Lefrak v. Schneps

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Lefrak v. Schneps

223 A.D.2d 581, 637 N.Y.S.2d 166, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 216

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 16, 1996

StatusPublished

This text of 223 A.D.2d 581 (Lefrak v. Schneps) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Lefrak v. Schneps, 223 A.D.2d 581, 637 N.Y.S.2d 166, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 216 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the defendants appeal (1) from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (O’Donoghue, J.), dated June 2, 1994, which, inter alia, granted the plaintiffs’ motion to preliminarily enjoin them from, among other things, communicating with, intimidating, menacing, or harassing the infant plaintiff, Emma Maera, and (2) as limited by their brief, [582]*582from so much of an order of the same court, dated October 13, 1994, as denied their motion for partial summary judgment and to vacate the preliminary injunction.

Ordered that the order dated June 2, 1994, is affirmed, and the order dated October 13, 1994, is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

In this action commenced by the plaintiffs, inter alia, to recover damages for several torts allegedly committed by the defendants in connection with the plaintiffs’ nine-year-old adoptive daughter, the court did not err in granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Under the facts of this case, the plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits, irreparable injury absent the granting of the injunction, and a balancing of equities in their favor (see, Doe v Poe, 189 AD2d 132).

The defendants’ remaining contentions are without merit. Copertino, J. P., Pizzuto, Santucci and Joy, JJ., concur.

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In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the defendants appeal (1) from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (O’Donoghue, J.), dated June 2, 1994, which, inter alia, granted the plaintiffs’ motion to preliminarily enjoin them from, among other things, communicating with, intimidating, menacing, or harassing the infant plaintiff, Emma Maera, and (2) as limited by their brief, [582]*582from so much of an order of the same court, dated October 13, 1994, as denied their motion for partial summary judgment and to vacate the preliminary injunction.

Ordered that the order dated June 2, 1994, is affirmed, and the order dated October 13, 1994, is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

In this action commenced by the plaintiffs, inter alia, to recover damages for several torts allegedly committed by the defendants in connection with the plaintiffs’ nine-year-old adoptive daughter, the court did not err in granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Under the facts of this case, the plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits, irreparable injury absent the granting of the injunction, and a balancing of equities in their favor (see, Doe v Poe, 189 AD2d 132).

The defendants’ remaining contentions are without merit. Copertino, J. P., Pizzuto, Santucci and Joy, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

223 A.D.2d 581, 637 N.Y.S.2d 166, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 216, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lefrak-v-schneps-nyappdiv-1996.

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