Lee v. Lee

244 A.D.2d 643, 663 N.Y.S.2d 708, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11137

This text of 244 A.D.2d 643 (Lee v. Lee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lee v. Lee, 244 A.D.2d 643, 663 N.Y.S.2d 708, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11137 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinion

—Mercure, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Rumsey, J.), entered September 17, 1996 in Chenango County, which denied defendant’s motion for upward modification of a prior order of maintenance.

After more than 30 years of marriage, plaintiff commenced this action against defendant for divorce in September 1991. In June 1994, during the trial of the action, plaintiff and defendant entered into an “opting out agreement” pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) in which they, inter alia, agreed to a distribution of their marital property. The agreement, however, did not settle the issue of maintenance. That issue was resolved by a stipulation entered into by the parties in open court a few days later under which plaintiff agreed to, inter alia, pay defendant spousal maintenance of $5,800 per month indefinitely. Only those provisions of the stipulation relating to spousal maintenance were merged into the judgment of divorce which was subsequently rendered in April 1995. In March 1996, defendant moved for upward modification of the award of maintenance based upon, inter alia, a decline in her medical condition. Supreme Court summarily denied the motion and this appeal by defendant ensued.

[644]*644There must be an affirmance. It is well settled that in order to obtain modification of a prior award of maintenance, the moving party must establish that there has been a substantial change in circumstances since the prior award was rendered (see, Domestic Relations Law §236 [B] [9] [b]; Matter of Hermans v Hermans, 74 NY2d 876, 878; Matter of Archer v Archer, 142 AD2d 881, 882). Defendant has simply failed to make that showing here. Although she asserts that she has incurred increased expenses due to a decline in her medical condition which has resulted in her hospitalization on three occasions and caused her to expend substantial sums on medical supplies and prescription medications, defendant has failed to substantiate her claim that her condition has substantially deteriorated from that of June 1994. Indeed, in her statement of net worth, defendant notes that in June 1994 she suffered from the following: “chronic interstitial cystitus [sic], fiber myalgia [sic], vulvas vestibuliti bacterial cystitus, generative osteoarthritis, rumitoid [sic] arthritis, migarin [sic] headaches, colitis, irritable bowel symptrom [sic], allergies, emotional problems, hypothyroidism, post-menopausal symptoms, astigmatism, dental problems (pain in lower jaw, sensitivity, infection of lower jaw), spinal problems * * * etiology, dysthymia, gastroenteritis.” Under the circumstances, we conclude that defendant’s subsequent bladder problems and colitis certainly do not constitute a substantial change in her medical condition warranting upward modification of the prior award.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Hermans v. Hermans
547 N.E.2d 87 (New York Court of Appeals, 1989)
Archer v. Archer
142 A.D.2d 881 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1988)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
244 A.D.2d 643, 663 N.Y.S.2d 708, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11137, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lee-v-lee-nyappdiv-1997.