Lee v. Kansas City Gas Co.

91 Mo. App. 612, 1902 Mo. App. LEXIS 320
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 20, 1902
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 91 Mo. App. 612 (Lee v. Kansas City Gas Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lee v. Kansas City Gas Co., 91 Mo. App. 612, 1902 Mo. App. LEXIS 320 (Mo. Ct. App. 1902).

Opinion

BROADDUS, J.

— The amended petition on which this ease was tried alleges: That on the fourteenth of January, 1898, the defendant corporation, through its agents, ordered the plaintiff to put in a gas pipe in the basement of a certain house in Kansas City, Missouri; that it was the duty of the defendant to furnish for his use reasonably safe appliances and materials, but that the defendant negligently furnished plaintiff with imperfect, unsafe and defective appliances and materials for doing said work; that defendant knew, or could have known by the exercise of ordinary care, of the unsafe and defective condition of said appliances and materials, and the danger arising from the use of the same; that the said materials and appliances were imperfect, unsafe and defective in that a tin strap, furnished plaintiff to be used by him in said work in fastening and holding said pipe to the ceiling, was rotten and not of ordinary strength, and that in place [615]*615of screws to be used in securing said tin strap, plaintiff was furnished with and directed to use wire nails, which said nails and the heads thereon were too small and not reasonably safe and sufficient for that use and rendered the work dangerous — plaintiff not knowing of said danger.

Plaintiff then proceeds to allege that it was the duty of the defendant to furnish him with a helper in said work, which it refused and neglected to do, although it knew, or might have known by the exercise of ordinary care, the danger attending its failure to provide such helper; that owing to the negligence of defendant in furnishing said unsafe, imperfect an! defective appliances and materials, and in failing to provide a helper, one end of said pipe, which said plaintiff was putting in, fell and struck the plaintiff whereby he was seriously and permanently injured.

The answer consists of a general denial, and an allegation of contributory negligence and that the plaintiff, knowing the danger, assumed the risk.

The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,490, which finding the court on motion set aside; from which action of the court in setting aside said verdict, plaintiff appealed. The court’s grounds for setting aside the verdict were as follows: ' “Eor the reason that the court erred in not giving instruction No. TSP asked by the defendant at the close of all the evidence, which said instruction No. ‘N’ asks that under the pleadings and evidence the verdict of the jury must be for the defendant; and for the further reason that the court is of the opinion that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which directly contributed to the injury.”

It will be seen that the plaintiff relies upon the fact that the defendant did not furnish him with a helper to assist him in putting in the pipes, and on the “imperfect, unsafe and defective appliances and materials” with which he was furnished to do the work. There are no allegations in the [616]*616petition going to sbow in what manner a helper was required by the necessities of the business, nor does it allege in what particular the plaintiff would have been protected from the danger which culminated in his injury, by the aid of a helper. The rules of pleading require that this should be done. Put after answer and trial the defect is waived. Yet the failure to state specifically the facts constituting this alleged dereliction of duty on the part of the defendant most certainly, in this case, left the circuit court in an embarrassing position during the trial; and to know just what evidence to admit and what to reject of that which was offered was a difficult matter and left the case, as to both the pleading and evidence, in an unsatisfactory condition in that respect The element of definiteness was wanting.

It was shown by the evidence that the plaintiff requested a helper to assist him in doing the work, which said helper the defendant failed to furnish; and there was evidence tending to show that a helper was necessary from the requirements of the work to be done. This was negligence. Harper v. Railroad, 47 Mo. 579; Stoddard v. Railway, 65 Mo. 514. But it is useless to cite authorities on the point — it is self-evident.. But there must be a casual connection between the act of negligence and the injury complained of. The petition did not allege, nor was it shown by the facts, what part a helper would take in the work; nor in what manner the plaintiff would have been protected by having one to assist him. In a general way, there was evidence that it would have been safer. Of course, we can conceive that if a helper had been on hand he might have held the pipe while it was being attached to the ceiling of the basement and the plaintiff’s injury would have been avoided. This, at most, was only a probability. But in view of the evidence of the plaintiff that he considered the pipe was safely attached to the ceiling just before it became detached, the probabilities are equal, if not stronger, that he would not have called upon his helper [617]*617to bold the pipe in place, even if be bad bad such helper, and as a necessary consequence the injury would have resulted as it did. But this is not all: The evidence in the ease shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the want of a helper was not the producing cause of the injury; and that it did not in the least contribute towards it; but that the appliances and materials and the manner in which they were used were the direct, proximate and only cause of plaintiff’s injury, and if the defendant is to be held liable for said injury, it must be on that ground alone.

Eor the purpose of convenience we will adopt a statement of the facts bearing on this branch of the case made by Judge Smith in the opinion written by him and delivered by the court on the sixth day of May, 1901.

“Plaintiff, who was an experienced gasfitter in the employment of the defendant, was ordered by the latter’s foreman to put a gas stove and the necessary pipe in a certain building. He first went to the building and after ascertaining where the stove was to be located and where the pipe would have to be placed in order to make the required connections, and the length of such pipe, he returned to defendant’s shop for the stove, pipe and other material needed. He applied to the foreman for screws with which to fasten the straps that were to hold up the pipe. The foreman referred him to the storekeeper, but on applying to the latter he found there were no screws in stock. He then went to the shop and there selected the necessary straps and the nails required to fasten the same. The straps were scattered around on the benches and the nails were in the kegs. As the plaintiff expressed it in his testimony: ‘The material was there in the shop and you were supposed to go and help yourself.’ The joists in the building to be fitted with the pipe were ordinary pine or oak, two by twelve, and were not plastered over; and it is not disputed but that the straps could be sufficiently fastened thereto by nails. The plaintiff further testified that before [618]*618the time of the accident he had found that in some places the nails would give way and sometimes they would not; and that sometimes he would have to clinch them over the eye-hole in the straps, so that the heads would not pull thiough them.

“It further appears that in putting up the pipe in the building the plaintiff fastened one strip securely with the nails he had.

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Bluebook (online)
91 Mo. App. 612, 1902 Mo. App. LEXIS 320, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lee-v-kansas-city-gas-co-moctapp-1902.