Legal Sense, Done With The Intent To Commit a Crime.'" State v. Smith, 119 Tenn. 521

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE FILED JANUARY 1998 SESSION

March 25, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appe llate Court C lerk

NELSON B. GRAVES, )

)

Appellant, ) No. 01C01-9705-CR-00171 ) ) Johnson County v. )

) Honorable Lynn W. Brown, Judge )

HOWARD CARLTON, WARDEN,) (Habeas Corpus) and STATE OF TENNESSEE, )

)

Appellees. )

CONCURRING OPINION

I concur in the results and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. I

would hold, though, that the indictments sufficiently contain any necessary mens rea by

allegations that the offenses were “feloniously” committed. Historically, the word

“feloniously” has meant “[p]roceeding from an evil heart or purpose; done with a

deliberate intention of committing a crime.” Black’s Law Dictionary 617 (6th ed. 1990).

As our supreme court has previously noted, “one meaning attached to the word is: ‘In a

legal sense, done with the intent to commit a crime.’” State v. Smith, 119 Tenn. 521,

526, 105 S.W. 68, 70 (1907). Thus, I believe that the indictments include any required

mens rea.

____________________________

Joseph M. Tipton, Judge