2020 IL App (1st) 190995-U
THIRD DIVISION September 30, 2020
No. 1-19-0995
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). _____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ ELAINE J. LEE, ) ) Charging Party-Appellant, ) ) Appeal from the v. ) Illinois Educational ) Labor Relations Board THE ILLINOIS EDUCATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD; ) and MAYWOOD-MELROSE PARK-BROADVIEW SCHOOL ) 2018-CA-0066-C DISTRICT 89, ) ) Respondents-Appellees. )
JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Howse and Justice Burke concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Appellant’s failure to comply with mandatory rule regarding appellate brief precluded review.
¶2 This is a direct appeal from the dismissal of an unfair labor practice charge which
Elaine J. Lee filed pro se with respondent Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (“Board”)
regarding her employment as a school psychologist during the 2017-18 school year.
¶3 Lee, who was hired in 2004 and subsequently tenured, alleged that respondent Maywood-
Melrose Park-Broadview School District 89 (“District”) violated Sections 14(a)(1), 14(a)(3), and 1-19-0995
14(a)(5) of the Illinois Labor Relations Act (Act) and portions of the 2014-18 collective bargaining
agreement (“CBA”) between the school district and her employment union, Maywood Education
Association (“Union”), by implementing a professional performance remediation plan for the
2017-18 school year. 115 ILCS 5/14(a)(1), 14(a)(3), 14(a)(5) (West 2016). The remediation plan
was based on four evaluations conducted in late 2017.
¶4 Under section 14(a)(1) of the Act, educational employers are prohibited from
“[i]interfering, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed under
this Act.” 115 ILCS 5/14(a)(1) (West 2016). Sections 14(a)(3) and 14(a)(5) prohibit educational
employers from, respectively, “[d]iscriminating in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term of condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any employee
organization”) and “[r]efusing to bargain collectively in good faith with an employee
representative which is the exclusive representative of employees.” Lee cited the CBA’s Article
V, Section 5.01, entitled “Evaluation of all teachers” and Section 5.02, entitled “Professional
Development Plan.” Lee alleged that the District knew or should have known that the evaluation
plan undertaken in 2017 “circumvent[ed] the primary purpose of the [CBA] between [the District
and Union] to improve quality of instructions [(sic)] for teacher’s [(sic)] evaluations” and that her
evaluation plan should have been negotiated between the District and her union.
¶5 The District responded that none of Lee’s allegations implicated Section 14(a) of the Act
115 ILCS 5/14 (West 2016). On the face of her charge and in her position statement, Lee had
explicitly stated that the basis for her charge was the District’s compliance with Article V of the
CBA when implementing the remediation plan, and she alleged no other conduct by the District
or any actions she took that were protected by the Act. Section 14(a)(3) of the Act applies to
-2- 1-19-0995
discrimination based on union activity, while section 14(a)(1) covers adverse action against an
employee because of other protected concerted activity. Bloom Township High School District.
206, Cook County v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 312 Ill. App. 3d 943, 957, 728
N.E.2d 612, 623 (2000). Section 14(5) requires an educational employer to bargain in good faith
with the union. Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations
Board, 315 Ill. App. 3d 522, 528, 734 N.E.2d 69, 74 (2000). The District also contended that no
CBA violation had occurred and that by the terms of the CBA, violations were subject to a
grievance procedure initiated by the union and binding arbitration.
¶6 After an investigation, the Board’s executive director issued a recommended decision and
order dismissing the charge on grounds that it failed to raise an issue of fact or law warranting a
hearing.
¶7 Lee filed exceptions and Board affirmed the dismissal. The Board concluded that Lee had
submitted no evidence demonstrating that she engaged in activity protected by the Act and that her
employer took adverse action because of such activity. The Board also concluded that violations
of a collective bargaining agreement do not constitute unfair labor practices.
¶8 The administrative agency entered its dismissal order on April 25, 2019. Lee timely filed
her direct appeal on May 14, 2019. Given the age of this appeal, we note that when Lee failed to
file an opening brief, we dismissed the matter for want of prosecution, but granted her petition for
reconsideration and the parties then completed their briefs on August 26, 2020. We have
jurisdiction over this direct administrative review action pursuant to section 16 of the Act, section
3-113 of the Administrative Review Law, and Supreme Court Rule 335. 115 ILCS 5/16 (West
2016) (providing for judicial review of a final order of the Board); 735 ILCS 5/3-113 (West 2016)
-3- 1-19-0995
(allowing for direct review of administrative orders by an appellate court); Ill. S. Ct. R. 335 (eff.
July 1, 2017) (same).
