Lee v. Armor Correctional Health Services

District Court, E.D. Wisconsin·Decided May 11, 2020·No. 2:19-cv-00614·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

LAVALL T. LEE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 19-C-614

NURSE BRITTANY, MILWAUKEE COUNTY JAIL, and ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH SERVICES,

Defendants.

ORDER

Plaintiff Lavall Lee, who is currently incarcerated at Racine Correctional Institution and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. Plaintiff’s case was reassigned to this court on February 11, 2020. On May 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint. The court will grant Plaintiff’s motion to file an amended complaint. This matter comes before the court for screening Plaintiff’s amended complaint and on his motion for default judgment. SCREENING OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT The court has a duty to review the complaint and dismiss the case if it appears that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Hoskins v. Polestra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003). In screening a complaint, I must determine whether the complaint complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and states at least plausible claims for which relief may be granted. To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, Plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It must be at least sufficient to provide notice to each defendant of what he or she is accused of doing, as well as when and where the alleged actions or inactions occurred, and the nature and extent of any damage or injury the actions or inactions caused. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter “that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is

inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556. “[T]he complaint’s allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555 (internal quotations omitted). ALLEGATIONS OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT Plaintiff was housed at Milwaukee County Jail for a period of time between January and December 2018. On April 3, 2018, Plaintiff alleges he completed a medical services request form, as required by the jail, to complain he was coughing up blood, had blood in his stool, and had severe stomach pains. He was given Tylenol and charged a $20 medical co-payment. On April 15, 2018, Plaintiff again complained of the same symptoms—both verbally and through another

medical services request form. He claims he was charged another $20 co-payment, but did not receive treatment to determine what caused his condition. On April 16, 2018, Plaintiff completed a third medical request form, noting his condition had become more severe. He was again charged a $20 co-payment, but did not receive treatment until April 24, 2018, when only his blood pressure and temperature were taken. Plaintiff proceeded to file an inmate grievance on May 7, 2018, claiming he was denied adequate medical treatment. Per policy and procedure, Plaintiff claims his grievance should

have—but did not—result in Plaintiff being examined by a nurse practitioner or a doctor. Plaintiff then submitted three more requests for medical services, on May 14, 22, and 26, 2018. Each time he was seen by a nurse and charged a $20 co-payment, but alleges his primary medical complaints were ignored. Plaintiff filed another inmate grievance on June 18, 2018. It was reviewed by Nurse Brittany, who deemed it “unfounded” because Plaintiff refused medication. Plaintiff, however, alleges this medication was for his blood pressure and unrelated to the symptoms that were causing his repeated requests for treatment. Plaintiff filed a seventh medical request on August 13, 2018. He was charged a $20 co-payment and scheduled to see a doctor. Plaintiff suffered a medical emergency on August 24, 2018. Correctional Officer Hebbe

saw Plaintiff bleeding and unable to move; she notified health services, but no one responded. At some point later, Nurse Brittany told Hebbe that she was aware of Plaintiff’s medical emergency, but there was nothing she could do for Plaintiff. Plaintiff proceeded to file an inmate grievance. On September 5, 2018, a doctor diagnosed Plaintiff: his gastrointestinal tract was infected with H. pylori bacteria, which caused duodenitis. Plaintiff was also diagnosed with diverticulitis. Plaintiff claims the doctor said these conditions could have been avoided if he was treated earlier. The doctor also diagnosed Plaintiff with gastritis and internal hemorrhoids. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff has asserted claims for violations of his constitutional rights against Nurse Brittany [last name unknown], the Milwaukee Jail, and Armor Correctional Health Services (ACHS), a private corporation that provides health care to jail inmates under a contract with the County. THE COURT’S ANALYSIS Estelle v. Gamble held that prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they are

deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976). A claim for deliberate indifference must establish “(1) an objectively serious medical condition; and (2) an official’s deliberate indifference to that condition.” Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff has been allowed to proceed on his claim that Nurse Brittany was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical condition. See Dkt. Nos. 22, 42. At issue in Plaintiff’s amended complaint is whether he has stated a claim against the Milwaukee County Jail, ACHS, or both. The claim against the Milwaukee County Jail is actually a claim against the County, since the jail is not a separate legal entity. To allege that Milwaukee County or ACHS, a private corporation, is liable for the conduct of prison officials under Monell v. Department of Social

Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), Plaintiff must show “that the entity’s official policy, widespread custom, or action by an official with policy-making authority was the ‘moving force’ behind his constitutional injury.” Dixon v. Cty. of Cook, 819 F.3d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting City of Canton v.

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Related

Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
City of Canton v. Harris
489 U.S. 378 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
James Hoskins v. John Poelstra
320 F.3d 761 (Seventh Circuit, 2003)
Gomez v. Randle
680 F.3d 859 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Service
577 F.3d 816 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Earnest D. Shields v. Illinois Department of Correct
746 F.3d 782 (Seventh Circuit, 2014)
Kevin Dixon v. Cook County, Illinois
819 F.3d 343 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)