Lee v. State

422 A.2d 62, 47 Md. App. 213, 1980 Md. App. LEXIS 378
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland
DecidedNovember 13, 1980
Docket249, September Term, 1980
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 422 A.2d 62 (Lee v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Special Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lee v. State, 422 A.2d 62, 47 Md. App. 213, 1980 Md. App. LEXIS 378 (Md. Ct. App. 1980).

Opinion

Gilbert, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The appellant, Robert Edward Lee, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County of various violations of the Maryland Controlled Dangerous Substances Act. See Md. Ann. Code art. 27, §§ 276-303 (1976 Repl. Vol.). Following conviction, Lee was sentenced to a period of 15 years incarceration, but a sentence review panel reduced the time to be served to five years.

Lee has appealed to this Court where he advances a pentad of reasons why the judgment of the circuit court should be reversed. Because we hold that the trial court erred in refusing to grant appellant’s motion to suppress physical evidence, we find it unnecessary to consider the other four issues raised.

We set forth briefly the factual situation from which this matter arose.

From the record it is apparent that Officer Michael Garvey of the Montgomery County Police Department applied for and obtained a search warrant on December 19, 1978 for the premises known as Apartment 9, 12309 Braxfield Court, Rockville, Maryland. Lee was apprehended in that particular apartment on that same date when the warrant was executed at 9:10 a.m.

As a result of the search, the police seized in the premises approximately 33V2 pounds of marijuana, 510 methaquadone tablets, 742 capsules of amphetamine, a scale, miscellaneous personal papers belonging to Lee, $7,266 in United States currency, of which $1,415 were in Lee’s pocket, a quantity of glass vials, two cutting boards, plastic "baggies,” and other paraphernalia.

Prior to trial, Lee moved to suppress the evidence for want of probable cause in the issuance of the warrant. Additionally, Lee asked for a hearing pursuant to Franks v. *215 Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). The court heard argument on both motions and denied them.

When the matter went to trial before the judge who issued the warrant, Lee, through his counsel, asked the court to rehear the motion to suppress the evidence. The rehearing was denied.

Lee contends that the application for the warrant shows on its face that the information relied upon by the issuing judge was stale and did not establish probable cause. We agree.

In Peterson v. State, 281 Md. 309, 379 A.2d 164 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 945 (1978), the Court of Appeals addressed the issue, for the first time, of stale probable cause. Judge Orth, writing for the Court, summarized the rules governing probable cause in the issuance of a search warrant. He quoted from State v. Edwards, 266 Md. 515, 518-19, 295 A.2d 465, 466-67 (1972), where it said:

"The finding of 'probable cause,’ while demanding more than mere suspicion, Draper v. U.S., 358 U.S. 307, 311-12, 79 S. Ct. 329, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327 (1959), requires less evidence than would justify conviction, Locke v. U.S., 7 Cranch 339, 348, 3 L. Ed. 364 (1813), and less than would justify an officer in making a search without a warrant, Johnson v. U.S., 333 U.S. 10, 15, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436 (1948). The evidence itself need not be legally competent in a criminal trial, Draper v. U.S., supra, 358 U.S. at 311, and may in fact be hearsay, Jones v. U.S., 362 U.S. 257, 272, 80 S. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1960), so long as the judicial officer issuing the warrant is informed of some underlying circumstances supporting the affiant’s conclusions and his belief that any informant involved was credible or his information reliable, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964), and such judicial officer is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the facts contained in the affidavit based on his *216 experience in such matters. Irby v. U.S., 114 U.S. App. D.C. 246, 314 F.2d 251, 253 (1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 842 (1963).” Peterson v. State, supra at 313, 379 A.2d at 166.

Judge Orth, for the Peterson Court, went on to declare:

"Our concern in determining whether a warrant necessary to the reasonableness of a search and seizure has been issued upon an affidavit supporting probable cause is only with the question '"whether the affiant had reasonable grounds at the time of his affidavit and the issuance of the warrant for the belief that the law was being violated on the premises to be searched; and if the apparent facts set out in the affidavit are such that a reasonably discreet [sic] and prudent man would be led to believe that there was a commission of the offense charged, there is probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant.” ’ State v. Edwards, 266 Md. at 519, quoting Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 441, 45 S. Ct. 546 (1925). It follows that if the facts set out in the affidavit are 'stale,’ the affiant would not have reasonable grounds at the time of his affidavit and the issuance of the warrant for the belief that the law was being violated on the premises to be searched. The question is what constitutes 'stale probable cause.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 313-14, 379 A.2d at 166-67.

The Peterson Court adopted the rule regarding stale probable cause as stated in Garza v. State, 120 Tex. Crim. 147, 149, 48 S.W.2d 625, 626 (1932), which "properly states the law and embodies the holdings of the Court of Special Appeals,[ 1 ] the more persuasive teachings of the courts in *217 other jurisdictions, and the general opinions of text writers and commentators.” Peterson v. State, supra at 315, 379 A.2d at 167. The Texas Court articulated the rule as follows:

"The affidavit for a search warrant on probable cause, based on information and belief, should in some manner, by averment of date or otherwise, show that the event or circumstance constituting probable cause, occurred at the time not so remote from the date of the affidavit as to render it improbable that the alleged violation of law authorizing the search was extant at the time the application for the search warrant was made.” Garza v. State, supra at 149, 48 S.W.2d at 626.

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422 A.2d 62, 47 Md. App. 213, 1980 Md. App. LEXIS 378, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lee-v-state-mdctspecapp-1980.