Lee v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, S.D. Georgia
• Decided: February 11, 2025
• Docket: 4:24-cv-00124
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION LESLIE CAROL LEE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CV424-124 ) COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL ) SECURITY, ) ) Defendant. ) ORDER Plaintiff filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), seeking $8,500.18 in fees. Doc. 21. Before the expiration of Defendant’s time to respond, see S.D. Ga. L. Civ. R. 7.5, Plaintiff filed an Amended Motion seeking $8,075.17 in fees. Doc. 23. In it, Plaintiff explains that the parties conferred and “agreed to settle for the amount requested,” explicitly representing that Defendant does not object to the Amended Motion. Id. at 2. “Under the EAJA, a party that prevails against the United States in court may be awarded fees . . . if the government's position in the litigation was not ‘substantially justified.’” Jackson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 601 F.3d 1268, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)). A plaintiff who wins remand pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is a “prevailing party.” Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S.

292, 300-01 (1993). A prevailing party may file a motion for attorney’s fees under the EAJA up to 90 days after entry of judgment. Newsome v.

Shalala, 8 F.3d 775, 779 (11th Cir. 1993). Where an award is appropriate, the Court must also determine whether the number of hours counsel claims to have expended on the matter, counsel's requested

hourly rate, and the resulting fees are all reasonable. See Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 773 (11th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff is a prevailing party since, on the Defendant’s motion, the

Court remanded the case to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. See doc. 18 (Consent Motion to Remand); doc. 19 (Order); doc. 20 (Judgment). Her request for fees is timely. Compare doc.

20 (Judgment entered November 18, 2024) with doc. 21 (Original Motion filed January 28, 2025); doc. 23 (Amended Motion filed February 10, 2025). By its consent to the Amended Motion, Defendant does not appear

to contend that its position was substantially justified. See doc. 23 at 2; doc. 24 at 1 (alleging the Government’s position was “not substantially justified”); see also Stratton v. Bowen, 827 F.2d 1447, 1450 (11th Cir. 1987) (“The government bears the burden of showing that its position was substantially justified.”). Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to an award

pursuant to the EAJA. The Court must then determine whether the requested fees are

reasonable. EAJA fees are determined under the “lodestar” method by determining the number of hours reasonably expended on the matter multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Jean, 863 F.2d at 773. Under

the EAJA, fees are “based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of services furnished,” not to exceed $125 per hour unless the Court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor

justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). Plaintiff originally asserted that an hourly rate of $250.32 for attorney time and an hourly rate of $75.00 for paralegal time are appropriate in this case, considering

the cost-of-living increase as measured by the Consumer Price Index. Doc. 22 at 2. Applying those rates, the original Motion then seeks $7,960.18 for 31.8 hours of attorney time, and $540.00 for 7.2 hours of

paralegal time for a total EAJA request of $4,500.18. Id. The Amended Motion explains that the parties conferred and agreed to “settle this motion” for a total fee award of $8,075.17. Doc. 24 at 2. Although the parties do not provide the basis for this $425.01 reduction, given the Defendant’s consent to the reduced award, the Court

finds the requested fee award reasonable. See doc. 24-3 (attorney and staff ledger of time expended on matter); doc. 24-2 (Consumer Price Index

table and rate calculation); Holton v. Saul, 2019 WL 6040184, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 13, 2019) (finding an hourly rate of $75 for paralegals reasonable).

Plaintiff asks that the Court order the government to pay the EAJA award directly to Plaintiff’s counsel. Doc. 23 at 1; see also doc. 24-1 (EAJA Fee assignment). In Astrue v. Ratliff, the Supreme Court held that an

EAJA award “is payable to the litigant and is therefore subject to a Government offset to satisfy a pre-existing debt that the litigant owes the United States.” 560 U.S. 586, 589 (2010). Based on Ratliff, the proper

course is to “award the EAJA fees directly to Plaintiff as the prevailing party and remain silent regarding the direction of payment of those fees.” Bostic v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 858 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1306 (M.D. Fla.

2011). Therefore, the Court awards the EAJA fees to Plaintiff, subject to offset by any debt owed by Plaintiff to the United States, and leaves it “to the discretion of the government to accept Plaintiff's assignment of EAJA Fees and pay fees directly to Plaintiff[’s] counsel after a determination that Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt.” Bostic, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 1306; see also Robinson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2015 WL 176027, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 2015) (allowing EAJA fees “to be paid by virtue of a fee assignment, to plaintiff's counsel by the defendant if the plaintiff does

not owe a debt to the United States Department of the Treasury’). Based on the above, the Amended Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act is GRANTED. Doc. 23. The original Motion is DISMISSED AS MOOT. Doc. 21. The Court awards EAJA fees totaling $8,075.17 to Plaintiff, subject to offset by any debt owed by Plaintiff to the United States, and leaves it to the discretion of the Government to accept Plaintiff's assignment of EAJA Fees after a determination that Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt. SO ORDERED, this 11th day of February, 2025. ( Laighond ee CHRISTOPHER L. RAY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA