Lee v. Lee

744 P.2d 1378, 69 Utah Adv. Rep. 52, 1987 Utah App. LEXIS 582
CourtCourt of Appeals of Utah
DecidedNovember 10, 1987
Docket860143-CA
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 744 P.2d 1378 (Lee v. Lee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 69 Utah Adv. Rep. 52, 1987 Utah App. LEXIS 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

Opinion

OPINION

BILLINGS, Judge:

The wife appeals from the property distribution and alimony provisions of the decree of divorce. She contends the trial court abused its discretion by not awarding her an equitable share of the marital assets, and in fixing alimony at $1.00 per year. We agree, and, therefore, reverse and remand.

I.

FACTS

Debbie Lee (“the wife”) and Dennis Lee (“the husband”) were married for almost nine years, from December 9, 1976 until July 25,1985. At the time of the marriage, the wife was employed, primarily performing clerical functions. Shortly after the marriage, the wife quit her job at her husband’s request. The wife’s premarital property was minimal.

At the time of the marriage, the husband was the General Mine Foreman of Valley Camp Company. Prior to the marriage, the husband and his brother established a garbage collection business, in which the husband made a substantial monetary investment from personal assets. Subsequent to the parties’ marriage, the husband and his brother sold the garbage business and established D & D Equipment and Supply (“D & D”), a corporation involved in the coal industry. The husband owned 52 percent of the shares of D & D. The husband’s premarital assets consisted of a D8 cat (tractor), a 1973 Buick automobile, a

1972 pickup truck, and an $18,000 certificate of deposit.

During the marriage the parties had two children, purchased a mobile home and other minor assets, and continued the operation of D & D, the primary income-producing asset of the marriage. The husband worked for D & D for the duration of the marriage. The wife performed clerical duties for D & D during the marriage, including paying monthly bills, answering phones, and typing. The wife was not compensated for her services for over three years. 1

At trial, the valuation of D & D and its distribution as a marital asset were the main issues. A financial statement, dated February 1, 1985, signed by the husband, and submitted by him to Zions First National Bank, was admitted into evidence. This statement listed the total assets of D & D as $521,389, the total liabilities as $65,966, for a net worth of $455,423. The wife also testified that as of the Wednesday before the trial commenced, the balance in D & D’s checking account was $57,846. The husband called Marvin Mutz, a bookkeeper who prepared the year-end tax reports of D & D, to testify on the value of the company. A financial statement prepared by Mutz showed the total net worth of D & D as $112,397.34. The husband testified that the real property of the business had a value of $40,000, making the total net worth of D & D assets, according to the husband, $152,397.34.

Mutz also estimated the value of the husband’s 52 percent ownership of D & D stock to be $33,528. Mutz’s estimation of the value of the husband’s 52 percent interest in D & D was based upon the husband’s percentage of total authorized shares (100,-000), and not upon total issued shares (40,-000). If the value of the husband’s 52 percent interest in D & D had been based upon issued shares, the value of his stock, *1380 according to his own expert’s testimony, would be $83,820.00. 2

At the time of trial, the wife, had a high school education, and was currently unemployed despite her efforts at seeking employment.

The trial court awarded the wife assets valued at $19,000. The court awarded the 52 percent interest in D & D exclusively to the husband, without assigning any value to the company, together with other assets valued at $3,500. The wife was awarded $1.00 per year in alimony.

Two issues are raised on appeal. First, did the trial court deny the wife her equitable share of marital assets by refusing to place a value on D & D to allow a cash distribution to the wife, or, if it was unable to assign a value, by failing to make an in-kind distribution of the stock to her? Second, did the trial court abuse its discretion in fixing the alimony award at $1.00 per year?

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In divorce proceedings, the trial court has considerable discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties. Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 1984). The “determination of the value of the assets is a matter for the trial court which will not be reviewed in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.” Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted). However, the trial court must make findings on all material issues, and its failure to do so constitutes reversible error unless the facts in the record are “clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.” Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). The findings must be sufficiently detailed and consist of enough subsidiary facts to reveal the steps the court took to reach its conclusion on each factual issue presented. Id.

III.

DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ASSETS

The wife contends the trial court erred in refusing to assign a value to the husband's 52 percent in D & D, a marital asset, and in awarding it exclusively to the husband. We agree. The lower court, in its findings, states that “[bjased on the evidence presented to the court at trial the court refuse[s] to place a value on the parties^] share of the corporation.... [T]he market value of business cannot be determined from the evidence presented.”

A wife is entitled to a fair and equitable share of the financial benefits accumulated by virtue of the parties’ joint efforts during the marriage. See Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Utah 1983). D & D was established after the parties’ marriage, and its value was actualized during the marriage.

The wife assisted in the operation of the corporation by assuming clerical duties, including typing, answering the phones, and paying bills. Moreover, the wife also reared the parties’ two children and performed domestic duties, allowing the husband to participate full-time in the business. Therefore, she is entitled to a fair and equitable share of D & D. The trial court’s award of the 52 percent interest in D & D, the principal asset of the marriage, exclusively to the husband without any findings as to its value constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.

Alternative avenues were available to the trial court to award the wife her equitable share of D & D. First, the trial court could have valued the husband’s 52 percent interest in D & D based on the financial statements and testimony submitted by the parties. The court could then have awarded the wife an equitable portion of D & D by way of off-setting property, or a cash distribution payable over a period of time. This alternative was sanctioned by the Utah Supreme Court in Argyle v.

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Bluebook (online)
744 P.2d 1378, 69 Utah Adv. Rep. 52, 1987 Utah App. LEXIS 582, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lee-v-lee-utahctapp-1987.