¶9 The appellant’s brief lacks any citation to the record on appeal. Furthermore, the
appellant’s argument is “[b]ased upon Appellant’s knowledge and belief” rather than citation and
discussion of relevant authority. Even more concerning is that the entire appellate argument is
slightly more than one page. This short argument does not address the alleged violations of the Act
and it contains only conclusory statements regarding the alleged violations of the CBA. For
instance, Lee states the following to support her allegation that the evaluation plan violated the
CBA:
“There appears from reading District 89 Evaluation Plan multiple meetings were held
2014-2015; 2016-2017 between District 89 Evaluation Committee members, i.e., school
administrators and teacher representatives. Nothing is stated on the record to substantiate
both parties formally recommended changes to the evaluation process as required pursuit
to Article V section 5.01.
Appellant states Appellee, the District[,] directly violated Article V section 5.01- 5.02.
of the collective bargaining agreement by usurping the authority of the Agreement.”
¶ 10 Then, in order to refute the District’s contention that CBA violations are subject to
grievance by the union and arbitration, Lee states only the following:
“Appellees[’] argument that Appellant had no legal standing to challenge the evaluation
process is frivolous. Appellant was a member of bargaining unit of its employees
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2020 IL App (1st) 190995-U
THIRD DIVISION September 30, 2020
No. 1-19-0995
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). _____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ ELAINE J. LEE, ) ) Charging Party-Appellant, ) ) Appeal from the v. ) Illinois Educational ) Labor Relations Board THE ILLINOIS EDUCATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD; ) and MAYWOOD-MELROSE PARK-BROADVIEW SCHOOL ) 2018-CA-0066-C DISTRICT 89, ) ) Respondents-Appellees. )
JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Howse and Justice Burke concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Appellant’s failure to comply with mandatory rule regarding appellate brief precluded review.
¶2 This is a direct appeal from the dismissal of an unfair labor practice charge which
Elaine J. Lee filed pro se with respondent Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (“Board”)
regarding her employment as a school psychologist during the 2017-18 school year.
¶3 Lee, who was hired in 2004 and subsequently tenured, alleged that respondent Maywood-
Melrose Park-Broadview School District 89 (“District”) violated Sections 14(a)(1), 14(a)(3), and 1-19-0995
14(a)(5) of the Illinois Labor Relations Act (Act) and portions of the 2014-18 collective bargaining
agreement (“CBA”) between the school district and her employment union, Maywood Education
Association (“Union”), by implementing a professional performance remediation plan for the
2017-18 school year. 115 ILCS 5/14(a)(1), 14(a)(3), 14(a)(5) (West 2016). The remediation plan
was based on four evaluations conducted in late 2017.
¶4 Under section 14(a)(1) of the Act, educational employers are prohibited from
“[i]interfering, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed under
this Act.” 115 ILCS 5/14(a)(1) (West 2016). Sections 14(a)(3) and 14(a)(5) prohibit educational
employers from, respectively, “[d]iscriminating in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term of condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any employee
organization”) and “[r]efusing to bargain collectively in good faith with an employee
representative which is the exclusive representative of employees.” Lee cited the CBA’s Article
V, Section 5.01, entitled “Evaluation of all teachers” and Section 5.02, entitled “Professional
Development Plan.” Lee alleged that the District knew or should have known that the evaluation
plan undertaken in 2017 “circumvent[ed] the primary purpose of the [CBA] between [the District
and Union] to improve quality of instructions [(sic)] for teacher’s [(sic)] evaluations” and that her
evaluation plan should have been negotiated between the District and her union.
¶5 The District responded that none of Lee’s allegations implicated Section 14(a) of the Act
115 ILCS 5/14 (West 2016). On the face of her charge and in her position statement, Lee had
explicitly stated that the basis for her charge was the District’s compliance with Article V of the
CBA when implementing the remediation plan, and she alleged no other conduct by the District
or any actions she took that were protected by the Act. Section 14(a)(3) of the Act applies to
-2- 1-19-0995
discrimination based on union activity, while section 14(a)(1) covers adverse action against an
employee because of other protected concerted activity. Bloom Township High School District.
206, Cook County v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 312 Ill. App. 3d 943, 957, 728
N.E.2d 612, 623 (2000). Section 14(5) requires an educational employer to bargain in good faith
with the union. Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations
Board, 315 Ill. App. 3d 522, 528, 734 N.E.2d 69, 74 (2000). The District also contended that no
CBA violation had occurred and that by the terms of the CBA, violations were subject to a
grievance procedure initiated by the union and binding arbitration.
¶6 After an investigation, the Board’s executive director issued a recommended decision and
order dismissing the charge on grounds that it failed to raise an issue of fact or law warranting a
hearing.
