CoNNOR, J.
Chapter 120, Public Laws of North Carolina, 1929 (tbe North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act), became effective as to all its provisions and for all its purposes on 1 July, 1929. The act since said date has been and, as amended from time to time, is now in full force and effect as tbe law of this State. It was enacted by tbe General Assembly in the exercise of its police power, and is constitutional and valid in all respects.
Hanks v. Utilities Co.,
204 N. C., 155, 167 S. E., 560;
Heavner v. Lincolnton,
202 N. C., 400, 162 S. E., 909;
Hagler v. Highway Commission,
200 N. C., 733, 158 S. E., 383. Tbe purpose of tbe act is to provide compensation for an employee in this State who has suffered an injury by accident which arose out of and in tbe course of bis employment, tbe compensation to be paid by tbe employer, in accordance with tbe provisions of tbe act, without regard to
whether the accident and resulting injury was caused by the negligence of the employer, as theretofore defined by the law of this State. See
Winslow v. Carolina Conference Association,
211 N. C., 571, 191 S. E., 403. The right of the employee to compensation, and the liability of the employer therefor, are founded upon mutual concessions, as provided in the act, by which each surrenders rights and waives remedies which he theretofore had under the law of this State. The act establishes a sound public policy, and is just to both employer and employee.
Conrad v. Foundry Co.,
198 N. C., 723, 153 S. E., 266. As administered by the North Carolina Industrial Commission, in accordance with its provisions, the act has proven satisfactory to the public and to both employers and employees in this State with respect to matters covered by its provisions.
It is provided by section 2, paragraph (a) of the act that the term “employment” as used therein includes all private employments in which five or more employees are regularly employed in the same business or establishment. The act is applicable to all employers and employees in this State, except those specifically excepted or exempted from its provisions, sec. 14. A's to all employments not specifically excepted or exempted, in the absence of a notice in writing or in print, to the contrary, given in apt time to the North Carolina Industrial Commission, which is created by the act and charged with its administration, it is conclusively presumed that both the employer and the employee have accepted the provisions of the act, the one to pay and the other to accept compensation for an injury suffered by the employee by an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment. In such ease both the employer and the employee are bound by the provisions of the act. Sec. 4, N. C. Code of 1935, sec. 8081 (k).
On the facts alleged in the complaint, and admitted in the answer, and agreed at the trial of the instant case, as appears from the stipulation in the record, both the plaintiff, as an employee and the defendant, American Enka Corporation, as an employer, are conclusively presumed to have accepted the provisions of the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act, and are bound by said provisions with respect to injuries suffered by the plaintiff, by accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment, not including, however, a disease in any form which did not result naturally and unavoidably from the accident. Sec. 2, N. C. Code of 1935, 8081 (i), paragraph (f).
Under the provisions of the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act an employee, when both he and his employer are subject to the provisions of the act, has a right to compensation in accordance with its provisions only for an injury as defined in paragraph (f) of section 2 of the act, N. C. Code of 1935, sec. 8081 (i), which is as follows:
“ ‘Injury’ and ‘personal injury’ shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of tbe employment, and shall not include a disease in any form except when it results naturally and unavoidably from the accident.”
Such injury is compensable under the provisions of the act, without regard to whether it was the result of an accident which was caused by the negligence of the employer. An injury is not compensable, however, under the provisions of the act where it was not the result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of the employment, nor where the injury is a disease in any form, unless such disease resulted naturally and unavoidably from an accident.
By his acceptance of the act as binding upon him in all its provisions, an employee surrenders his right in the event his injury was caused by the negligence of his employer, without fault on his part, to recover of his employer damages for his injury to be assessed by a jury in accordance with well settled principles of law, and the employer agrees to pay compensation to his employee for his injury, without regard to whether the injury was caused by his negligence, and in such case surrenders his right to invoke certain defenses which are well recognized in the law of this State as bars to a recovery by the employee of damages for his injury, although the injury was caused by the negligence of the employer. The validity of the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act has been upheld because of the mutual concessions of employer and employee under its provisions. The act is not compulsory. It is expressly provided therein that it shall be binding on an employer and an employee only when it has been accepted by both. Either may reject its provisions as applicable to him.
