Lee v. Allison

District Court, N.D. California·Decided June 14, 2022·No. 5:21-cv-01633·Unknown

Opinion

WILBERT H LEE, Case No. 21-cv-01633-HSG

Plaintiff, ORDER OF PARTIAL SERVICE v.

KATHLEEN ALLISON, et al., Defendants.

Plaintiff, an inmate at San Quentin State Prison (“SQSP”), has filed a pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Dkt. No. 8)1 is now before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A. Standard of Review A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See United States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). A pleading that offers only labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement does not suffice. Id. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). B. Amended Complaint Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were involved in the decision to transfer over 100 inmates, some of whom were infected with COVID-19, from CIM to SQSP in May 2020. He alleges that Defendants failed to take adequate safety precautions before, during, and after the transfer, including failing to test the transferring prisoners or screen them for symptoms at the appropriate times, failing to implement distancing measures on the transfer busses, and failing to test and isolate the transferred prisoners upon arrival. He alleges that SQSP was an inappropriate prison for sending the prisoners, because it has “exceedingly poor ventilation, extraordinary close living quarters, [and] inadequate sanitation due to its antiquated infrastructure and overcrowding.” Dkt. 8-5 at 9. Plaintiff names as Defendants California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) director Allison; CDCR Secretary Diaz; CDCR associate director Davis; SQSP warden Ron Broomfield; federal receiver Kelso; SQSP chief medical officer Pachynski; California Institute for Men (“CIM”)2 chief medical officer Escobell; CDCR director of medical services doctor Steven Tharratt; SQSP Healthcare chief executive director Clarence Cryer; CIM warden Dean Borders; and California Correctional Health Care Services (“CCHCS”) doctor Joseph Bick. Dkt. No. 8-5 at 5-7. Plaintiff sues all Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. Dkt. No. 8-5 at 7. The amended complaint alleges that defendant Kelso “ordered or helped facilitate the transfer . . . with the approval of” defendants Diaz, Allison, and Davis; that defendants Escobell and Tharratt ordered that the transferring prisoners not be retested the day before the transfer; that defendant Bick was “responsible for all transfer and testing protocols”; that defendant Borders approved the[] transfers of untested” prisoners; and that defendant Davis, “with the approval of” defendants Allison and Bick, “decided to disregard the . . . social distancing guidelines” by placing more than 19 prisoners on each bus. Dkt. No. 8-5 at 9-10, 12. It alleges that defendants Broomfield, Cryer, and Pachynski “chose not to implement . . . basic safety measures” to prevent spread of the virus upon the arrival of the transferring prisoners at SQSP. Id. at 13. It also alleges that defendants Diaz and Allison were “well aware of the concerns raised” regarding the transfer. Id. at 12. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions caused an outbreak of COVID-19 at SQSP, leading to his contracting the disease on June 29, 2020, and that he “continues to experience adverse effects from the COVID-19 virus.” Dkt. 8-5 at 14. Plaintiff attaches records pertaining to his grievances; a document showing his positive test results for COVID-19 on June 29, 2020; news articles about the transfer; and a report by the Office of the Inspector General titled COVID-19 Review Series Part Three: California Correctional Health Care Services and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Caused a Public Health Disaster at San Quentin State Prison When They Transferred Medically Vulnerable Incarcerated Persons from the California Institution for Men Without Taking Proper Safeguards. Dkt. 8-5 at 22-96. Plaintiff alleges the above actions and inactions violated the Eighth Amendment. He seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and costs of suit. C. Legal Claims The allegations regarding the May 2020 transfer of CIM inmates into SQSP state official is deliberately indifferent if he or she knows that prisoner faces substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it). Plaintiff is suing each defendant individually and “in his [or her] official capacity.” Dkt. No. 8-5 at 7. The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution bars a person from suing a state in federal court without the state’s consent. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100 (1984). State officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” under Section 1983 because “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus, such a suit is therefore no different from a suit against the state itself. Id. Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s claims for monetary relief to the extent that they are based on acts by Defendants in their official capacities. See id. The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims for damages against Defendants in their official capacities. The Court also DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Tharratt. The Court understands, as the Attorney General has represented to another court in this district, that “[t]o the best of [the

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Related

West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
491 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)