Lee v. Kijakazi

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: May 5, 2025
• Docket: 5:21-cv-06624
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 8 A.L., Case No. 21-cv-06624-VKD

9 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 10 v. ATTORNEYS’ FEES

11 LELAND DUDEK, Re: Dkt. No. 21 Defendant. 12

13 14 I. BACKGROUND 15 Plaintiff A.L. filed this action for review of an unfavorable decision by the Commissioner 16 of Social Security (“Commissioner”).1 After the parties stipulated to a voluntary remand, the 17 Court remanded the matter and entered judgment for A.L. Dkt. Nos. 16-18. The Court 18 subsequently granted the parties’ stipulation to award attorneys’ fees in the amount of $9,000 to 19 A.L.’s counsel, Katherine Siegfried, pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). Dkt. 20 No. 20. In March 2025, following remand, the Commissioner issued a favorable decision 21 awarding A.L. past-due benefits in the amount of $184,176. Dkt. No. 21-6; see also Dkt. No. 21-2 22 ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 21-3 ¶ 4. 23 Ms. Siegfried now moves for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Dkt. No. 21. 24 She seeks an award of $37,844 pursuant to a contingency fee agreement with A.L. That 25 agreement provides that if A.L. is successful following an appeal, then A.L. “agree[d] that the fee 26

27 1 Leland Dudek, the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, is substituted for 1 for any appellate work will be up to twenty-five percent (25%) of all back benefits awarded in 2 [his] case.” Dkt. No. 21-5; see also Dkt. No. 21-2 ¶ 4. Ms. Siegfried states that she will reimburse 3 A.L. for the previous $9,000 EAJA fee award, leaving a net fee award of $28,844. Dkt. No. 21-2; 4 see also Dkt. No. 21-3 ¶ 9. 5 Ms. Siegfried avers that she served A.L. with a copy of the present motion for fees and her 6 accompanying declaration electronically and by U.S. mail. Dkt. no. 21-2 ¶¶ 9-10. Ms. Siegfried 7 has also submitted a declaration from A.L. supporting her fees motion. See Dkt. No. 21-3. The 8 Court has received no objection from A.L. The Commissioner filed a response, taking no position 9 on Ms. Siegfried’s fees motion. Dkt. No. 23. The motion is deemed suitable for determination 10 without oral argument. Civil L.R. 7-1(b). Upon consideration of the moving and responding 11 papers, the Court grants Ms. Siegfried’s motion. 12 II. DISCUSSION 13 When a court renders judgment favorable to a claimant represented by an attorney, “the 14 court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not 15 in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by 16 reason of such judgment[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). A court may award such fees even if the 17 court’s judgment did not immediately result in an award of past-due benefits. Butler v. Colvin, 18 No. 3:14-cv-02050-LB, 2017 WL 446290, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2017). Although a district 19 court may award fees under both the EAJA and § 406(b), “‘the claimant’s attorney must refund to 20 the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.’” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1144 n.3 (9th 21 Cir. 2009) (quoting Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002)). 22 Section 406(b) “does not displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by 23 which fees are set for successfully representing Social Security benefits claimants in court.” 24 Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. “Rather, § 406(b) calls for court review of such arrangements as an 25 independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases.” Id. “The 26 statute does not specify how courts should determine whether a requested fee is reasonable” and 27 “provides only that the fee must not exceed 25% of the past-due benefits awarded.” Crawford, 1 Agreements are unenforceable to the extent that they provide for fees exceeding 25 percent of the 2 past-due benefits.”). The attorney seeking fees must show that the fees sought are reasonable for 3 the services rendered. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. 4 In determining a reasonable fee award under § 406(b), courts “must respect ‘the primacy of 5 lawful attorney-client fee agreements,’ . . . ‘looking first to the contingent fee agreement, then 6 testing it for reasonableness.’” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793, 7 808). In this context, reasonableness does not depend on lodestar calculations, but upon “the 8 character of the representation and the results the representative achieved.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 9 808. Fees resulting from a contingent fee agreement are unreasonable and subject to reduction by 10 the court “if the attorney provided substandard representation or engaged in dilatory conduct in 11 order to increase the accrued amount of past-due benefits, or if the ‘benefits are large in 12 comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case.’” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148 13 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). Although the Supreme Court has “flatly rejected [a] lodestar 14 approach,” id., a court may require, “not as a basis for satellite litigation, but as an aid to the 15 court’s assessment of the reasonableness of the fee yielded by the fee agreement,” submission of 16 the requesting attorney’s records of the hours worked and normal hourly billing rate for non- 17 contingent fee cases. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. 18 Ms. Siegfried has demonstrated that the requested fees are reasonable for the services 19 rendered. Her contingency fee agreement with A.L. provides for fees within the 25% limit 20 imposed by § 406(b). Dkt. No. 21-5. Ms. Siegfried is seeking fees in an amount less than 25% of 21 A.L.’s past-due benefits award. She successfully pursued A.L.’s appeal in this Court, and 22 obtained a favorable result in which A.L. received substantial past-due benefits. Dkt. Nos. 21-6; 23 see also Dkt. No. 21-2 ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 21-3 ¶ 4. Nothing in the record suggests that Ms. Siegfried’s 24 performance was substandard, or that she engaged in dilatory conduct in order to increase the 25 amount of fees to be awarded. The Court finds no instances of undue delay. 26 Ms. Siegfried’s time records, which the Court has reviewed as an aid to the assessment of 27 the reasonableness of the requested fee, indicate that she spent 43.9 hours working on the present 1 hourly rate Ms. Siegfried says she currently charges for non-contingency/non-Social Security 2 matters, as discussed above, Gisbrecht and Crawford make clear that a lodestar analysis does not 3 drive the evaluation of fees under § 406(b). See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 806; Crawford, 586 F.3d 4 at 1149. Moreover, the Court recognizes that Ms. Siegfried assumed a risk of not recovering fees 5 by representing A.L. on a contingency basis since June 2021. See Dkt. No. 21-5. There is no 6 || indication that at that time, Ms. Siegfried could have known that A.L. would obtain a stipulation 7 and order remanding the case for further proceedings and that, years later, the agency ultimately 8 would find that A.L. was entitled to past-due benefits. 9 Accordingly, the Court finds that the requested fees are reasonable. 10 || 11. CONCLUSION 11 Based on the foregoing, Ms. Siegfried’s motion for fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is 12 || granted. The Court awards $37,844 in fees to Ms. Siegfried. Ms. Siegfried shall refund to A.L. 13 |} $9,000 in EAJA fees previously awarded. IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 15 Dated: May 5, 2025 16

Virginia K. DeMarchi Z 18 United States Magistrate Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28