The remedy provided by the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act for the enforcement by both an employer and an employee of their mutual rights under its provisions is a proceeding begun and prosecuted before the North Carolina Industrial Commission, which is created by the act. It is provided in the act that processes and procedure in a proceeding before the Industrial Commission shall be as summary and simple as reasonably may be. The proceeding is conducted under rules prescribed by .the Industrial Commission and is usually expeditious and satisfactory in its results to both employer and employee. An award made by the Industrial Commission in accordance with its findings of fact and conclusions of law is ordinarily conclusive and final. Only its conclusions of law may be reviewed by the courts on an appeal from its award in a proceeding begun and prosecuted before the Industrial Commission for compensation under the provisions of the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act.
The question presented by this appeal is whether in a case where both an employee and his employer are subject to the provisions of the
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CoNNOR, J.
Chapter 120, Public Laws of North Carolina, 1929 (tbe North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act), became effective as to all its provisions and for all its purposes on 1 July, 1929. The act since said date has been and, as amended from time to time, is now in full force and effect as tbe law of this State. It was enacted by tbe General Assembly in the exercise of its police power, and is constitutional and valid in all respects.
Hanks v. Utilities Co.,
204 N. C., 155, 167 S. E., 560;
Heavner v. Lincolnton,
202 N. C., 400, 162 S. E., 909;
Hagler v. Highway Commission,
200 N. C., 733, 158 S. E., 383. Tbe purpose of tbe act is to provide compensation for an employee in this State who has suffered an injury by accident which arose out of and in tbe course of bis employment, tbe compensation to be paid by tbe employer, in accordance with tbe provisions of tbe act, without regard to
whether the accident and resulting injury was caused by the negligence of the employer, as theretofore defined by the law of this State. See
Winslow v. Carolina Conference Association,
211 N. C., 571, 191 S. E., 403. The right of the employee to compensation, and the liability of the employer therefor, are founded upon mutual concessions, as provided in the act, by which each surrenders rights and waives remedies which he theretofore had under the law of this State. The act establishes a sound public policy, and is just to both employer and employee.
Conrad v. Foundry Co.,
198 N. C., 723, 153 S. E., 266. As administered by the North Carolina Industrial Commission, in accordance with its provisions, the act has proven satisfactory to the public and to both employers and employees in this State with respect to matters covered by its provisions.
It is provided by section 2, paragraph (a) of the act that the term “employment” as used therein includes all private employments in which five or more employees are regularly employed in the same business or establishment. The act is applicable to all employers and employees in this State, except those specifically excepted or exempted from its provisions, sec. 14. A's to all employments not specifically excepted or exempted, in the absence of a notice in writing or in print, to the contrary, given in apt time to the North Carolina Industrial Commission, which is created by the act and charged with its administration, it is conclusively presumed that both the employer and the employee have accepted the provisions of the act, the one to pay and the other to accept compensation for an injury suffered by the employee by an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment. In such ease both the employer and the employee are bound by the provisions of the act. Sec. 4, N. C. Code of 1935, sec. 8081 (k).
On the facts alleged in the complaint, and admitted in the answer, and agreed at the trial of the instant case, as appears from the stipulation in the record, both the plaintiff, as an employee and the defendant, American Enka Corporation, as an employer, are conclusively presumed to have accepted the provisions of the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act, and are bound by said provisions with respect to injuries suffered by the plaintiff, by accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment, not including, however, a disease in any form which did not result naturally and unavoidably from the accident. Sec. 2, N. C. Code of 1935, 8081 (i), paragraph (f).
