Green’s claims for punitive damages. 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter will proceed to trial on the remaining || claims. The Court will set a pre-trial status conference by separate Order. 7 Dated this 13th day of September, 2023. CN

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