Filed 8/25/26 Legacy Partners Tenancy Cases CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
LEGACY PARTNERS B349432 TENANCY CASES.
(Los Angeles County
NORMA CASTANEDA et al., Super. Ct. No. 23STCV01307
Plaintiffs and JCCP No. 5290)
Respondents,
v.
LEGACY PARTNERS, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.
[And 33 other related cases.*]
* Bryant et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. Alameda County, No. 23CV032950); Chapman et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. S.F. City and County, No. CGC- 23-606910); Freitas et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, No. 23CV417282); Hernandez et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. Alameda County, No. 23CV035108); Hollenbeck et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al.
(Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, No. 23CV417400); Joshi et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. San Mateo County, No. 23-CIV-02863); Popov et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. San Mateo County, No. 23-CIV-02160); Sharma et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, No. 23CV418369); Shi et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, No. 23CV416202); Soto et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, No. 23CV416120); and Ta et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. San Mateo County, No. 23-CIV-02512) (Northern California Tenants).
Aguirre et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A.
County, No. 23STCV02560); Akroush et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV07795); Argarin et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. Orange County, No. 30-2023-01319947-CU-BT-NJC); Aronson et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV14142); Bachman et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV09026); Bell et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV09732); Blackwell et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV10895); Cann et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV14483); Cardenas et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV06202); Cole et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV06106); Cook et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV11309); Goodwin et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV03297); Gregory et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV06107); Hamilton et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV09766); Ludwig et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. Orange County, No. 30-2023-01320256-CU-BT-NJC); Mansourian et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV10248); Ortiz et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc.,
3
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Samantha P. Jessner, Judge. Dismissed.
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Craig J. Mariam, John P.
Cogger and Stephanie L. Cobau for Defendant and Appellant.
Brod Law Firm and Gregory J. Brod for Plaintiffs and Respondents Northern California Tenants.
Litigation Advocacy Group and Glenn A. Murphy for Plaintiffs and Respondents Southern California Tenants.
******
Legacy Partners, Inc. (Legacy), a property manager for numerous apartment complexes throughout California, is the defendant in 34 lawsuits brought by 453 individuals (collectively, tenants) pursuant to the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA) (Civ. Code, §§ 1786–1786.60).1 Legacy filed a petition for coordination, which was granted.
Two years later, Legacy moved for class certification, seeking to require the tenant-plaintiffs to proceed in one of two
et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV09174); Peirson et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV10492); Perez et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV05888); Reynaga et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV12297); Tabe et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV15406); and Warrior et al. v. Legacy Partners, Inc., et al. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 23STCV12541) (Southern California Tenants). 1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.
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subclasses depending on which application service the individual tenants used to apply for an apartment. Tenants opposed the motion for class certification, asserting Legacy failed to identify an ascertainable class and class certification would prejudice tenants, depriving them of the minimum statutory damages set forth in section 1786.50, subdivision (a)(1), among other things. The trial court denied Legacy’s motion.
Legacy purports to appeal from the trial court’s order denying its motion for class certification. Legacy argues the order is appealable under the “death knell” doctrine. (Citing, inter alia, In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 761 (Baycol) [death knell doctrine “comes into play for class claims only when an order ‘is tantamount to a dismissal of the action as to all members of the class other than plaintiff’”].) However, we find the death knell doctrine inapplicable in this case because the order is not tantamount to a dismissal of any tenant’s claim. Instead, the claims at issue will proceed in the context of the coordinated proceeding. Because the death knell doctrine is inapplicable, and Legacy raises no alternative ground for appeal under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, we dismiss the appeal as we lack jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
I. ICRAA A. Purpose ICRAA states that an investigative consumer reporting agency may provide an investigative consumer report to a person other than the subject of the report under limited circumstances, including where the person “[i]ntends to use the information in connection with the hiring of a dwelling unit ….” (§ 1786.12, subd. (d)(5).) ICRAA defines an “investigative consumer report”
5
as one “in which information on a consumer’s character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living is obtained through any means.” (§ 1786.2, subd. (c).)
ICRAA is “intended to promote disclosure and accuracy in background checks, especially in the rental, employment, and insurance contexts.” (First Student Cases (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1026, 1034.) It was “enacted to ensure that consumer reporting agencies ‘exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to privacy.’” (Id. at p. 1032, quoting §§ 1785.1, subd. (c), 1786, subd. (b).) It “requires the person procuring the report (or causing it to be made) … to ‘certify to the investigative consumer reporting agency’ … that it provided the consumer a ‘clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing’ … that includes the act’s disclosure requirements, and that the consumer gave a written authorization for the report’s procurement.” (Id. at p. 1033, citations omitted.) Those who use such reports are required to notify the consumer of the report in a timely fashion, identify the reporting agency, provide a means to easily request and receive a copy of the report, and send a copy of the report when requested within three days. (§ 1786.16, subds. (a)(3) & (b)(1).)
