Lee v. . Lee

4 S.E.2d 880, 216 N.C. 349, 1939 N.C. LEXIS 165
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedOctober 18, 1939
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 4 S.E.2d 880 (Lee v. . Lee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lee v. . Lee, 4 S.E.2d 880, 216 N.C. 349, 1939 N.C. LEXIS 165 (N.C. 1939).

Opinion

Devin, J.

The plaintiff’s title to the land contracted to be conveyed was derived from the joint will of Merilda and Ersula Lee. The pertinent provisions of the will are as follows:

“Item 2: We give and devise to our cousin, T. W. Lee, the tract of land on which we now reside, containing one hundred seventeen and one-half (117%) acres for his natural life in fee simple.
*350 “Item 9: Our will and desire is that all of the residue of our estate, if any, after taking out the devise, and legacies above mentioned, and marking our graves with turne stones shall go to our cousin, T. W. Lee.”

Upon the death of the testators the joint will was probated in 1913. It was admitted that all the legacies and debts of the devisors have been paid. It was also admitted that the plaintiff is the only heir at law of T. W. Lee, the devisee mentioned in the will.

Whatever may have been the effect of the devise to T. W. Lee “for his natural life in fee simple,” it is apparent that the later devise of “all of the remainder of our estate ... to our cousin, T. W. Lee,” perfects title in fee in the named devisee; for if he took only a life estate by Item 2, the remainder passed to him by the inclusive terms of the residuary clause in Item 9. Thus the life estate and the remainder became united in the same person. 19 Am. Jur., 592.

It was well said in Edens v. Williams, 1 N. C., 27: “Every part of the will is to be considered in its construction, and no words ought to be rejected, if any meaning can be possibly put upon them. Every string should give its sound.” Heyer v. Bulluck, 210 N. C., 321.

We concur in the ruling of the court below that plaintiff’s proper deed would convey fee simple title to the land, subject to the dower right of plaintiff’s mother, as agreed, and that upon tender of deed plaintiff is entitled to recover the balance of the purchase price of the land.

Judgment affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Edmunds v. Edmunds
669 S.E.2d 874 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 2008)
Olive v. Biggs
170 S.E.2d 181 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1969)
First Union National Bank v. Bryant
125 S.E.2d 291 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1962)
FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK OF NC v. Bryant
125 S.E.2d 291 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1962)
Hubbard v. Wiggins
81 S.E.2d 630 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1954)
Marks v. Thomas
78 S.E.2d 340 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1953)
Voncannon v. Hudson Belk Co. of Asheboro, N. C., Inc.
73 S.E.2d 875 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1953)
Coppedge v. Coppedge
66 S.E.2d 777 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1951)
First National Bank of Salisbury v. Brawley
58 S.E.2d 706 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1950)
Williams v. . Rand
28 S.E.2d 247 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1943)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
4 S.E.2d 880, 216 N.C. 349, 1939 N.C. LEXIS 165, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lee-v-lee-nc-1939.