Lee Joseph Reddic, Sr. v. Larry Reddic

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: March 25, 2009
• Docket: 07-08-00316-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

NO. 07-08-0316-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL D

MARCH 25, 2009

______________________________

LEE JOSEPH REDDIC, SR., APPELLANT

V.

LARRY REDDIC, APPELLEE

_________________________________

FROM THE 99^TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;

NO. 2006-537,398; HONORABLE WILLIAM C. SOWDER, JUDGE

_______________________________

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.

 

CONCURRING OPINION

          I join in the Court’s opinion and write separately simply to point out another reason for affirming the trial court’s judgment. As the Court states, all of appellant Lee Joseph Reddic, Sr.’s issues on appeal focus on the precept that limitations does not begin to run against a co-tenant until the adverse co-tenant repudiates the co-tenancy. Appellee Larry Reddic cites Republic Production Co. v. Lee, 132 Tex. 254, 121 S.W.2d 973, 978 (Tex. 1938) for the proposition that a recorded conveyance inconsistent with a non-possessing co-tenant’s title, followed by possession, may serve to give the co-tenant the required notice of repudiation. Gossett v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 436 S.W.2d 416, 420-21 (Tex.Civ.App.–Tyler 1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.), which the Court cites, recognizes the same proposition. I believe the trial court’s judgment can be sustained on the basis of those holdings, apart from the rationale that the property was the sole management community property of Rose Mae Cotton.

James T. Campbell

                                                                                                Justice

N>Id. at 938. The situation before us is akin to that in Quin. Here, as there, appellant failed to explain to the trial court, via evidence or argument, "the distinctions and differences in approach between a neurologist and [psychiatrist] . . . prior to a ruling on the motion. . . ." ⁽⁴⁾ Id. Nor can we conclude that such differences were so patently apparent that they did not have to be stated. Id. Given this, "we perceive no harm suffered by appellant due to the court's [alleged] refusal to appoint a neurologist." Id.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment entered below.

Brian Quinn

Justice

Do not publish.

1. John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment. tex. gov't code ann. §75.002(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2002).

2.

Though the record indicates that Dr. Shaw was a psychiatrist, it does not reveal whether he was also a neurologist. That would seem pertinent to the extent appellant argues he was entitled to an examination by a neurologist as well as a psychiatrist. For purposes of this appeal, however, we will assume that Shaw is not a neurologist.

3.

Immediately before trial and in relation to another pretrial motion, appellant represented to the court that it denied his request to be examined by a neurologist. Yet, he did not cite to any particular order; nor did we find one in the record before us. Instead, we can only deduce that appellant assumed the trial court overruled that aspect of his motion.

4.

Appellant's attempt to explain those differences for the first time in his appellate brief via references to several books comes too late. Simply put, they were not grounds presented below as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a). See Oulare v. State, 76 S.W.3d 231, 233 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (holding that the specific grounds for the objection must be stated to preserve the complaint for appeal). Nor do we find evidence of record indicating that Dr. Shaw could not or would not detect maladies which a neurologist could or would. In other words, if a psychiatrist (who is a trained medical doctor) could perform tests like those which a neurologist could perform there may be no need for the appointment of a neurologist.