¶7 Lee filed exceptions and Board affirmed the dismissal. The Board concluded that Lee had
submitted no evidence demonstrating that she engaged in activity protected by the Act and that her
employer took adverse action because of such activity. The Board also concluded that violations
of a collective bargaining agreement do not constitute unfair labor practices.
¶8 The administrative agency entered its dismissal order on April 25, 2019. Lee timely filed
her direct appeal on May 14, 2019. Given the age of this appeal, we note that when Lee failed to
file an opening brief, we dismissed the matter for want of prosecution, but granted her petition for
reconsideration and the parties then completed their briefs on August 26, 2020. We have
jurisdiction over this direct administrative review action pursuant to section 16 of the Act, section
3-113 of the Administrative Review Law, and Supreme Court Rule 335. 115 ILCS 5/16 (West
2016) (providing for judicial review of a final order of the Board); 735 ILCS 5/3-113 (West 2016)
-3- 1-19-0995
(allowing for direct review of administrative orders by an appellate court); Ill. S. Ct. R. 335 (eff.
July 1, 2017) (same).
¶9 The appellant’s brief lacks any citation to the record on appeal. Furthermore, the
appellant’s argument is “[b]ased upon Appellant’s knowledge and belief” rather than citation and
discussion of relevant authority. Even more concerning is that the entire appellate argument is
slightly more than one page. This short argument does not address the alleged violations of the Act
and it contains only conclusory statements regarding the alleged violations of the CBA. For
instance, Lee states the following to support her allegation that the evaluation plan violated the
CBA:
“There appears from reading District 89 Evaluation Plan multiple meetings were held
2014-2015; 2016-2017 between District 89 Evaluation Committee members, i.e., school
administrators and teacher representatives. Nothing is stated on the record to substantiate
both parties formally recommended changes to the evaluation process as required pursuit
to Article V section 5.01.
Appellant states Appellee, the District[,] directly violated Article V section 5.01- 5.02.
of the collective bargaining agreement by usurping the authority of the Agreement.”
¶ 10 Then, in order to refute the District’s contention that CBA violations are subject to
grievance by the union and arbitration, Lee states only the following:
“Appellees[’] argument that Appellant had no legal standing to challenge the evaluation
process is frivolous. Appellant was a member of bargaining unit of its employees
represented for purpose of collective bargaining by the Union to file Charge complaint
alleging violation of Article V sections 5.01.-5.02.”
-4- 1-19-0995
¶ 11 “Rule 341(h) governs the contents of the appellant’s opening brief, and its terms are
requirements, not mere suggestions. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016); Hall v. Naper Gold
Hospitality LLC, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 7, 969 N.E.2d 930. The rule is in effect so that the
parties present clear and orderly arguments to the reviewing court so that it can properly ascertain
and address the issues involved. Hall, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 7. Rule 341(h)(7), in particular,
provides that the appellant’s argument section must contain the contentions of the appellant with
“citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Jan.
1, 2016). Reviewing courts are not expected to search the record in order to find error where the
appellant has not made a good-faith effort to present a brief in compliance with the briefing rules.
In re Estate of Parker, 2011 IL App (1st) 102871, ¶ 47, 957 N.E.2d 454.
¶ 12 Lee is pro se, however, even pro se appellants are expected to adhere to the supreme court
rules, including those that govern the contents of appellate briefs. Twardowski v. Holiday
Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 321 Ill. App. 3d 509, 511, 748 N.E.2d 222, 225 (2001) (“pro se
status does not relieve [an appellant] of the burden of complying with the format for appeals as
mandated by the supreme court rules); see also Tannenbaum v. Lincoln National Bank, 143 Ill.
App. 3d 572, 574, 493 N.E.2d 143, 144 (1986) (“Although his right to appear pro se is well
established, it is equally well established that when he does appear pro se, he must comply with
the established rules of procedure.”).
¶ 13 Failure to comply with the rules is not an inconsequential matter; a brief that “lacks any
substantial conformity to the pertinent supreme court rules may justifiably be stricken.” Hall, 2012
IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 7; Bielecki v. Painting Plus, Inc., 264 Ill. App. 3d 344, 354, 637 N.E.2d
1054, 1061 (1994) (bare contentions “do not merit consideration on appeal and should be
-5- 1-19-0995
rejected”). Striking a brief “is a harsh sanction and is appropriate only when the violations of the
procedural rules hinder our review.” Hall, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 15.
¶ 14 The lack of substance and citation in Lee’s opening brief prevents us from analyzing her
concerns and forming an opinion about them. We cannot conduct a meaningful review. Under the
circumstances, we must strike the brief and dismiss the appeal.
¶ 15 Appeal dismissed.
-6-