Lee v. U.S. Postmaster General

174 F. Supp. 3d 1325, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46274
District Court, M.D. Florida·Decided March 30, 2016·No. Case No: 6:15-cv-2113-Orl-18GJK·Published

Opinion

ORDER

G. KENDALL SHARP, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS CAUSE comes for consideration on Plaintiff Norman Detric Lee’s (“Lee”) Verified Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture (Doc. 1), to which the United States Postmaster General (the “United States”) responded in opposition (Doc. 7), and Lee replied (Doc. 10), For the reasons that follow, Lee’s motion will be denied.

This case concerns $68,587.00 in United States currency (the “Subject Currency”) that was seized by agents of the United States Postal Inspection Service on May 29, 2014. (Doc. 1 at 1.) On May 28, 2014, Lee was arrested by the Orlando Police Department and immediately transported to the Orange County Correctional Facility, where he was detained until his release on. or about May 31, 2014. (Id.) Subsequently, on May 29, 2014, the Subject Currency was seized from 13379. Glacier National Drive, #¡206 in Orlando, Florida (the [1326] “Glacier Address”), the same location where Lee was arrested. (Id.) Lee avers that he has not returned to the Glacier Address since his arrest on May 28, 2014, and that he immediately relocated to California upon his release from the Orange County Correctional Facility on May 31, 2014. (Id. at 1-2.) On October 20, 2014, Lee was charged in state court with one count of felony possession of cannabis stemming from his May 28, 2014 arrest; however, said charge was dismissed on April 10, 2015. (Id. at 2.) On December 17, 2015, Lee filed his Verified Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture (Doc. 1), wherein he requests the court to set aside the administrative forfeiture of the Subject Property pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § '983. (Id. at 1.)

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 983(c):

(1) Any person entitled to written notice in any nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding under a civil forfeiture statute who does not receive such notice may file a motion to set aside a declaration of forfeiture with respect to that person’s interest in the property,- which motion shall be granted if — ’
A. the Government knew, or reasonably should have known, of the moving party’s interest and failed to take reasonable steps to provide such party with notice; and
B. the moving party did not know or have reason to know of the seizure •within sufficient time to file a timely claim.

18 U.S.C. § 983(e). Indisputably, “individuals whose property interests are at stake due to government actions are entitled to notice of the [forfeiture] proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.” Mesa Valderrama v. United States, 417 F.3d 1189, 1196 (11th Cir.2005). “The notice necessary to satisfy ’due process requires only that interested persons be given ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’ ” Id. at 1196-97. (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)). The government is obligated to take reasonable steps to provide interested parties with actual notice; however the government is not required to demonstrate that it was successful in providing actual notice. Id. at 1197 (citing Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170, 122 S.Ct. 694, 151 L.Ed.2d 597 (2002)).

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Lee v. U.S. Postmaster General, 174 F. Supp. 3d 1325, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46274 (M.D. Fla. 2016).

174 F. Supp. 3d 1325 (Lee v. U.S. Postmaster General) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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