Lee v. Rodriguez

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Lee v. Rodriguez

2017 NY Slip Op 3869, 150 A.D.3d 481, 55 N.Y.S.3d 167

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 11, 2017

Docket3986 24480/13

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 2017 NY Slip Op 3869 (Lee v. Rodriguez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Lee v. Rodriguez, 2017 NY Slip Op 3869, 150 A.D.3d 481, 55 N.Y.S.3d 167 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2017).

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Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Betty Owen Stinson, J.), entered April 21, 2016, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint alleging serious injury under Insurance Law § 5102 (d), unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendants demonstrated prima facie that plaintiffs suffered no serious injuries to any of their allegedly injured body parts by submitting the affirmed reports of an orthopedist and a neurologist who found no deficits in the relevant ranges of motion upon recent examination (see Shinn v Catanzaro, 1 AD3d 195, 197 [1st Dept 2003]). They also submitted evidence that plaintiffs neither reported any injury to the police immediately after the motor vehicle accident nor sought any medical treatment shortly after the accident, indicating that their claimed injuries were not causally related to the accident (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218 [2011]; Rosa v Mejia, 95 AD3d 402, 404 [1st Dept 2012]).

*482 In opposition, plaintiffs’ only admissible submissions were the affirmed reports of a doctor who found limitations in range of motion in the allegedly injured body parts on examination of plaintiffs some three years after the accident. Moreover, to the extent the doctor recited findings made by another doctor who purportedly examined plaintiffs three weeks and two months after the accident and referred to MRI reports not in the record, his reports are hearsay and therefore may not be relied upon to raise an issue of fact (see Malupa v Oppong, 106 AD3d 538 [1st Dept 2013]). As the record is “devoid of any medical records, charts or bills to support [plaintiffs’] claim of having received treatment” after the accident (Rosa v Mejia, 95 AD3d at 403), it shows no causal connection between the accident and plaintiffs’ claimed injuries (see Camilo v Villa Livery Corp., 118 AD3d 586 [1st Dept 2014]).

Concur—Friedman, J.P., Moskowitz, Manzanet-Daniels, Kapnick and Webber, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Betty Owen Stinson, J.), entered April 21, 2016, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint alleging serious injury under Insurance Law § 5102 (d), unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendants demonstrated prima facie that plaintiffs suffered no serious injuries to any of their allegedly injured body parts by submitting the affirmed reports of an orthopedist and a neurologist who found no deficits in the relevant ranges of motion upon recent examination (see Shinn v Catanzaro, 1 AD3d 195, 197 [1st Dept 2003]). They also submitted evidence that plaintiffs neither reported any injury to the police immediately after the motor vehicle accident nor sought any medical treatment shortly after the accident, indicating that their claimed injuries were not causally related to the accident (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218 [2011]; Rosa v Mejia, 95 AD3d 402, 404 [1st Dept 2012]).

*482 In opposition, plaintiffs’ only admissible submissions were the affirmed reports of a doctor who found limitations in range of motion in the allegedly injured body parts on examination of plaintiffs some three years after the accident. Moreover, to the extent the doctor recited findings made by another doctor who purportedly examined plaintiffs three weeks and two months after the accident and referred to MRI reports not in the record, his reports are hearsay and therefore may not be relied upon to raise an issue of fact (see Malupa v Oppong, 106 AD3d 538 [1st Dept 2013]). As the record is “devoid of any medical records, charts or bills to support [plaintiffs’] claim of having received treatment” after the accident (Rosa v Mejia, 95 AD3d at 403), it shows no causal connection between the accident and plaintiffs’ claimed injuries (see Camilo v Villa Livery Corp., 118 AD3d 586 [1st Dept 2014]).

Concur—Friedman, J.P., Moskowitz, Manzanet-Daniels, Kapnick and Webber, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

2017 NY Slip Op 3869, 150 A.D.3d 481, 55 N.Y.S.3d 167, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lee-v-rodriguez-nyappdiv-2017.

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