LEE

16 I. & N. Dec. 305
CourtBoard of Immigration Appeals
DecidedJuly 1, 1977
DocketID 2606
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 16 I. & N. Dec. 305 (LEE) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Board of Immigration Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
LEE, 16 I. & N. Dec. 305 (bia 1977).

Opinion

Interim Decision #2606

MATTER OF LEE

In Visa Petition Proceedings A 20929617 -

A-20929618 A-20929619 Decided by Board August 18, 1977 Under Korean law, the relationship created between a child born out of wedlock and his father by "recognition" through registration in the Korean Family Registry is identical in all relevant respects to that between a father and child born during marriage. Since the rights and duties flowing from each of the relationships is identical, a "recognized" child is a "legitimated" child under section 101(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Where, as here, the recognition occurred prior to the eighteenth birthday of the children, they are eligible for issuance of immigrant visas under section 203(a)(2) of the Act. ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: Pro cc BY: Wilson, Acting Chairman; Maniatis and Maguire, Board Members. Board Member Appleman dissenting.

These cases are before the Board on a motion for reopening and reconsideration of our decision of September 7, 1976, in which we affirmed the decision of the District Director denying the visa petitions on the ground that the petitioner's sons, although "recognized" under Korean law by registration as the legal children of the petitioner in the *Korean Family Registry, were not "legitimated" for the purposes of section 101(b) of the Act. The petitioner now contends that we have misconstrued Korean Iaw, and that the relationship created by "recogni- tion" brings into effect identical rights and duties to those which flow from the relationship between a father and a child born during wedlock. The petitioner has submitted a memorandum of law from a Korean attorney in support of his claim. See 8 C.F.R. 3.2. The motion to reopen and reconsider will be granted. Upon reconsideration, we shall with- draw our September 7, 1976, decision, and order the petitions approved. In the past we have relied upon a 1968 memorandum from the Library of COTIErl'PRS to hold that the legal relationship created Joy "recognition" is not equivalent to a "legitimation" under Korean law- Matter of Kim, ,

14 I. & N. Dec. 561 (BIA 1974). Nonetheless, we held until 1974 that

305 Interim Decision #2606

this procedure created a valid adoption under Korean law, and con- sequently classified the relationship as one of father-child under section 101(b)(1)(E). Matter of Chong, 13 I. ez N. Dec. 45 (BIA 1968). We withdrew from this holding in Matter of Chung, Interim Decision 2312 (BIA 1974), when we learned from the Library of Congress of a Korean Supreme Court decision to the contrary_ Since 1974, we have thus held that "recognition" does not create a relationship valid under section 101(b) for the purpose of immigration benefits. In dealing with a relationship created under the laws of a foreign country, we have long analyzed that relationship in terms of the rights and duties it brings into effect under the foreign law. Matter of Kwong , Interim Decision 2387 (BIA 1975); Matter of Searamuzzo, unreported (BIA October 16, 1957). Cf. Matter of Irani, Interim Decision 2468 (BIA 1975); Matter of Kong, Interim Decision 2360 (BIA 1974). If a Korean legal procedure brings into effect rights and duties coextensive with the rights and duties of children born during wedlock under the laws of Korea, then the procedure by which this is accomplished deserves inclusion under the legally descriptive term of art "legitimation." In the cases now before us for reconsideration, the petitioner has submitted a memorandum of law from a Korean attorney. This memorandum details the rights and duties flowing from the relationship created by "recognition" by registration of the child in the Korean Family Registry as the legal child of the father. The memorandum alleges that the rights and duties flowing from the legal relationship created by the act of "recognition" are identical to the rights and duties flowing from the relationship between a father and a child "born . . . during the marriage." We have consulted the Far Eastern Law Division of Library of Congress. In a memorandum dated June 28, 1977 Dr. Sung Yoon Cho, Acting Chief of the Division, has verified that, with the exception of one minor difference which is arguably irrelevant for immigration purposes, the rights and duties flowing from the two relationships are coextensive. The rights and duties flowing from the relationship created by "rec- ognition" directly parallel those resulting from the relationship between the father and a child "born during . . . the marriage" in the following ways: (1) The father in both cases owes an absolute duty of support (Article 974 of the Korean Civil Code of 1960); (2) The father in both cases has an absolute right of custody (Art. 909); (3) The child in both eases has full and equal inheritance rights with respect to property (Arts. 1000, 1008, 1014); (4) The child in both eases has a legal duty to obey his father (Art. 974);

l Appendix "A."

306 Interim Decision #2606

(5) The child in both cases has a right to use the family name (Arts. 781 and 782); (6) A son in both cases can succeed to the role of "II ead of Family" (Art. 984).

The sole difference in the rights flowing from these two relationships revealed in the two documents is that, although both a recognized son and a son born during the marriage may succeed to the title of "Head Of Family," the oldest son born during the marriage takes precedence over the "recognized" son in the assumption of that role (Article 985). This difference is immaterial for two reasons. First, although a daughter born during the marriage may succeed to "Head Of Family," her rights are inferior to the rights of the "recog- nized" son. Thus, if there were no son born during the marriage, the "recognized" son would succeed to the role of 'Head Of Family" ahead of a female sibling born during the marriage. Second, the concept of "Head of Family" is entirely foreign to United States common law, and has no parallel in United States parent-child relations. Thus, if all the remaining rights and duties are identical, it should be deemed irrelevant to the issue of immigration benefits, as hpyoncl the, twin goals of family unity and the prevention of immigration fraud. We conclude that the relationship created by "recognition" through registration in the Korean Family Registry as the legal child of the father is identical in all relevant respects to that between a father and a child born during the marriage under Korean law. Since the rights and duties flowing from each of the relationships are identical, we shall therefore include a "recognized" child within the ambit of a "legiti- mated" child under section 101(b). We therefore recede from our earlier holding in the present case, and hold that the petitioner's three sons have been legitimated" under Korean law. As legitimated children who were under the age of eighteen years at the time of their legitimation, and were at that time in the custody of their father, they are eligible for the issuance of an immigrant visa under section 203(a)(2) of the Act. The petitions will therefore be approved. ORDER: The motion to reconsider is granted. FURTHER ORDER: The petitions are approved. Irving A. Appleman, Member, Dissenting In my opinion this decision is premature_ The ruling is based on a memorandum from the Far Eastern Law Division of the Library of Congress, in response to a communication from this Board. Neither our communication nor the response, was seen by the parties prior to the decision. The memorandum appears to be somewhat at variance with earlier memoranda from the Library of Congress involving the same subject

307 Interim Decision #2606 matter. Relying on an earlier statement, we held in Matter of Chong, 13 I_ & N. Dec.

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