Lee v. North Pacific Lumber Co.

146 P. 131, 75 Or. 7, 1915 Ore. LEXIS 168
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 16, 1915
StatusPublished

This text of 146 P. 131 (Lee v. North Pacific Lumber Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lee v. North Pacific Lumber Co., 146 P. 131, 75 Or. 7, 1915 Ore. LEXIS 168 (Or. 1915).

Opinion

Me. Justice Harris

delivered the opinion of the court.

1. The contract provides that the plaintiff shall receive as compensation for his services one fourth of the profits of the business obtained by him. The parties are agreed upon what was obtained, and there is no dispute as to the receipts of the business. There is no provision in the agreement fixing a basis from which “profits” are to be estimated. The differences between the plaintiff and defendant result from the variant methods employed in attempting to ascertain the cost of the lumber manufactured and sold. The cost of manufacturing the lumber sold by plaintiff was not kept as a separate account on' the books of the company, and the defendant insists that the only accurate method for determining the manufacturing cost is to consider the plant as a whole, and ascertain the average cost per 1,000 feet from the total output of the mill and the expense of operating the entire business of defendant. The plaintiff rejects the method proposed by defendant, and the former contends that the only fair way is to ascertain as near as possible the cost of producing the particular shipments sold by him. We are of the opinion that the plan offered by defendant is neither accurate nor fair. The plaintiff is in no way concerned with either the profits or losses [12]*12on any business not obtained by Mm, because Ms compensation is to be determined by the profits on the lumber that be, and not some other person, sold. The failure of the parties to agree on a cost price and their neglect to provide for a method by which the cost price shall be determined makes the problem a difficult one to solve. The defendant operates its business as a whole, and does not keep separate accounts of all the details of the different departments. There is no way of showing how or where every part of any specified log is disposed of. A portion of a log may or may not go to the planer; some part may be sold in Portland, and in such case delivery is made with the wagons and teams of the company. The slabs taken from a given log may be.small or large. One log may be practically all clear, while another may produce little or no clear lumber. The lumber manufactured from a given log may pass through the hands of many employees, or it may be handled by only a certain number of the different crews. The conditions existing make it impossible to reach an exact and accurate determination of the cost of manufacturing the lumber sold by plaintiff. Not one of the expert accountants was able to sustain the claim that any given method was exactly correct, because in every case an estimate or an approximation somewhere entered into the calculation. While it must be conceded that the exact cost of the lumber sold by plaintiff cannot be ascertained, still the parties are entitled to have the cost determined by a method which will be not only fair, but will also reveal the exact cost as near as conditions permit. The lumber sold by plaintiff should bear its full share of the expense incurred in producing that lumber, but the business obtained by plaintiff is not entitled to share in the profits realized from other business done by the com[13]*13pany, and the lumber sold by plaintiff should not be compelled to bear any part of any losses resulting from other sales.

Expert accountants testified for both parties; and, as usual, these experts became advocates for their respective clients: Baber v. Caples, 71 Or. 212 (138 Pac. 472, 475). In many ways the manufacturing cost was minimized by the plaintiff and enlarged by the defendant. Before discussing the question of profits and losses it is necessary first to state the rule of law which, in our opinion, is applicable.

2. The plaintiff acted as selling agent for the company from September 1, 1903, until September 18, 1906. The contract fixes the compensation as one fourth of the profits of the business obtained by the plaintiff with a guaranty of $2,400. The parties understood this clause of the contract to mean a guaranty of $2,400 for each year. The profits or losses of one year’s business cannot be carried to the following year. If there was a loss the first year the defendant is not entitled to have that loss carried to the next year. If there was a profit the second year, but not sufficient to increase the amount of the guaranty, then the plaintiff is not entitled to have that amount carried to the third year. The business done during any one year is closed with the end of that year. The defendant cannot charge the losses of one year against the profits of a succeeding year: Jennery v. Olmstead, 90 N. Y. 363. Applying the rule just stated, the business done by plaintiff covers three annual periods, the first ending September 1, 1904, the second terminating September 1, 1905, and the third closing with September 18, 1906.

There are two principal items entering into the calculations. One item is the cost of the log delivered [14]*14at the mill, and the other is the expense of manufacturing the log into the lumber sold by plaintiff.

There is no way of knowing just what log rafts were cut, but it appears from the evidence that, generally speaking, the South African trade required a good quality of lumber. We have determined the cost of the logs by the quality and sizes of the lumber called for in the specifications and the prices paid for logs necessary to produce the lumber specified. To the price of the log 40 cents is added for towing. The defendant owns two boats used for towing purposes, and the company operated these two boats at a profit. The plaintiff therefore claims that he is entitled to a share in the profits to the extent of a pro rata reduction on the price of the log; but this is only demanding to receive from one department that which the plaintiff declines to take from other departments of the business. Forty cents per thousand for towage is a fair charge, and it is, in fact, less than the usual charge.

We now come to a consideration of the cost of manufacturing the log, and many items enter into the calculation. The first item to which attention is given is the gain in scale. There is, as a rule, a gain in lumber feet over log feet as scaled. The plaintiff claims a difference in scale ranging from a loss of 5 per cent to a gain of 25 per cent. The books of the company show exactly the aggregate of log feet purchased each year and the amount of lumber feet manufactured during the same period; and, notwithstanding this fact, the expert accountants do not agree on the gain in scale. We think the evidence supports the conclusion that the gain in scale was 13 per cent for 1904, 8.87 per cent during 1905, and 7.31 per cent in 1906, and in calculating the cost of the lumber we make a uniform allowance for a gain in scale on the basis mentioned. [15]*15It is a mere guess to attempt to estimate the loss or gain in scale as is done by plaintiff. In the very nature of things, it can only be an approximation to say that in flooring and ceiling there was a loss of 5 per cent, while in another kind of lumber there was a gain of 25 per cent. It is true that there may be a loss on some lumber and a considerable gain on other lumber, but there is no way of knowing just what that gain or loss is. It seems to us that it is fairer to apply the gain disclosed by the books, because we know what that gain is, and are not obliged to resort to mere estimates.

The parties are not agreed on the disposition to be made of the receipts from by-prodncts such as sawdust, slabwood and laths.

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Related

Jennery v. . Olmstead
90 N.Y. 363 (New York Court of Appeals, 1882)
Baber v. Caples
138 P. 472 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1914)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
146 P. 131, 75 Or. 7, 1915 Ore. LEXIS 168, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lee-v-north-pacific-lumber-co-or-1915.