B. Enforcement ICRAA includes a provision making an investigative consumer reporting agency or user of information that fails to comply with the statute “liable to the consumer who is the subject of the report.” (§ 1786.50, subd. (a).)
“As originally enacted in 1975, ICRAA … provided that any agency or user of information that ‘fail[ed] to comply with any requirement’ under its provisions was liable to the consumer for ‘[a]ny actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of
6
the failure or, except in the case of class actions, three hundred dollars ($300), whichever sum is greater.’” (Parsonage v. Wal- Mart Associates, Inc. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 399, 414 (Parsonage).) In 1998, the Legislature amended ICRAA, partly in response to “concerns that ‘[t]he existing penalty of $300 for false information contained in a report [wa]s not a sufficient incentive to ensure accuracy.’” (Ibid.) The penalty was raised from $300 to $1,000, then to $2,500. (Ibid.)
In 2001, the Legislature again amended ICRAA to incorporate provisions addressing identity theft, among other things. (Parsonage, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 415.) In addition, “the Legislature also again sought to ‘increase penalties for violations’ and raised the sum available as an alternative to actual damages from $2,500 to $10,000, where it currently stands.” (Ibid.) However, the statute makes an exception in cases where the consumers proceed as a class action, disallowing the statutory penalty in such cases.
The provision currently reads, in part: “An investigative consumer reporting agency or user of information that fails to comply with any requirement under this title with respect to an investigative consumer report is liable to the consumer who is the subject of the report in an amount equal to the sum of all the following: [¶] (1) Any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure or, except in the case of class actions, ten thousand dollars ($10,000), whichever sum is greater.” (§ 1786.50, subd. (a)(1), italics added.)
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Thus, had Legacy successfully forced the tenants to proceed as a class, each individual tenant would have been ineligible for the $10,000 statutory penalty.2 II. Procedural history In 2023, 453 California consumers who applied to Legacy for residential apartment homes filed 34 separate lawsuits seeking to enforce their rights under ICRAA for Legacy’s alleged violations of the statute. Each tenant requested ICRAA’s $10,000 statutory damage award.
Legacy filed a petition for coordination on May 30, 2023, which was granted on October 17, 2023.
On April 11, 2025, Legacy filed its motion for class certification, seeking to require the tenants to proceed against Legacy in one of two subclasses, depending on which application service the tenants used to apply for an apartment. Legacy did not identify any putative plaintiffs other than the 453 tenants who had already chosen to sue, nor did Legacy identify individuals suitable to serve as class representatives.
Tenants opposed the motion, arguing it was “‘designed to prevent [them] from seeking minimum statutory damages’ available under ICRAA.” The court requested additional briefing, and the matter was heard on July 25, 2025.
On July 31, 2025, the court filed a ruling adopting its written tentative decision denying Legacy’s motion for class certification as its final order. The court noted, “ICRAA ‘expressly precludes the recovery of the statutory $10,000 amount in class actions.’” (Quoting Bernuy v. Bridge Property
2 As the trial court and the Legislature noted, it would be very difficult for most ICRAA plaintiffs to prove actual damages.
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Management Co. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1174, 1190.) The court noted tenants argued “[i]f this case were certified as a class action[], … they would be limited to recovery of their actual damages, regardless of whether their actual damages are less than $10,000.”
The court cited Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2014)
59 Cal.4th 1, 34 (Duran), for the proposition that “[t]he class action procedural device may not be used to abridge a party’s substantive rights.’” After addressing Legacy’s arguments, the court noted it agreed with Legacy to a certain extent: “It would certainly be more efficient for all involved, the Court and the parties, to resolve [tenants’] claims, and the claims of the [tenants] in the 33 other cases, in one class proceeding if possible.” However, the court also noted, “Certification of a class would … abridge their right to a statutory award of $10,000, in violation of Duran.” The court declined to allow Legacy “to impose on [tenants] a method of prosecuting their claims that they do not agree with.” (Citing Pinnacle Holdings, Inc. v. Simon (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1430, 1437 [plaintiff could not “impose” on defendants the “responsibility” of representing a class of other defendants].) The court further noted it was “not clear how a class plaintiff could adequately represent a class, for example, if she did not want to represent the class or otherwise proceed on a class basis in the first place.”
The court concluded, “Because certification of a class would abridge [tenants’] substantive right (assuming they prevail on the merits of their claims) to ICRAA’s statutory award of $10,000, the Court denies Legacy’s motion for class certification.”
