Lee v. The City of Troy

District Court, N.D. New York·Decided April 8, 2021·No. 1:19-cv-00473·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - LAMONT LEE,

Plaintiff, -v- 1:19-CV-473

THE CITY OF TROY; PATROLMAN CHRISTOPHER PARKER; PATROLMAN LOUIS PERFETTI; PATROLMAN JUSTIN ASHE; and PATROLMAN KYLE JONES,

Defendants.

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APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

SIVIN, MILLER & ROCHE LLP EDWARD SIVIN, ESQ. Attorneys for Plaintiffs GLENN D. MILLER, ESQ. 20 Vesey Street, Suite 1400 New York, New York 10007

PATTISON, SAMPSON LAW FIRM MICHAEL E. GINSBERG, ESQ. Attorneys for Defendants RHIANNON INEVA P.O. Box 208 SPENCER, ESQ. 22 First Street Troy, New York 12181

OFFICE OF RICHARD T. MORRISSEY RICHARD T. MORRISSEY, ESQ. Attorneys for Defendants 64 Second Street Troy, New York 12180

DAVID N. HURD United States District Judge MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER

On March 3, 2018, plaintiff Lamont Lee (“Lee” or “plaintiff”) was arrested in the City of Troy, New York (“Troy” or the “City”). In the process, plaintiff alleges that the arresting officers (together with the City “defendants”) used excessive force to secure his compliance. To hear plaintiff tell it, the arresting officers grabbed him, took him down, and then punched and kneed

him repeatedly while he was on the ground. For their part, defendants argue that plaintiff resisted arrest throughout the entire encounter, and the arresting officers only used the force necessary to ensure his compliance. The parties presented those clashing narratives to the Court on summary

judgment. Typically, one would imagine that such a robust argument over questions of fact—namely whether Lee continued to resist arrest throughout the arresting officers’ use of force and whether that resistance justified the force used—would preclude summary judgment for either side. But

defendants believed they possessed a silver bullet: a surveillance video of plaintiff’s entire altercation with the arresting officers. Even so, when the Court decided defendants’ motion for summary judgment on February 16, 2021,1 Lee’s claims of (I) assault and battery under

New York common law and (II) excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 survived. As for how those claims managed to clear summary judgment despite the video evidence depicting plaintiff’s entire arrest, it would seem that defendants’ silver bullet

misfired. With their initial motion, defendants submitted video evidence on a compact disc, which they claimed showed the arrest on March 3, 2018. But the video in the Court’s possession showed nothing of the sort. Instead, the

video consisted of two Troy officers—neither one among the officers who arrested Lee—interviewing a witness to the arrest. The Court nevertheless believed that justice could best be done on a full record. To that end, the Court gave defendants a second chance by notifying

them of the video’s inefficacy, and waited for another disc before turning to the merits of their summary judgment motion. Yet when the Court received that second disc, it discovered that defendants had if anything taken a step

1 In addition to the events of March 3, 2018, plaintiff also brought claims for unreasonable search and seizure, excessive force, assault and battery, and retaliation under New York and federal law based on an entirely separate incident which took place on April 24, 2018. Plaintiff—as well as his grandson Tymel Kornegay, then also a plaintiff—and defendants cross-moved for summary judgment on both plaintiffs’ claims regarding the events of April 24. The Court granted summary judgment in defendants’ favor and dismissed all of those claims, leaving only plaintiff Lee’s claims relating to the March 3 incident. backwards. No file on the second disc allowed a user to watch any video at all, whatever efforts—technological or arcane—were brought to bear.

Thus, no video evidence was considered in deciding defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Lee’s arrest on March 3, 2018, and defendants’ motion was denied. To the Court’s mind, a reasonable factfinder could conclude for or against plaintiff based on his narrative as it competed with

defendants’. Moreover, if a factfinder did credit plaintiff’s version of events— that the arresting officers punched and used their full body weight to drop their knees on him as he lay prone and had ceased resisting arrest—the Court held that qualified immunity would not attach to those facts.

On March 2, 2021, defendants moved the Court to reconsider its denial of their motion for summary judgment regarding Lee’s arrest under Local Rule of the Northern District of New York (“Local Rule”) 60.1.2 In that motion, defendants argue that the disc itself was functional, but the Court lacked the

requisite software to be able to play the video. Because the Court had successfully viewed the interview video on the earlier disc, defendants argue

2 Defendants’ motion also relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 60(b). But that Rule only allows for relief from a final judgment. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 527 (2005). The denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment, so Rule 60(b) does not offer defendants a path to relief. Fitzgerald v. City of Troy, N.Y., 2013 WL 5442274, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013) (denying motion for reconsideration of denial of summary judgment under Rule 60(b) because denial of summary judgment is not final order even though defendants assert qualified immunity). that they erroneously believed that the Court had access to that software and should not be blamed for the fact that the video was not viewable.

A motion for reconsideration under the Local Rules of this District requires the movant to prove: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the existence of new evidence not previously available; or (3) that reconsideration is necessary to remedy a clear error of law or to prevent

manifest injustice. Delaney v. Selsky, 899 F. Supp. 923, 925 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). But courts are strict in construing that standard. Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). Undaunted by their burden, defendants argue that their video evidence is

“new” because it was not available to the Court in its initial review. Defendants are wrong. Evidence cannot be “new” if defendants already had access to it before they filed their motion for summary judgment. Cf. Bishop v. Cty. of Suffolk, 2015 WL 5719802, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2015) (applying

Eastern District’s standard for motion for reconsideration and holding that evidence in movant’s possession prior to motion does not qualify as new). It is not hard to see why. Making the court, rather than the movant, the metric by which the novelty of evidence is measured would invite an endless

stream of motions for reconsideration, because any additional piece of evidence that the movant did not provide in their initial motion would provide grounds to ask the court to rethink its decisions. Of course, defendants are not quite so culpable as that hypothetical suggests, because they made two efforts to include the video evidence with their motion.

Yet defendants are culpable nonetheless. The Court is of course aware that surveillance videos can often only be viewed through specialized software.

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