Lee McKine, Jr. v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 18, 2025
• Docket: 07-24-00218-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-24-00218-CR

LEE MCKINE, JR., APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the 364th District Court Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. DC-2O24-CR-1167, Honorable William R. Eichman II, Presiding

June 18, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.

A jury convicted Appellant, Lee McKine, Jr., of the murder1 of Alexandria Garcia

and assessed punishment at life imprisonment. Appellant’s counsel has filed a motion to

withdraw, supported by an Anders2 brief. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and

affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(3).

2 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). BACKGROUND

Early in the morning of September 17, 2002, Appellant was at an after-hours club

located in a storage unit on the outskirts of Lubbock, Texas. While there, Appellant and

others got in a fight. The dispute escalated and spilled into the parking lot. Security

camera video showed Appellant brandishing and possibly firing a handgun described as

an AK-47 style pistol.

Appellant left the club with two female companions. As Appellant drove, he fired

his handgun at an automobile occupied by some of his opponents from the club fight.

One shot struck Garcia, a backseat passenger. Garcia was pronounced dead at a nearby

hospital.

Meanwhile, Appellant and his two companions went to a home where they hid the

firearm under a mattress. They then returned to the club to retrieve Appellant’s phone.

En route, sheriff’s deputies stopped Appellant for a traffic violation, and he was arrested

on an outstanding warrant arising from another matter. His two passengers were allowed

to return home, where they posted social media videos dancing with Appellant’s firearm.

Law enforcement’s investigation led to Appellant’s two female companions. Both

identified Appellant as the shooter. Both received testimonial immunity and testified at

trial.

Appellant pleaded not guilty. After the close of evidence, the jury quickly returned

with a guilty verdict. At punishment, Appellant pleaded true to two enhancement

allegations that raised the sentencing range from 5–99 years to 25–99 years. The jury

assessed life imprisonment, and the trial court imposed sentence accordingly. Appellant

filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled by operation of law. 2 ANALYSIS

In support of her motion to withdraw, appellate counsel certifies that she conducted

a conscientious examination of the record and, in her opinion, the record reflects no

reversible error upon which an appeal can be predicated. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Via an explanatory letter to

Appellant, counsel provided Appellant with her motion to withdraw and a copy of her

Anders brief. In a notice filed with the Court, counsel certified that a copy of the record

was delivered to Appellant. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–20, 320 n.22 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2014) (specifying counsel’s obligations on the filing of a motion to withdraw

supported by an Anders brief). By letter, the Court also advised Appellant of the right to

file a pro se response to counsel’s Anders brief. Appellant filed a response presenting a

narrative of background facts and expressing his concerns with trial procedure.

We have carefully reviewed counsel’s Anders brief and Appellant’s pro se

response and conducted an independent review of the record to determine whether there

are any nonfrivolous issues which might support an appeal. See Penson v. Ohio, 488

U.S. 75, 80, 109 S. Ct. 346, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at

409; Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). Based on this

review, we conclude there are no grounds requiring reversal of Appellant’s conviction or

sentence.

Although we affirm the conviction, the judgment contains one error requiring

correction. The nunc pro tunc judgment of conviction orders an additional fee will be

added if court costs are not paid within thirty-one days of this judgment. Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure article 102.030(a) requires convicted defendants to pay a $15

3 reimbursement fee if they pay any fines, court costs, or restitution more than thirty-one

days after judgment. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.030(a).

The judgment nunc pro tunc was signed June 21, 2024; Appellant’s notice of

appeal was filed one day earlier. A defendant’s appeal suspends the duty to pay fines,

court costs, and restitution, making assessment of a time payment fee premature before

the appellate mandate issues. Dulin v. State, 620 S.W.3d 129, 132–33 (Tex. Crim. App.

2021).

We possess authority to modify an incorrect judgment when we have the

necessary information to do so. Campos-Dowd v. State, No. 07-20-00342-CR, 2021 Tex.

App. LEXIS 4553, at *7 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 9, 2021, no pet.) (per curiam) (citing

TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b)). Since mandate has not yet issued, we delete the time payment

fee from the judgment without prejudice to subsequent assessment. See Pruitt v. State,

646 S.W.3d 879, 885–86 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2022, no pet.).

CONCLUSION

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted. As modified, the trial court’s judgment

nunc pro tunc is affirmed.3

Lawrence M. Doss Justice

Do not publish.

3 Counsel shall, within five days after this opinion is handed down, send Appellant a copy of the

opinion and judgment, along with notification of Appellant’s right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4. This duty is an informational one, not a representational one. It is ministerial in nature, does not involve legal advice, and exists after this Court grants counsel’s motion to withdraw. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 411 n.33. 4