Legacy filed its notice of appeal from the order on August 28, 2025.
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DISCUSSION
I. Dismissal is required as the order at issue is not appealable “The one final judgment rule is ‘a fundamental principle of appellate practice’ [citation], recognized and enforced in this state since the 19th century [citation].” (Baycol, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 756.) Thus, courts are “reluctant to depart from its principles and endorse broad exceptions.” (Id. at p. 757.)
One such exception is the “death knell” doctrine. (Baycol, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 757.) Under the death knell doctrine, the denial of a request for class certification may be an appealable order. (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 699 (Daar).) The Daar court explained “[i]n determining whether there has been a final judgment, sometimes a difficult question, we have long adhered to the rule ‘that the question, as affecting the right of appeal, is not what the form of the order or judgment may be, but what is its legal effect.” (Id. at pp. 698–699.) In Daar, the legal effect of the order denying class certification was “tantamount to a dismissal of the action as to all members of the class other than plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 699.) Because the order “demolished the action as a class action,” the Daar court concluded “the order in the case at bench is in legal effect a final judgment from which an appeal lies.” (Ibid.)
“The gist of the death knell doctrine is that the denial of class action certification is the death knell of the action itself, i.e., that without a class, there will not be an action or actions.” (Farwell v. Sunset Mesa Property Owners Assn., Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1552.)
The matter before us is not appropriate for application of the death knell doctrine. Separate individual actions against
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Legacy have been filed and pursued. There is no indication in the record that the denial of Legacy’s motion for class certification is the death knell for the coordinated actions before the trial court.
“‘[E]xceptions to the one final judgment rule should not be allowed unless clearly mandated.’” (Baycol, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 757.) The exception carved out in Daar was due to its impact, as it “effectively rang the death knell for the class claims.” (Ibid.) “In cases decided since Daar,” the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal “have emphasized that orders that only limit the scope of a class or the number of claims available to it are not similarly tantamount to dismissal and do not qualify for immediate appeal under the death knell doctrine; only an order that entirely terminates class claims is appealable.” (Id. at pp. 757–758.)
Nothing in the trial court’s order terminates any tenant’s claim. Nor does it prevent any tenant not named as a party in the coordinated proceeding from bringing his or her own lawsuit against Legacy. In sum, “[n]othing in this record suggests that the trial court’s order has sounded a death knell.” (Shelley v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 692, 696.)
Because the death knell doctrine is inapplicable, and Legacy has failed to provide any other basis for appeal, we lack jurisdiction and the appeal must be dismissed. II. Neither party sought an extraordinary writ Neither party has asked that we exercise our power to treat this purported appeal as a petition for extraordinary writ, nor has either party argued the matter meets the criteria to be treated as a petition for extraordinary writ. (See Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 400–401; H. D. Arnaiz, Ltd. v. County of San Joaquin (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1367.)
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However, we note that to the extent the matter could be treated as a petition for extraordinary writ, it would be denied. An order denying class certification is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 326–327.) Under this standard, a trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed unless it reflects “““a clear case of abuse”’” resulting in a miscarriage of justice. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 331; see Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566.) “‘“[A] disposition that results in an error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion.”’” (Orozco v. WPV San Jose, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 375, 401.)
The deferential abuse of discretion standard does not apply “if the trial court has evaluated class certification using improper criteria or an incorrect legal analysis.” (Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1297.)
Legacy’s argument that the trial court failed to follow the correct legal analysis in denying its motion for class certification is incorrect. Legacy argues California courts follow a three-part test when evaluating motions for class certification under Code of Civil Procedure section 382. (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.) Legacy identifies the three-part test as: “‘“(1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.”’” (Ibid.)
Preliminarily, we note Legacy has failed to meet this three-
part test, as it has failed to identify any class representative and failed to explain how such representative could adequately represent a class when the representative “did not want to
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represent the class or otherwise proceed on a class basis in the first place.”
Further, Legacy presents only part of the trial court’s required analysis in deciding whether class certification is appropriate. In addition to showing the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class and a well-defined community of interest, the party advocating class certification must show “substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.” (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1021.) “[B]ecause group action also has the potential to create injustice, trial courts are required to ‘“carefully weigh respective benefits and burdens and to allow maintenance of the class action only where substantial benefits accrue both to litigants and the courts.”’” (Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435.)
In its careful analysis of the respective benefits and burdens of class certification, the trial court gave great weight to the tenants’ rights to ICRAA’s statutory award of $10,000. Legacy has failed to show the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the tenants’ entitlement to the statutory award, established as an incentive to enforce ICRAA requirements, weighed heavily against class certification.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Tenants are awarded their costs on appeal.
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
We concur:
RICHARDSON, J. GOORVITCH, J.