Under the provisions of the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act an employee, when both he and his employer are subject to the provisions of the act, has a right to compensation in accordance with its provisions only for an injury as defined in paragraph (f) of section 2 of the act, N. C. Code of 1935, sec. 8081 (i), which is as follows:
“ ‘Injury’ and ‘personal injury’ shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of tbe employment, and shall not include a disease in any form except when it results naturally and unavoidably from the accident.”
Such injury is compensable under the provisions of the act, without regard to whether it was the result of an accident which was caused by the negligence of the employer. An injury is not compensable, however, under the provisions of the act where it was not the result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of the employment, nor where the injury is a disease in any form, unless such disease resulted naturally and unavoidably from an accident.
By his acceptance of the act as binding upon him in all its provisions, an employee surrenders his right in the event his injury was caused by the negligence of his employer, without fault on his part, to recover of his employer damages for his injury to be assessed by a jury in accordance with well settled principles of law, and the employer agrees to pay compensation to his employee for his injury, without regard to whether the injury was caused by his negligence, and in such case surrenders his right to invoke certain defenses which are well recognized in the law of this State as bars to a recovery by the employee of damages for his injury, although the injury was caused by the negligence of the employer. The validity of the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act has been upheld because of the mutual concessions of employer and employee under its provisions. The act is not compulsory. It is expressly provided therein that it shall be binding on an employer and an employee only when it has been accepted by both. Either may reject its provisions as applicable to him.
The remedy provided by the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act for the enforcement by both an employer and an employee of their mutual rights under its provisions is a proceeding begun and prosecuted before the North Carolina Industrial Commission, which is created by the act. It is provided in the act that processes and procedure in a proceeding before the Industrial Commission shall be as summary and simple as reasonably may be. The proceeding is conducted under rules prescribed by .the Industrial Commission and is usually expeditious and satisfactory in its results to both employer and employee. An award made by the Industrial Commission in accordance with its findings of fact and conclusions of law is ordinarily conclusive and final. Only its conclusions of law may be reviewed by the courts on an appeal from its award in a proceeding begun and prosecuted before the Industrial Commission for compensation under the provisions of the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act.
The question presented by this appeal is whether in a case where both an employee and his employer are subject to the provisions of the
North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act, neither having rejected said provisions, it being conclusively presumed for that reason that both have accepted said provisions, and where the employee has suffered an injury while engaged in the performance of the duties of his employment, which is not compensable under the provisions of the act, because the injury was not by accident which arose out of and in the course of the employment, but is a disease which did not result naturally and unavoidably from an accident, but was the result of‘conditions which are not attributable to negligence on the part of the employer, has the employee the right to recover damages of the employer to be assessed by a jury, and for that purpose to maintain an action in the Superior Court against the employer ?
The answer to this question requires a consideration of a provision of the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act which is as follows :
“The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee, where he and his employer have accepted the provisions of this act, respectively, to pay and accept compensation on account of personal injury or death by accident, shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representatives, parents, dependents, or next of kin, as against his employer, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service, or death.” Sec. 11, N. 0. Code of 1935, sec. 8081 (r).
When the plaintiff in this action failed to reject the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act, as applicable to his employment by the defendant, American Enka Corporation, and thereby became subject to its provisions, in consideration of the liability assumed by the said defendant to pay to him compensation for an injury which he might suffer by an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, without regard to whether the accident and resulting injury were caused by its negligence, he surrendered his right to recover of^ the defendant damages for an injury caused by the negligence of his employer, and waived his right to maintain an action in the Superior Courts of this State to recover such damages. See
Pilley v. Cotton Mills,
201 N. C., 426, 160 S. E., 479, and
Francis v. Wood Turning Co.,
208 N. C., 517, 181 S. E., 628.
The validity of the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act, by which rights are conferred upon employees and liabilities imposed upon employers in this State upon the principle of mutual concessions, is largely dependent upon the foregoing provision of the act.
In view of said provision there is no error in the judgment dismissing this action. The judgment is
Affirmed.